

Documenting the Influence of Noddings's Theory of Care in Moral Education and Philosophy of Education: 2003-2013

By

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Abstract

Educational research has a broad scope of interest; and, since Ancient Greece, it has constantly interacted with other fields such as ethics, social work, and psychology. For centuries, scholars and researchers have struggled to answer the questions: What is moral knowledge? How do we acquire moral knowledge? What does education mean? The need to answer these questions has motivated educational theorists and philosophers to construct new and thought-provoking educational theories. Many educational theorists and philosophers have improved and/or challenged the theories of interest over time, but few have constructed their own theories. Nel Noddings, a well-respected educational philosopher and a moral theorist, has provided comprehensive answers to these questions through the Theory of Care she constructed. The Theory of Care has been influential in different fields of research, and scholars have paid attention to her theory since Noddings has first discussed it in 1984. The influence of Theory of Care (TC) has been documented in certain fields of research; however, its influence in the fields of moral education and philosophy of education, the fields harboring the essential research on this theory, has gone undocumented. The aim of this dissertation was to fill this gap in educational research while providing insights regarding the influence of Noddings's TC and how several authors have used TC in the fields of moral education and philosophy of education from 2003 through 2013. Drawing on the articles published in two journals representative of the fields of interest, an analysis was done about how Noddings's TC has influenced and potentially contributed to the educational problems discussed in these fields of research and its influence through the issues discussed in these journals is described. Because Noddings is one of the most frequently cited authors in the theoretical fields of education, for the sake of manageability, the sample for this project only included the articles, which mainly discussed Noddings's TC and

were published in the Journal of Moral Education and the Journal of Philosophy of Education from 2003 through 2013. There exist two different, yet interactive, phases in the analysis of these articles in addition to being able to read TC using a critical and systematic lens. The analysis of articles for this dissertation revealed that TC has been mostly influential and contributed to the discussion of particular concepts, including school culture, relational thinking in/of moral education and philosophy of education, theories of moral philosophy and education, student's needs, and the practical implications of theoretical knowledge. Noddings's Theory of Care has been discussed in connection with each one of these concepts, sometimes only in one field of interest, sometimes in both fields of interest. These concepts indicated that the influence of TC in the fields of moral education and philosophy of education has been significant and has contributed to educational research by either beginning the conversation or changing the way it is.

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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

Ethics has been an important field of research from Socrates to our present day, and it is interested in describing the reasoning behind the thought process, including the result of this thought process, or in other words, the behavior “of each individual who must decide what to do in concrete situations and how to envision his or her life as whole” (Higgins, 2003, p. 282). As a field of research, it has interacted with diverse areas of study, such as religion, philosophy, social work, feminist studies, education, and psychology. Through these interactions, several bridging terms and concepts that might be of interest to the scholars publishing in different fields of research have been generated. The moral value “care” has been one of these concepts and has become a crucial element of feminist moral thinking, moral education, and philosophy of education.

After the 1980s, one major contribution to the field of ethics and moral education is the inclusion of the moral value care, the representative value of feminine moral thinking. Several scholars (Held, 2006; Jackson, Sealey-Ruiz, & Watson, 2014; Shevalier & McKenzie, 2012; Slote, 2007; Wike, 2011) have thoroughly analyzed care in their studies; however, Carol Gilligan (1982) and Nel Noddings (1984) were the pioneers who conducted detailed research on care ethics and constructed comprehensive frameworks of care. The framework of care ethics represents a significant challenge to the Western cannon¹ and the male way of moral thinking, as it participates in the dialogue with other theories of moral philosophy, and it has been applied to various areas of research from medicine to sociology.

Nel Noddings is an educational theorist, a well-known philosopher, and a feminist scholar who has contributed significantly to ethics and educational research, particularly in moral

1. Western cannon is discussed in more detail in Chapter 2.

education through her Theory of Care. Noddings's theory stands at the intersection of different fields of study, such as ethics, moral psychology, feminist thinking, moral education, and educational philosophy. Well-respected scholars (Bergman, 2007b; Martin-Alcoff & Feder-Kittay, 2007; Tappan, 2006) from the fields of moral education and educational philosophy have, directly or indirectly, acknowledged the influence of her theory in these areas. Yet, no one before her has documented the details of this influence or has thoroughly studied how this influence contributes to the ongoing discussions occurring in the relevant literature. In this dissertation, the aim was to fill this gap and document the influence of Noddings's Theory of Care (henceforth TC) in two relevant fields of education and reflect on this influence through the articles published in two different journals of educational research. My reflection and interpretation of these articles provides a philosophical portrait documenting how this influence has contributed to the discussions in the selected fields of education within a pre-set time frame and how scholars have approached TC in their studies.

Noddings's TC is a theory of ethics and moral education that encourages the formation and implementation of ethical caring relationships to improve students' moral thinking as, according Noddings (1984/2003a/2013), human beings are motivated to act ethically/caringly to be in these relationships. In Noddings's (1984/2003a/2013) view, these ethical caring relationships are built and maintained through human interactions as these interactions nurture the ethical caring relationships. There are principal components of these ethical caring relationships and they are discussed later in this chapter.

Noddings first presented TC in her book, *Caring: A Feminine Approach to Ethics and Education*, when she published it in 1984. Since then, she has published 17 books and 200 articles and has worked in different universities, including Stanford. Her philosophically

different and educationally interesting account/framework of care has not only inspired scholars to analyze her theory in detail, but also has encouraged the practitioners to use it in classrooms and other educational settings. This being the case, it is possible to argue that Noddings's TC has significantly contributed to educational research; even though its major contribution has been to moral education as it has been mainly influential in this field.

Overview of the Chapters

In Chapter 1, I present the concept of moral care and Carol Gilligan's argument regarding the exclusion of the women's voice in moral psychology in Lawrence Kohlberg's scale. I begin this chapter with a discussion outlining Gilligan's research about care and her debate with Kohlberg, because these are significant to Noddings's TC. Then, I explain TC in detail and continue the discussion of Noddings's proposal(s) addressing the problems of the education system and schools of today. I end this chapter after discussing the educational significance and purpose of this study and introduce the criteria selected in the collection and analysis of the articles used in this dissertation.

In Chapter 2, I offer the literature that details the debate surrounding TC and other theories of moral philosophy while discussing its presence in and documenting its contribution to the fields of moral philosophy, moral education, and philosophy of education. The literature on Noddings's TC has been the basis of the research about TC in other areas of interest; therefore, I primarily provide the literature surrounding TC in these areas. Moreover, the research questions guiding this dissertation are primarily of interest to the scholars working in these fields of research. Finally, I end this chapter after documenting the need for this research within the relevant literature.

In Chapter 3, I present several definitions/frameworks of moral education and familiarize the reader with the field of moral education. After familiarizing the reader with this field of research, I introduce the *Journal of Moral Education (JME)*, the journal considered as being representative of the field of moral education. I explain the scope of this journal and detail my reasoning behind the selection of the articles used as data in this dissertation. I analyze the influence of TC on the themes that are discussed in the articles published in *JME* and reflect on this influence and its potential contribution to the discussions covered to moral education by describing how the authors of the selected articles have approached TC in their articles to present their ideas.

In Chapter 4, I introduce several definitions of the philosophy of education and familiarize the reader with Noddings's perspective of philosophy of education, a philosophical perspective of education based on the main tenets of TC. Then I introduce the *Journal of Philosophy of Education (JPE)*, the journal selected as representative of the field of philosophy of education. I explain the scope of this journal and the reasoning behind the selection of the articles used as data in this dissertation. Following this, I analyze the themes in the *JPE* articles as related to Noddings's TC and discuss how the authors of the selected articles have incorporated TC to present their ideas and improve the strength of their arguments.

In Chapter 5, I present my concluding thoughts as I reflect on the themes present in these articles and discuss the findings of this research: how TC has influenced the debates occurring in these fields and has contributed to these fields through the discussion of particular problems of education. I provide more information regarding how this study might be limited only to these fields within the chosen time frame and explain how these findings might alter if different

journals or time frames are selected. In this chapter, I humbly offer several recommendations that might concern the future research on Noddings's TC in educational research.

The Concept of Care and Noddings's TC

In ethics and moral education, the word “care” is more than an ordinary word. Care represents an alternate perspective concerned with giving voice to individuals who do not want to use existing frames of morality as these frames might be unappealing for several reasons. Ideally, this alternate perspective provides the opportunity to these individuals to reflect on and share their personal experiences, because it places the individual and his/her experiences generated as a result of his/her interaction with the social environment to its focus.

Care exists as a concept similar to other concepts (justice, good, and evil) of morality that have been used to construct the long-standing theories of moral philosophy. In the relevant literature, the concept of care has several interpretations, and each one of these interpretations focuses on another aspect of care. For example, in her definition, Noddings (1984/2003a/2013) focused on the relational aspect of care and moral thinking. However, Berenice Fisher and Joan Tronto (1990), focused on the active and healing feature of care. Different from the previous accounts of care, Selma Sevenhuijsen (1998), in her work, framed care as a skill that helps “to ‘see’ and to ‘hear’ needs, and to take responsibility for these needs being met” (p. 83).

In the larger literature, various interpretations of care exist, and different perspectives depend on these interpretations, but here, I primarily focus on Carol Gilligan's and Nel Noddings's interpretations describing this concept. The contributions of these authors (Gilligan, 1982, 1995; Noddings, 1984/2003a/2013, 2002a) have played pivotal roles in establishing a solid theoretical and practical ground for the discussion of care ethics in the academic circles of moral philosophy, moral psychology, and education. In fact, these works are more than 30 years old,

but scholars do not lose their interest in these authors' works as Gilligan and Noddings are still cited for their earlier works. Therefore, I think my selection is justified.

Carol Gilligan is a feminist scholar specializing in moral psychology and social psychology, and earned her doctoral degree at Harvard University. Gilligan (1982) has contributed to the construction of the concept of care in the field of moral psychology through her groundbreaking book *In a Different Voice: Psychological Theory and Women's Development*. In this book, Gilligan (1982) not only discredited the validity of Lawrence Kohlberg's Moral Judgment Scale, but also and presented her research findings, which have been contra to Kohlberg's main assumption about individuals and moral thinking processes.²

Gilligan's research findings have suggested that Kohlberg has excluded the voice of women from his research and scale, in which he claimed to describe the moral development of human beings, but has provided a faulty lens/framework to employ in describing the moral development of the individuals. Gilligan (1982) reported this situation as "In the research from which Kohlberg derives his theory, females simply do not exist" (p. 18), and she identified it to be extremely troubling. According to Gilligan (1982), any moral framework excluding or missing the voice of women is troubling because, roughly speaking, this voice is the voice of half the population of the world. This being the situation, Gilligan (1982), in her research, has claimed that it was both impossible and inaccurate to draw conclusions of universality or construct a valid framework of morality when only the viewpoint of a particular group was considered as relevant. [In his scale, Kohlberg has only used the viewpoints of young boys when

2. Lawrence Kohlberg presented his scale as the result of his PhD research, in which he analyzed the developmental stages of moral thinking of young boys. He then later has modified his scale to include a seventh stage.

he built his scale and determined their objective moral reasoning process as the main reasoning process to be embraced to reach the final and the most advanced stage of moral thinking.]

On Kohlberg's (1958, 1971) original moral judgment scale, six different and cumulative orientations of morality exist, and this scale presented a developmental framework of moral thinking.³ In this scale, moving to the upper stages of morality is only possible by providing the accurate answer to the moral dilemmas⁴ presented in the scale. Kohlberg has categorized these orientations of morality under three main stages: pre-conventional, conventional, and post-conventional. Each stage had two orientations in itself, and the individual could move to the upper orientations and stages only if the individual provided the correct answer and demonstrated that he/she had a certain amount of accumulated moral knowledge. Kohlberg (1958, 1971) has listed these stages (from the early stages to the late/advanced ones) as:

1. Obedience-and-Punishment Orientation: In this stage, the individual makes a decision and carries out that decision based on the possibility of being punished if getting caught. Obedience helps the individual to protect himself/herself from the punishment.

3. Kohlberg has constructed his scale based on Jean Piaget's Cognitive Theory of Knowledge. In his theory, Piaget (1932/1965) has argued that the individual goes through cognitive stages of mental development while constructing their knowledge regarding the world they live. According to Piaget (1932/1965), there are four different and cumulative stages of development, and it is possible to see one individual goes through these stages respectively to acquire necessary knowledge in moral thinking.

4. Moral dilemmas involve moral conflicts in which one struggles to make a decision as a result of the conflicting moral requirements one has. The most well-known dilemma presented in this scale is Heinz's drug dilemma. According to the story representing this moral dilemma, Heinz's wife has cancer, and there is a radiation drug recently produced by a local pharmacist living in town. Heinz has only 200 \$ in his pocket and visits the pharmacist to buy the drug only to find out that he is selling it with a price tag of 2000 \$. Heinz explained his wife's situation and tells the pharmacist he could bring the rest of the money later once his wife is in better condition. However, the pharmacist tells that he has the right to make a profit from the drug as he has worked hard to develop it, and refuses to sell the drug. Heinz leaves the store empty handed and goes back to his house only to find out that his wife may not be able to survive the night without the drug. The question posed to the participants in this scale is "What should Heinz do now? Should he steal the drug and save his wife, or should he refrain from committing the crime and let his wife die?"

2. Instrumental Orientation: In this stage, the individual has a sense of rules that frame the moral behavior, and he/she performs the moral behaviors if performing these behaviors benefit the individual.
3. Good Boy/Nice Girl Orientation: In this stage, the individual's understanding of morality is more advanced compared to earlier stages, yet he/she justifies his/her behavior based on its conformity to the general norms.
4. Law-and-Order Orientation: In this stage, the individual makes a decision and carries out that decision based on the conformity of his/her behavior into the laws of the society. The justification of these behaviors is connected to the laws of the society.
5. Social-Contract Orientation: In this stage, the individual makes a decision and carries out that decision based on the conformity of his/her behavior to the societal contract. The individual refrains from acting on the basis of self-interest and considers the societal peace to be his or her priority.
6. Universal-Ethical-Principal Orientation: In this stage, the individual has a deeper understanding of morality and justice, and performs a moral behavior based on this understanding. When acting, the individual considers not just the moral principles governing his/her society, but also the moral principles of the general world. His/her justification of moral behaviors reflects his/her understanding of the universal principles of ethics.

Kohlberg (1958, 1971) assumed that his scale was universally valid, meaning that everyone was experiencing similar things when they were moving from the lower stages of moral development to the upper and more advanced stages of moral development. In her book, *In a Different Voice*, Gilligan (1982) criticized this foundational assumption of Kohlberg's scale and argued that the scale has been blind to the alternate viewpoints, particularly to the viewpoints

of women, which focus on care and relationships and employ a relational and alternative perspective of moral development represented through their moral reasoning processes and how they answered the moral problems/dilemmas presented in this scale. Therefore, Gilligan (1982) said the scale was unable to accommodate these individuals'—women's—viewpoints and moral reasoning, and it limited their moral development to the Good Boy/Nice Girl Orientation. As presented in the list on the previous page, this stage is located on the conventional stage of Kohlberg's moral theory, and one needs to use the objective moral reasoning process representing the male viewpoint⁵ to move to the upper stages of morality. Noting that this is a serious problem, Gilligan (1982) concluded the scale was biased and the moral framework it represented was troubling, as it failed to be a universal framework.

Gilligan's project of the inclusion of the moral value care, which is mainly present in the women's voices, to moral philosophy and moral psychology has attracted the attention of scholars publishing in different disciplines of study, including feminist studies, practical ethics, critical thinking, moral education, and philosophy of education (Collins, 2004; Kuhse, Singer, & Rickard, 1998; Noddings, 1984/2003a/2013; Thompson, 1998; Tronto, 1995). Nel Noddings is one of these scholars interested in Gilligan's call to include the moral value care in the academic discussions, and she has constructed a whole theory of moral philosophy and moral thinking, the TC. In this regard, TC becomes an important framework to study and through her publications Noddings (1984/2003a/2013, 2002a, 2005, 2007) structures this alternate perspective of moral thinking around the moral value of care and human relationships.

5. The male viewpoint present and promoted in the original scale of Kohlberg focused on the individual rights, consequences of the actions and rules, rather than care, relationships, and acquiring more information regarding the dilemma presented in the scale.

Noddings's TC has promoted a relational approach to be implemented in education and offered an alternate framework of motivation to be moral, which redefined the scope of moral thinking and behaving. Unlike other theories of morality that focus on deliberative justice, rights, and individual actions, with TC, Noddings (1984a/2003a/2013, 2002a, 2016) focused on human needs, care, and the maintenance of ethical caring relationships. Noddings has published and edited several books and articles, and, through these writings, she has explained the possible ways of implementing care in education and contributed to the academic discussion. Her books have been translated into 12 different languages, including Chinese and Turkish, and her theory, TC, has continued to be of interest to scholars and practitioners.

In the first edition (1984), and other subsequent editions (2003a, 2013), of her *Caring: A Feminine Approach to Ethics and Moral Education* book, Noddings claimed she was offering a framework/definition of ethics from the perspective of a woman, of an outsider to the field of ethics. With this framework she was offering, Noddings was interested in meeting and relating to the other, which signals a developmental process of moral thinking and learning, not in the justification, or getting credit, for an individual's one-time action or teaching an appropriate moral behavior to students by dictating rules and codes and using generalizations. In fact, according to Noddings (1989), the current theories of moral philosophy were using the *I* language of the men and bearing the signs of the masculine, male way of thinking.

With her framework/theory, Noddings (1984/2003a/2013) opposed the male way of thinking used in the fields of ethics and moral education and offered an alternate perspective that could be the voice of the women, an underrepresented group of people in this field. As a woman philosopher, Noddings rightfully considered herself to be a natural member of this underrepresented group of people and criticized the present situation in the field of ethics in the

1980s. Noddings (1984) has argued the field of ethics was a field of study highly dominated by the moral theories representing the male thinking and excluding the other voices by discrediting these voices' way of thinking and described the exclusion she sensed as a philosopher defending female way of moral thinking and practicing ethics:

It sounds all very nice, says my male colleague, but can you claim to be doing 'ethics?' After all, ethics is the study of justified action ... Ah, yes. But, after 'after all,' I am a woman, and I was not party [*sic*] to that definition. Shall we say then that I am talking about 'how to meet the other morally?' Is this part of ethics? Is ethics part of this? (p. 95)

In the relevant literature, scholars (Bergman, 2004; Campbell, 2008; Carr, 2005b; Martin-Alcoff & Feder-Kittay, 2007) categorized Noddings's framework of ethics, TC, as a relational, feminine theory of ethics because it promotes the maintenance and the establishment of the ethical caring relationships. Ideally, these ethical relationships are constructed upon emotions, and emotions are mostly associated with the women's culture. In Noddings's (2013) view, the maintenance of ethical caring relationships is necessary to motivate people to act morally because:

We want to be moral in order to remain in the caring relation and to enhance the ideal of ourselves as one-caring. It is this ethical ideal, this realistic picture of ourselves as one-caring, that guides us as we strive to meet the other morally. Everything depends upon the nature and strength of this ideal, for we shall not have absolute principles to guide us. (p. 5)

There are two parties involved in this ethical caring relationship: the one caring (the carer) and the one cared-for. Noddings (1992) described this ethical caring relationship as the relationship in which "A, the carer, cares for another, B, and B recognizes that A cares for B" (p. 91). The roles of A and B may appear static at the first observation, but this is merely a misconception of the early writings of Noddings. In the third edition of her book, *Caring: A Relational Approach to Moral Education*, Noddings (2013) has cleared this misunderstanding by explaining that these roles could be interchangeable, as everyone can be the carer in one

relationship and the cared-for in another relationship. Ethical caring relationships are special kinds of relationships, in which both the carer and cared-for are dependent on each other if they want to maintain these relationships, improve their moral thinking, and become better persons through these relationships. In Noddings's (2013) view, these relationships are the motivational source to be moral as human beings and are first observed to be natural caring relationships. These natural caring relationships may develop into ethical caring relationships if the caring/carers and the cared-for individuals use the memories of being cared-for to construct new caring relationships.

Noddings's example of the natural caring relationship is the relationship present between a mother and an infant "in which we respond (to cared-for) as one-caring out of love or natural inclination" (Noddings, 2013, p. 5). I think Noddings purposefully chose to offer this relationship as a representative of the natural caring relationship and analyze it in several editions of her *Caring* book (1984/2003a/2013) because, although it is very simple in form and could be observed anywhere in this world; it is still very important for becoming a caring person and living ethically. Noddings believes this relationship may motivate one to act ethically and care because "there is no principle, no moral rule that prescribes a mother to love and care for her children" (Noddings, 2013, p. 5). In the same book, confident with the strength of this relationship, Noddings (2013) continued her discussion by stating that "We love not because we are required to love but because our natural relatedness gives natural birth to love. It is this love, this natural caring, that makes the ethical possible" (p. 43).

In Noddings's (1984/2003a/2013) view, the natural caring relationships have the potential to develop into the ethical caring relationships because ethical caring relationships are derived from the natural caring relationships. According to Noddings (2013), these two are

different from each other because the previous one is the source of the latter one as “Natural caring is the cherished condition; ethical caring seeks to restore or replace natural caring” (Preface Section). Establishing a natural caring relationship is the first step taken in the direction of constructing an ethical caring relationship and Noddings’s ethical ideal. This does not mean that the ethical caring relationships are in a more elevated position compared to the natural caring relationships; it simply means that ethical caring relationships are different and more developed versions of natural caring relationships.

A necessary move regarding the definition and the scope of the ethical caring relationships is to distinguish it from the just relationships formed around the notion of equality between the involving parties. First, the ethical caring relationship Noddings had in her mind differs from a just relationship established between two human beings, which is constructed upon the concept of equality in several ways. In most caring relationships a difference of power and a degree of control exist between the parties involved, meaning that one party has a certain degree of power and control over another party (Benporath, 2003). Conversely, in a just relationship, there is no power difference observed between the two parties involved in this relationship.

Second, just relationships operate on the condition that everyone has the same chance to succeed under similar circumstances, and they embrace a philosophical view called “moral objectivity,” which promotes the treatment of identical equity among individuals. [For more information on moral objectivity, see footnote #12 on page 40.] In just relationships, a student gets the attention of the teacher because he or she deserves it, independent of the special conditions that constitute his/her character or status. This means that another student would get the same attention from the teacher under similar circumstances, regardless of any particular condition (any obstacle, or any privileging relationships). Teachers internalizing this perspective

disapprove of providing the same resources to the needy or vulnerable students and do not make decisions based on the principle of favoring the needy and vulnerable⁶ because they consider these special conditions as irrelevant of the distribution of attention, which is defined as a right, and do not provide it to the student unless the student deserves it.

Third, an ethical caring relationship is dependent on the presence and the utilization of certain feelings in the direction of receiving the other (Noddings, 2013). However, the just relationships described above are not dependent on the presence and the utilization of feelings because just relationships are contractual. In a contractual relationship, the observed situation is similar to this: If as party A you do X, as party B, I promise to do Y in return. Contractual relationships are mostly established between a legal entity and an individual who is connected to that legal entity through birth, mandatory sanctions, and inalienable rights (Rawls, 1971).⁷ However, the situation observed in a caring relationship is different because caring relationships are dependent on the circumstantial human feelings; and there is no promise or contract to behave in a certain way. Noddings (2013) has drawn attention to this difference by stating that “What the cared-for gives to the caring relation is not a promise to behave as the one-caring does” (p. 4), but his/her selective attention. In most cases, the cared-for gives his/her attention to the caring relationship; and there is no contract requiring him/her to do this or stating the cared-for is obliged to demonstrate his/her appreciativeness. The intensity of this attention to the caring relationships determines the difference between the stages of caring, caring about, and caring for.

6. For more information about the discussion of vulnerability and care ethic, see Daniel Engster’s (2004) article titled “Care ethics and natural law theory: Toward an institutional political theory of caring” and Michael Kottow’s (2005) article titled “Vulnerability: What kind of principle is it?”

7. For more information on John Rawls and his theory of moral philosophy see the later sections of this dissertation.

In her theory, Noddings (2002a) identified two stages of caring; “caring-about” and “caring-for.” In Noddings’s (2002a) view, caring about describes a stage of caring, in which people learn to care after being cared-for. While being appreciative of this stage, Noddings (2013) stated that caring about is a limited version of caring she imagined because “‘Caring about’ always involves a certain benign neglect. One is attentive just so far. One assents with just so much enthusiasm. One acknowledges. One affirms. One contributes five dollars and goes on to other things” (p. 112).

According to Noddings (1984/2003a/2013), caring-for is the stage in which one truly experiences care and realizes its positive contribution to the holistic and comprehensive development of the individual. Noddings (2002a, 2003a) claimed, in this stage of caring, the scope of caring-for is limited to people living at a close distance; therefore, distance becomes an important limitation in the act of caring. Acknowledging this limitation, Noddings (2013) argued to care for everyone in this world happens to be an unattainable ideal because the capacity to care diminishes when the circles of caring enlarge, and:

Caring requires engrossment, commitment, displacement of motivation. The requirement that an ideal be attainable is attentive to this difference. It counsels that we construct an attainable ideal so that we will plan ahead and focus our efforts on what can in fact [*sic*] be done. (p. 112)

There are different sorts of relationships found among the society, and not all these relationships serve to the ethical caring ideal Noddings imagines or describes. Considering this, it is necessary for one to distinguish the ethical caring relationships from other kinds of relationships. One way to separate these relationships from the others is to look at the important components of the ethical caring relationships discussed in Noddings’s TC.

Essential Components of the Ethical Caring Relationships Promoted in Noddings's TC

Noddings's TC is concerned with improving moral thinking and moral behavior in individuals through caring relationships and quality interactions and guiding them to be morally better and caring persons throughout their lives. In Noddings's (1989, 2003a, 2005, 2010) view, to act morally is equal to care, and to learn to care is a long and developmental process. This long developmental process and any teaching activity constructed upon TC needs to include the four major components of ethical caring relationships. Noddings (1995a, 2013) identified the essential components of the TC as engrossment, sympathy, reciprocity, and motivational displacement.

As explained earlier, not every relationship qualifies to be an ethical caring relationship that leads to the ethical caring ideal Noddings had envisioned. The ethical caring relationship has important components in itself: engrossment, motivational displacement, and reciprocity (Noddings, 1995a, 2013). If a relationship lacks one or more than one of these components, then that relationship may not be considered as an ethical caring relationship. Ideally, one will become a caring person practicing care after he/she remembers what it is like to be being cared-for. In these relationships, engrossment and motivational displacements are the characteristics of the carer/caring, while reciprocity is recognized as the characteristic of the cared-for.

Engrossment is necessary for the establishment of an ethical caring relationship because "At bottom all caring involves engrossment" (Noddings, 2013, p. 17). Engrossment is a concept referring to how the caring one understands and approaches the needs or demands of the person being cared-for. Engrossment is mainly intrinsic, meaning that the will to become engrossed in a cared-for student should be rooted in the caring teacher without being dependent on the external factors.

In a caring relationship between the teacher and the student, the carer/caring teacher becomes emotionally engrossed to the student (Noddings, 1992). Moreover, the engrossment of the caring teacher is present in the acts of the caring teacher, and, as a result of this state of presence, the student knows that his or her ideas, experiences, and values are of interest to the teacher. Engrossment is associated with an internal force: how the caring party feels about and sympathizes with the cared-for.

Noddings used the word “sympathize” on purpose and refers to sympathy, not to empathy. Sympathy asks for attaching, and relating, but not by being consumed by this attention and participating in this relation. Unlike empathy, which is commonly associated to the father’s language by Noddings (2013), sympathy does not imply or refer to shrinking one’s personality and problems into units of analysis. According to Noddings (2010a), sympathy plays an important role in a caring relation because “caring relation is colored throughout by sympathy—an attitude of solicitude toward the cared-for and a willingness to listen and be moved” (p. 392).

According to Noddings (2010b), there exists a fine line between sympathy and empathy. Ideally, this line reveals itself when the carer/caring decides what to do with the information obtained after understanding the other’s problems and conditions. Noddings (2013) did not recommend analyzing the other’s condition as an information unit, and she argued that solving the problem for the other cared one refers to empathy. In TC, solving the problem for the cared one is not recommended because it limits the moral development of the cared one. What is recommended for the carer is sympathizing with the other: “receive the other into myself, and I see and feel with the other. I become a duality...The seeing and feeling are mine, but only partly and temporarily mine, as on loan to me” (Noddings, 2013, p. 30).

Engrossment is connected to motivational displacement and sympathy. With sympathy in the ethical caring relationship, the caring teacher, the carer/caring motivationally displaces with the cared for, the student. Motivational displacement happens when the caring teacher willingly puts his or her own interests aside and approaches the cared-for's situation to understand it. Through motivational displacement, the caring teacher understands the needs, struggles and reality of the cared-for, the student from his or her standpoint. With this new understanding of the cared-for's reality, an ethical commitment to act emerges. As Noddings (2013) stated in her book, "I feel also [*sic*], that I must act accordingly; that is I am impelled to act as though in my own behalf, but in [*sic*] behalf of the other" (p. 16).

Here, the word "must" represents the commitment of the carer, the caring teacher, to the caring relationship. The caring teacher constantly works to seek involvement and recognition in the cared-for (Noddings, 1992, 1995a, 2003b, 2013, 2015, 2016), and this requires an understanding of the student's feelings and struggles toward the subject matter. The ethical bond, the ethical caring relationship formed between the caring teacher and the cared student, grows stronger and thicker as both parties commit to the relationship through their acts.

Reciprocity is the last component of this ethical ideal and refers to the recognition of the caring one's acts by the cared-for. Reciprocity may be defined as the contribution of the cared-for to the ethical caring relationship, and its presence in the ethical caring relationship is significant for the improvement of the moral well-being of the carer/caring. Unlike engrossment and motivational displacement, reciprocity is the responsibility of the cared-for in an ethical caring relationship (Noddings, 2013). If the cared-for does not reciprocate or recognize the acts of caring and respond to them, then the ethical caring relationship may, and should, be

considered as incomplete. This function of reciprocity in an ethical caring relationship is essential for the maintenance of the ethical caring relationship because:

What the cared-for gives to the relation either in direct response to the one-caring or in personal delight or in happy growth before her eyes is [*sic*] genuine reciprocity. It contributes to the maintenance of the relation and serves to prevent the caring from turning back on the one-caring in the form of anguish and concern for self. (Noddings, 2013, p. 74)

Several ways of reciprocation and completing an ethical caring relationship have been possible, as the ethical caring relationship occurs in multiple forms. Noddings's TC encourages this variety because it aims at the completion of an ethical caring relationship and it acknowledges there is no one standard form for the completion of this process. One word of caution is necessary here, as one might get confused. Noddings (2013) treated the completion of the ethical caring relationship as a process necessary to the realization of the ethical caring ideal, and she prefers the existence of this process over getting moral credit for acting in a certain way. This is an unlikely feature to be embraced for a theory of moral philosophy; in fact, this is what distinguishes her theory from other theories of morality, including Utilitarianism and Kantian ethics. Noddings (1984) explained the reasoning behind her preference of continuation over product, people over principle, process over justification:

As one-caring, I am not seeking justification for my action; I am not standing alone before some tribunal. What I seek is completion in the other-the sense of being cared-for and, I hope, the renewed commitment of the cared-for to turn about and act as one-caring in the circles and chains within which he is defined. Thus, I am not justified but [*sic*]somehow fulfilled and completed in my own life and in the lives of those I have thus influenced. (p. 95)

In TC, the ethical caring relationships are required to construct the ethical ideal of care, and they aim to guide individuals to become better themselves and morally caring people (Noddings, 1984/2003a/2013). In the second edition of her *Caring* book, Noddings (2003a) has stated: "It is that condition toward which we long and strive [*sic*], and it is our longing for

caring-to be in that special relation -that provides the motivation for us to be moral” (p. 5). By nature, anything that helps to build and maintain this ethical caring relationship is nurturing and desired, but both parties involved in these relations need to recognize that they are in a relationship.

Ethical caring relationships are nurtured through the construction of natural caring relationships. Natural caring relationships are so fundamental to the survival of human beings, in fact, that Noddings (1984/2003a/2013) claimed that without having someone care for them, no individual would be able to pass through infancy and live. Unlike ethical caring, this natural caring is spontaneous, and it “arises out of of [*sic*] love or natural inclination” (Noddings, 2003a, p. 5). Noddings (2010a) challenged the dependence of moral thinking to moral principles found in ethics and differentiates thinking through natural caring from the principled thinking by stating “Natural caring ...[and] it is exercised with no need for reference to moral principles or direct reasoning from such principles” (p. 350). Natural caring is spontaneous, and may be found in any corner of this world where two human beings live. Her insistence on natural caring and its spontaneity might be considered as another sign of Noddings’s defiance of the domination of the principled thinking in moral philosophy and moral education.

Another reason for Noddings’s defiance of rules is that, in most cases, according to Noddings (1984/2003a/2013), rules come with the statements defining the exceptional conditions which tone down the practical implication of the moral rule. Moreover, Noddings (2003a) argues the moral rule offered in the theories of moral philosophy is static, and in most cases, its practical implementation is nearly impossible to the moral issues found in real lives. Moving from this limitation, Noddings (1984/2003a/2013) defended that the ethical caring relationships are in a more advantageous position compared to the static moral rules because she claimed these

relationships change quite often and assist individuals to adapt to the new situations. Not only do these relationships change, but the context nurturing them also changes and makes everything almost non-identical to each other. According to Noddings (2002a), these nurturing, caring relationships are the power source of the ethical ideal of care, and since life in educational settings is dynamic with the flexibility feature they have, they become more sufficient and better guides for teachers to improve the moral thinking of students compared to the teaching of moral behaviors through abstract rules and dictating school policies.

The ethical act of caring needs to go beyond the verbal statements and emotions of the caring individual, and the ethical act of caring needs to be present in the actions of the one caring because caring relationships are responsive. Noddings has stated this vital need for the representation and the responsive character of the ethical act of caring in the foreword section of Beck's (1994) book, "To care is to respond" (pp. ix-x). Through stressing the responsive character of the ethical caring relationships, Noddings drew a hypothetical line between merely thinking about ethics (theoretical knowledge of morality) and acting ethically (practical knowledge of morality). In Noddings's (2003a) view, this line begins to blur, if the one-caring is not present in his/her actions and is not responding to the cared-for in a meaningful way because "Caring is largely reactive and responsive" (p. 19). If the one-caring is not present in his/her actions, then the caring relationship might not reach to its full potential.

Noddings's TC encourages the holistic and comprehensive education of the child and bridging the gap between the home sphere and the public/school sphere. Her proposal of holistic and relational education puts Noddings in stark contrast to the practices and policies supporting traditional education and conventional methods of teaching. Noddings (1995a) explained that the rationale stands behind the teaching of care and educating the individual for the better: "We

should want more from our educational efforts than adequate academic achievement and ... we will not achieve even that meager success unless our children believe that they themselves [*sic*] are cared for and learn to care for others” (p. 675).

Noddings’s TC and A Care-Based Approach in Education

Noddings’s view of education naturally encompasses a moral flavor in it, but it does not limit itself to moral education as it suggests certain improvements to general education. In fact, Noddings (2005, 2007, 2013) has opposed the educating of the individual if the definition of this education refers to the concentration on only one piece of education, moral or academic. Her opposition called for the bridging of these pieces of education and constructs the bedrock of her proposal for the whole education of the student.

Noddings’s proposal for educating the student through educative caring practices requires the practicing of a different understanding while teaching; it requires one to restructure his/her teaching pedagogy focusing on care and to promote holistic education of the child rather than the teaching of fragmented knowledge to the child. The teacher embracing this teaching through caring pedagogy knows that “the primary aim of moral education is to produce people who will engage successfully in caring relations” (Noddings, 2010a, p. 394). In fact, this teaching through caring pedagogy underlines the implication of certain elements of care-based teaching and aims to create a caring, educative, and morally improving classroom.

The Elements of Noddings’s Philosophy of Care-Based Teaching

Dialogue is an important element of Noddings’s philosophy of care-based teaching since it is the first step taken to establish relations with students. Noddings (2013) stated that the main purpose of having a dialogue with someone else is “to come into contact with ideas and to understand, to meet the other and to care” (p. 186), and caring teachers know this fact. These

caring teachers carry on constructive and educational dialogues to understand the needs of their students, and they meet these needs when possible.

Several kinds of dialogue exist; however, not every dialogue occurs in the same format or in the format Noddings envisioned. In her writings, Noddings (2003a/2013, 2011, 2015) argued for a special kind of dialogue which enriches any teaching activity constructed upon TC. When, in her writings, Noddings (2006a) discussed the importance of dialogue for the maintenance of the ethical caring relationships and their place in care-based moral education she envisioned an active and educative two-way conversation occurring between the students and the teachers. These conversations may be rooted in the ordinary life issues students and teachers experience, and the participation of both parties to these conversations mirror the multiple perspectives these parties have (Noddings, 2006a).

This educative two-way conversation is different from the Socratic kind of dialogue found in the writings of the ancient Greek philosopher. In a Socratic kind of dialogue, the wise one (the teacher) asks philosophical questions, leading the young (the student) to find the correct answers, and the ignorant one answers these questions from which the wise one will generate new questions. The aim of the Socratic kind of dialogue is to reach the one true knowledge through dialogue, and it usually concentrates on the answers relevant to the subject matter. In contrast to this, Noddings's (2005) vision of "dialogue" is closer to the vision of Paulo Freire (1968/1996), and it functions as a tool to create open-ended conversations, in which neither the teacher nor the student pays significant attention to the delivery and acquisition of the end product, the subject matter. Delivery and acquisition of the subject matter have secondary importance. Confirmation is an important part of teaching care to individuals because it encourages teachers to ask multiple questions regarding the problematic situation. Asking

multiple questions helps the teachers to see beneath the surface of the general situation when a student acts inappropriately. The teacher constructs a caring dialogue with the student and confirms why an act is inappropriate in a certain situation. The inappropriate act in this situation is the act that does not help the student construct a better and morally educated self; and the confirming teaching practices have been structured around the principle that “When we confirm someone, we identify a better self and encourage its development” (Noddings, 1998, p. 192). However, educators need to be careful when they use confirmation in their acts because it can be understood as glossing over the student’s mistakes if teachers do not correct these mistakes within a reasonable time frame. Being aware of this fact, Noddings (1998) has drawn the line between the glossing over of the student’s mistakes and the confirmation by noting that “We do not confirm people in ways we judge them to be wrong” (p. 192).

Modeling is an important part of Noddings’s philosophy of teaching that is based on TC. Caring teachers acknowledge that they model their students, even in their unconscious behaviors, since they know “everything we [they] do... as teachers has [*sic*] moral overtones” (Noddings, 2013, p. 179). The caring teachers show their students how to care and live morally by forming caring relations with them and make moral decisions as a result of these relations. These teachers understand that modeling is a better way of improving a child’s moral thinking and shaping that child’s moral behavior compared with having the child reading the school rules describing what is an acceptable moral behavior and what is not.

As a former high school math teacher, Noddings experienced the problems occurring in a classroom firsthand and observed that the academic survival of the students at school depends largely on their home environments and their carers. I think the validity of Noddings’s observation and the importance of teachers functioning as role models has increased even more

because the number of young children who have only one parent at home to look upon and to take as a role model has risen to 20% (United States Census Bureau, 2016). In fact, according to Veugelers and DeKat (2003), school administrators need to hire caring teachers who can be role models for all the students, particularly for the struggling students, as these students need more role models to look up to.

Noddings was well aware of the fact that learning to care is a long process since there is no way to teach caring in a class period of 45 minutes. Her solution to this problem is practicing care in various environments, making practice the final important element of Noddings's philosophy of care-based teaching. Noddings (1995b/2011) explained the importance of practice in her *Philosophy of Education* when she reported, "If we want to produce people who will care for one another, then it makes sense to give students practice in caring and, more importantly, reflection on that practice" (p. 191).

In TC, Noddings (2002a, 2005, 2006) promoted an education system, in which the learning individual is a whole identity and he/she deserves more than the pieces and bits of knowledge the traditional system believes so. The ideal education structured around the moral value care requires the school, academic face of the public sphere to be connected with the home sphere of the individual. Understanding the importance of this connection, Noddings (2005, 2006a, 2008) argued for the whole education of the child and defended that the ideal education, or in other words, care-based education focuses on the education of the mind (the academic education) and the heart (the moral education) of the child at the same time.

In Noddings's (2002a) understanding, holistic education requires the improvement of the relationship between school and home spheres. She argued that educational settings should represent the caring homes, as children learn many things at home through constructive and

caring conversations conducted at the dinner tables. Teachers may start these conversations and encourage students' participation in these conversations since they would improve the children's critical thinking skills (Noddings, 2006b). Without these conversations happening in classrooms, students may miss the opportunity to improve their critical thinking skills.

Aims and Restructuring of the Educational System Based on Noddings's TC

For Noddings (2015), the purpose of education is “to produce better adults,” who are “competent, caring, loving and lovable people” (p. 8). This being the purpose, Noddings (2015) claimed the schooling system in the United States is in deep trouble because it is focused on testing. Schools functioning to serve this purpose produce students who are excellent test takers, but not great translators of knowledge, as they have problems with translating school knowledge to home or street knowledge (Noddings, 2015). The care-based education system aims to extend the definition of ideal education and resets the priorities of the schools while redefining the aim of the true education (Noddings, 2006; Verducci, 2013).

With her theory of TC, Noddings opposed the traditional ways of teaching and claimed that these ways are not capable of educating the child as a whole to be a better person and to care ethically. According to her, the students need to have enough time to experience care at schools because learning to care ethically is not something that could be learned without practicing it (Noddings, 1989, 2002a, 2003a, 2007). Anything that prevents this from happening should be considered as problematic and needs either to be replaced or complemented with other educational activities constructed upon care.

One of the changes Noddings (2013, 2015) proposed is to redesign the curriculum in the broadest sense possible so that it would fit the unique needs of the students and include them in the learning process. In TC, the importance of diversity and inclusivity in educational settings

and in the educational texts being taught to students is highlighted. The aim in doing this is to prevent the exclusion and marginalization of certain groups of individuals, and, ideally, it increases the chance of the academic survival of the students belonging to the different groups of race, religion, and socioeconomic status. Noddings's statement provided below reveals how Noddings (1999) argued in favor of a differentiated curriculum addressing the needs of all the students:

I think care theory favors a differentiated curriculum because it seems likely that as we work closely with students, we will be moved by their clearly different needs and interests. In any case, our claim to care must be based not on a one-time, virtuous decisions, but rather on continuing evidence that relations are maintained. (p. 13)

The practical implication of Noddings's holistic perspective requires the school curriculum to be restructured, so that it may be compatible with teaching care at schools. This restructuring may mean the abandoning the college-bound curriculums found in schools if they only aim to improve the academic knowledge of the students (Stengel & Tom, 2006). If the educators and curriculum designers are serious about educating the individual for the better whole person, then they need to prepare a school curriculum in which "The scope of the subject matter [must] be very broad" (Noddings, 2013, p. 191). From a wide variety of good options within a broad curriculum designed through TC, students will be able to choose what they want to learn and how they want to learn.

One of the changes this theory proposed is related to the school culture and educational administration, while it provided an alternate definition of education and a different function for the schools. Noddings (2005, 2015) is a strong supporter of the reduction of the number of students in schools by increasing the number of the schools established. By reducing the number of students in schools, Noddings (1988, 2002b, 2013, 2015) envisioned things might eventually change in schools. Teachers would have more time to get to know their students and care for

them. When teachers have time to get to know their students, then they will be able to point out issues (e.g. bullying, low grades, child abuse) to their students more easily and more quickly, and this may make schools safer (Craig & Pepler, 2007; Cunliffe & Eriksen, 2011; Smit & Scherman, 2016).

Ideally, caring teachers working in the smaller schools have the opportunity to build a positive caring environment of teaching. In this environment, caring teachers consider the positive behaviors as part of the classroom culture and norm; hence, they do not reward students for their one-time actions. Their aim is to make sure that students build an internal way of controlling and improving their behaviors, and the mission of these teachers is “to preserve and enhance caring in herself and in those with whom she comes in contact” (Noddings, 2003a, p. 172).

Noddings (2002b) defined education as “a constellation of encounters, both planned and unplanned, that promote growth through the acquisition of knowledge, skills, understanding [*sic*] and appreciation” (p. 283), and these encounters may happen almost anywhere, including streets, community centers, and hospitals. In fact, in her book, *Starting at Home: Caring and Social Policy*, Noddings (2002b) mapped out a large-scale social policy centering around care and the home sphere and discussed how odd places might transform into educative environments. Extending the education based on care to everyone, Noddings (2002b) has devoted an entire chapter to the education of homeless people and has argued that with the collaborating efforts of the schools “Perhaps ... today’s homeless children will not be tomorrow’s homeless parents” (p. 249-250).

Noddings’s TC demands an educational system, which favors human encounters and interactions. According to Noddings (2003c), the caring teacher relates to students, and knows

that teaching a child is more than pouring information into his/her mind. In her article, “Is Teaching a Practice?”, Noddings (2003c) discussed that teaching is a practice of altering human relations to better, and caring educators have the opportunity to “affect the lives of students not just in what we teach them by way of subject matter but in how we [they] relate to them as persons” (p. 250). Relating to children and encouraging them to be better persons requires a different, a caring perspective to be implemented in moral education.

In Noddings’s (2013) view, moral problems found in real-life situations, including educational settings, are not straightforward like math problems.⁸ Math problems represent the written forms of static conditions that do not change based on circumstances or the identity of the student dealing with the problem. Therefore, a student should use pre-established formulas to address these problems. Unfortunately, moral problems found in educational settings are circumstantial, meaning that how one student approaches a moral problem depends on the circumstances and the student’s identity and character. Considering this, caring educators, who are working to improve students’ moral thinking skills and to guide them behave morally, need to know:

What we [they] do depends not upon rules, or at least not wholly on rules -not upon a prior determination of what is fair or equitable- but upon a constellation of conditions that is viewed through both the eyes of the one-caring and the eyes of the cared-for. (Noddings, 2003a, p. 13)

In Nodding’s (1984/2003a/2013) view, to work through this new and different perspective on moral education, people should connect with the individuals affecting and

8. These moral problems are more like wicked problems as they have more than one social factor complicating the problem further and they are not usually solved through mathematical formulations. The term ‘wicked problem’ is introduced to social science by the famous philosopher Charles West Churchman in 1967; however, there are different definitions of it as different scholars have defined it differently by employing their own perspectives. If my reading of Churchman’s definition of wicked problems is accurate, then one of the defining characteristics of these problems is that the solution of the problem changes depending on how one frames it, meaning that it lacks a definite solution present in the math problems.

affected by the problem. People usually establish this connection when they ask questions similar to “what conditions pushed this student to act in this inappropriate way of hurting other students?” and get answers before analyzing the conditions using multiple lenses, including the lenses of the wrongdoer students. Asking these questions and transforming the answers to moral solutions require individuals to think outside the formal, abstract boxes of pre-established moral rules. Noddings (2003a) identified this perspective as a new position to be considered and employed in moral thinking and stated “This position or attitude of caring activates a complex structure of memories, feelings, and capacities...the process of moral decision making that is founded on caring requires a process of concretization rather than one of abstraction.” (p. 8)

Noddings favored neither the application of rules in the educating of students morally nor the globalization of her theory in moral education if this globalization requires standardization. [There are sections in Chapters 3 and 4 of this dissertation in which I discuss how other scholars have approached this issue in the fields of moral education and philosophy of education]. On the contrary, Noddings (2003a, 2005, 2013) was after construction of a framework of ethics and moral education that is compatible with the practical life, and she argued that her framework based on caring is more sustainable compared to other frameworks of moral thinking. Noddings (2003a) explained her problem with the perspective supporting the concept of “generalized knowledge is good” in moral thinking and she described her framework/theory as:

an invitation to see things from an alternative perspective...To begin with, I am denying the sort of generalizability that would be required to make such a judgment. Situations of relatedness are unique, and it is my purpose to build a picture of one-caring from a collection of concrete and unique situations. (p. 32–33)

Noddings’s TC treats the uniqueness of situations and cultural concepts constructed in different societies as the tools that might be used for the construction of a richer perspective in education, specifically in moral education. According to Collins and Ting (2014), Noddings

promoted diversity in education as much as possible because she was aware of the fact that “Diversity... is not about the survival of the fittest [standardized]. Rather, it is the non-survival of the non-fit. There can be many ways of being fit. Diversity... provides creativity and multiple paths of action” (p. 15). There are several ways to promote diversity in moral thinking and education, identifying the theories that do not promote is a common way to do.

One way of promoting this diversity in the construction of moral thinking and in education is to protect the cultural identity of the unique concepts and discuss them side by side with other theories of moral thinking and education. In their article, “The African Ethic of Ubuntu/Botho: Implications for Research on Morality,” Metz and Gaie (2010) volunteer for this task and discussed Ubuntu side by side with other theories of ethics and moral thinking, including Noddings’s TC. [See Chapter 3 for the analysis of their article in connection to Noddings’s TC.]

Shortly after the publication of the book *Caring* in 1984, articles and book chapters reviewing and discussing Noddings’s TC began and continued to appear in the qualified journals of education and moral philosophy (Bergman, 2004; Diller, 1988; Hamington, 2002, 2012, 2015; Li, 2015; Velasquez, West & Graham, 2013). This has signaled that Noddings’s TC is on its path to be an influential theory in the relevant fields of research and is going to contribute to the academic production of knowledge in these fields for a long time. My intention in doing this study was to understand how this theory has been present in the fields of moral education and philosophy of education from 2003 through 2013.

Significance of the Study

Noddings’s TC is a relational and practical theory of ethics and moral thinking; therefore, understandably, it has had a deep impact on moral education and ethics of teaching. It has

offered an alternate, relational perspective to use on moral education, but its influence has extended to other fields of education, such as nursing education, curriculum and instruction, teacher education, and philosophy of education. However, its influence in moral education and philosophy of education and how this theory has contributed to these fields has not been thoroughly analyzed before. Through this study, my work primarily concentrated on offering a convincing argument on the influence of Noddings's TC in the fields of moral education and philosophy of education starting in 2003 through 2013.

The fields of moral education and philosophy of education overlap with each other; thus, certain debates in these fields tend to co-occur. Moreover, it is difficult to draw a hypothetical line separating moral education and from philosophy of education, as most scholars ask questions that might be the focus of both fields of research. Still, in order to document the influence of TC in several debates and for the sake of the clarity of the issues debated, I treated moral education and philosophy of education as two distinct fields of education.

This study is a descriptive analysis documenting the influence of Noddings's TC between the years of 2003 and 2013, including both years. This study contributes to the relevant literature by explaining how Noddings's TC has been both influential in and contributed to these fields within the selected time frame. Through this project, as the researcher, I analyzed how Noddings's TC has contributed to the discussions present in the well-respected journals which are also representative of these fields within a preset time frame. I selected the *Journal of Moral Education* to use in this study because, according to Scimago Journal Ranking, and Journal Metrics, it is a well-respected journal representing the discipline of moral education. Parallel to my selection of the *Journal of Moral Education*, I selected the *Journal of Philosophy of Education* to use in this study for of two reasons. First, it is a well-respected journal representing

the discipline of the philosophy of education. Second, according to Scimago Journal Ranking and Journal Metrics, it is comparable to the *Journal of Moral Education* in quality, but its emphasis is different from the first one.

This study covered the years starting in 2003, the publication date of the second edition of *Caring: A Feminine Approach to Ethics and Moral Education*, through 2013, the publication date of the same book with a different title and an updated preface section. Noddings did not change her theory significantly between the first and second edition of the *Caring* book, but due to the criticisms she received during this time period, she made a number of changes to her theory in the third edition of the *Caring* book. For example, based on feminist criticism Noddings received between the years of 2003 and 2013, she removed it from the title of the third edition of the book.⁹

Research Questions Guiding This Dissertation:

1. Limited to and based on the articles published in the *Journal of Moral Education*, how has Noddings's TC been influential in the field of moral education as the authors appropriated Noddings's TC in this field between the years of 2003 and 2013?
2. Limited to and based on the articles published in the *Journal of Philosophy of Education*, how has Noddings's TC been influential in the field of philosophy of education as the authors appropriated Noddings's TC in this field between the years of 2003 and 2013?

9. In the third and final edition of her *Caring* book, Noddings (2013) acknowledges the validity of these criticisms and states "I think critics are right, however, to point out that the connotations of 'feminine' are off-putting and do not capture what I intended to convey. Relational is a better word" (Preface section).

Methodology: Collection and Analysis of Data

Philosophy of education is a field of research in which philosophers of education study the problems of education using the tools of philosophy.¹⁰ Philosophical research is different from empirical research conducted in the natural sciences because the philosophers of education understand and classify different things as data. They mostly evaluate the quality of the philosophical research by looking at the quality and clarity of the argument produced and conclude whether the argument is strong or weak, not right or wrong (Feinberg, 2008). The data produced in philosophical research are unique, and they are not open to testing using control and test groups or to generalizations as a result of this testing.

As a field of research, philosophy of education is a highly theoretical field of research, and philosophers of education usually employ a type of inquiry, which is mostly reflective by nature (Giarelli & Chambliss, 1984). In fact, well-respected philosophers of education reflect on the educational problems as they witness and offer solutions to these problems. For example, Paulo Freire (1968/1996, 1993, 1994) identified the oppressive education system in his country as a problem; he has provided his own system and theoretical framework after experiencing the oppressive system and reflecting on his experiences.

Establishing a clear and satisfactory argument is the aim of the philosophical research, and one way to produce this clear argument is to analyze concepts in detail and conduct a conceptual research on the issues of interest to philosophers of education. The utilization of conceptual analysis might be dated back to Plato, since he is considered as one of the earliest scholars interested in getting a clear answer to the concepts of a just state, good government, and

10. I provide detailed information on this issue in Chapter 4, in which I reflect on the influence of Noddings's TC in the field of philosophy of education starting in 2003 through 2013.

moral education. The aim of the conceptual analysis is to have a better understanding of a particular issue by breaking down concepts into its main components (Beaney, 2003).

Clarity is the main aim of the scholars publishing in the fields of philosophy and philosophy of education, and one researcher may accomplish this aim by re-describing the situation of the problem or the educational theory in which he or she is interested. In descriptive analysis, the researcher only aims to describe a situation “without directly attempting to change it” (Coe, Waring, Hedges, & Arthur, 2017, p. 10), and it addresses the question of “what is going on in a situation related to X?”. Considering the research questions stated earlier, descriptive analysis befits the nature of this study and serves my purpose of documenting the influence of Noddings’s TC in the selected fields of education between the years of 2003 and 2013. In this theoretical study, there is no control and test groups involved, and the researcher only aims to describe a situation in educational research in relation to a relatively new theory of ethics and moral education.

As the research questions indicate, this is a theoretical study in which I have described the situation by analyzing the articles in the selected journals. By looking at the data, I have described how the selected fields of education have treated Noddings’s TC within the years of 2003 and 2013, the second and the third editions of the *Caring* book. After describing the situation, I have reflected on and interpreted the data—the common themes discussed in the articles—as the influence of Noddings’s TC in the fields of interest. My analysis of the selected articles citing Noddings’s TC was only aimed to provide insights regarding the influence of this theory in these fields and document this influence using the ideas presented in connection to TC.

Providing insights regarding the influence of Noddings’s TC in the field of moral education required a careful reading of the articles published in the *Journal of Moral Education*.

I have selected the articles based on two important criteria. First, they needed to be published between the years of 2003 and 2013. Second, they needed to discuss Noddings's TC as their main theme. Through these criteria, I have conducted a descriptive analysis of the articles and explained how Noddings's TC has been influential in this field by analyzing how scholars have approached and used Noddings's TC in their articles. This descriptive analysis has assisted me to take a picture of the influence of Noddings's TC and its connection to the themes discussed in the field of moral education.

The number of articles citing Noddings's TC published in the *Journal of Moral Education* within this time frame is 20. My primary analysis began by dividing these articles into two main groups. The articles in the first group are the ones that have analyzed and echoed Noddings's TC. The authors of these articles used this theory to discuss new ideas and constructed their solutions to the problems found in the field of moral education. The authors of the second group of articles acknowledged the positive contribution(s) of Noddings's theory to moral education, but they have provided detailed analysis regarding the shortcomings of this theory while discussing new ideas or their solutions to the educational problems related to the field of moral education on which they wanted to elaborate more. Then, depending on the similarity of the educational problems these articles are discussing, I divided these articles into a number of smaller groups, which refer to phase two in this dissertation. In this second phase of my study, I analyzed these articles and inquired whether I could group the ideas which are relevant to Noddings's TC into common themes. Through these themes, I explain how Noddings's TC is influential, in other words, how Noddings's TC has been received in the field of moral education between the years of 2003 and 2013. I anticipated some of these themes to

be discussed in the literature review and in Chapter 4, but that is not a requirement. Similarly, not all the issues discussed in the literature review are present in the themes of Chapter 3.

I analyzed and documented the influence of Noddings's TC in the field of philosophy of education by employing the same criteria for the selection of the articles and analysis tools I used in Chapter 3. In Chapter 4, I shifted my focus to another field of education because of the second research question guiding this dissertation; however, everything else that matters in the design of this research (selection of the articles, phases of analyzing the articles, and the goal of analyzing these articles) has remained the same. Still, the next paragraph describes the analysis process I employed to document the influence and the contribution of Noddings's TC to the discussions ongoing in the field of philosophy of education starting 2003 through 2013.

Sixteen articles were selected for this study that cite Noddings's TC and were published in the *Journal of Philosophy of Education* within this time frame. My primary analysis was begun by dividing these articles into two main groups. The first group of articles refers to the ones that analyze and echo Noddings's TC. The authors of these articles have used this theory to discuss new ideas and construct their own solutions to the problems found in the field of philosophy of education. The authors of the second group of articles have acknowledged the positive contribution(s) of Noddings's theory to problems found in the field of philosophy of education, yet have raised serious challenges to Noddings's TC while discussing new ideas or their solutions to the educational problems of philosophy of education on which they want to elaborate more. Then, depending on the similarity of the educational problems discussed in these articles, I divided these articles into a number of smaller groups. Dividing these articles into a number of smaller groups was the second phase of my study. In this second phase, I analyzed these articles and studied whether they discussed common themes while using

Noddings's TC. Through these themes, I explained how Noddings's TC is influential, in other words, how Noddings's TC has been received in the field of philosophy of education between the years of 2003 and 2013. I anticipated some of these themes would be present in the literature review and in Chapter 3, but that is not a requirement. Similarly, not all the issues discussed in the literature review are present in the themes of Chapter 4.

I have only analyzed a small sample of articles citing Noddings's TC in educational research within the selected time range because Noddings has been one of the most cited scholars in these fields. For example, her book, *Caring: A Relational Approach to Ethics and Moral Education*, has been cited 9,844 times since it was published on September 14, 2013, which is relatively recent.¹¹ I have only used the articles present in the *Journal of Moral Education* and in the *Journal of Philosophy of Education* because they are representative journals publishing in the fields of interest and they are comparable in quality based on the journal ranking lists posted on the websites of Scimago Journal Ranking and Journal Metrics. Both of these journals have been essential journals, and the network of Kansas University Libraries provided access to the articles of interest published within 2003 and 2013.

Conclusion

In this chapter, I detailed the moral concept of care and presented several interpretations of care found in the different fields of research. Carol Gilligan's inclusive argument regarding care and moral psychology was significant for this research since her ideas on the care-based moral reasoning process and her contra arguments regarding Kohlberg have been of interest to Noddings. In addition to Gilligan's research and her ideas on the moral value care, I explained Noddings's theory, TC in detail.

11. According to Google Scholar, the number of getting cited for this book changes daily as it increases each time when one cites this book; however, on the day of September 9, 2017 it is 9844.

The comprehensive discussion of Noddings's TC has produced an important part of this chapter, as its influence in the selected fields of education starting in 2003 through 2013 is the subject of this dissertation project. In here, the interested reader can find the main claims of Noddings's TC and the essential components of this theory. As a further step taken in building an accurate understanding of Noddings's TC, I discussed Noddings's philosophy of care-based teaching and how to implement caring in schools after restructuring the education system we know, including the definition and the function of the schools.

I end this chapter, after having discussed the educational significance and purpose of this study, and introduced the criteria selected in the collection and analysis of the articles used in this dissertation. The literature on Noddings's TC has expanded to several fields of research, as the research conducted using Noddings's TC has spread out; however, I limited my focus to the literature that provided the basis for my research questions. Chapter 2 presents the discussion of this literature, a discussion of the influence of Noddings's TC in moral philosophy, moral education, and philosophy of education, and offers the foundational debates centered around TC and its implications for the relevant theoretical and practical research areas.

CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW

In Chapter 2, the literature focusing on the influence and the contribution of Noddings's TC to the ongoing conversations about moral philosophy, moral education, and philosophy of education is presented. Since Noddings and her theory of TC have been mainly debated in these different areas of research, I primarily concentrated on them while writing this literature review. In this chapter, I connected my research to the literature and located it within this literature while documenting the need for this study.

With the publication of *Caring: A Feminine Approach to Ethics and Moral Education* in 1984, Noddings offered the world a care-based perspective of moral philosophy. In this work, she provided a detailed account of the definition, the scope, and the characteristics of her perspective, a way of living ethically using the moral value of care as the basis. Since then, it has been difficult for scholars publishing in philosophy and education, particularly in the fields of moral philosophy, moral education, and the philosophy of education to be indifferent to Noddings's ideas and her theory of TC.

The research conducted on care has been vast, and it has interacted with other areas of research (Bergman, 2004; Diller, 1988; Friedman, 2008; Hamington, 2002, 2012, 2015; Li, 2015; Velasquez, West & Graham, 2013). Therefore, for the sake of manageability of this project, the focus in this chapter is on the three distinct and main areas of research relevant to the research questions of this dissertation: moral philosophy, moral education, and the philosophy of education. In this chapter, especially in the section detailing the influence of Noddings's TC as a problem in moral philosophy, I have constructed the literature by describing and analyzing its relationship to other theories of ethics for two main reasons. First, I agree with the statement that "Care ethics is motivated in large part by belief in the inadequacy of mainstream moral

theorizing” (Friedman, 2008, p. 544). Second, I think the debate among the proponents of the major ethical theories has partially influenced the debate in the fields of moral education and philosophy of education. The authors publishing in moral education and philosophy of education frequently refer to the major theories of ethics, including TC when they want to strengthen their position in academic discussions. Therefore, TC’s connection to these theories of moral philosophy has significant importance in familiarizing the reader with the context in which Noddings’s TC is debated.

Noddings’s TC and Its Influence in Moral Philosophy

Since 1984, Noddings’s TC has contributed significantly to the field of moral philosophy, and scholars working in this field have studied the theoretical structure and the practical implications of this TC. According to Daniel Engster (2007), one important topic of discussion has occurred between Noddings’s TC and the traditional understanding of the objective ethics¹² of justice. In fact, theoretically speaking, TC is in stark contrast to the ethics of justice because of its characteristics and the philosophical tenets Noddings (1984/2003a/2013) promoted.

Unlike Noddings’s TC, the framework represented by the ethics of justice relies on universally valid principles. These principles are formulated in a deductive manner as rule statements describe what to do in concrete, real-life situations (Herman, 1993; Kant & Ellington,

12. Objective ethics is the general framework used to refer to the concept of moral objectivity and the ethical theories embracing this concept. In moral objectivism, the definition of what is morally correct or wrong does not change based on what one thinks or the conditions. The philosophers supporting this view and using the framework of objective ethics in their studies tend to believe in the idea that moral truths are similar to scientific facts they are universally accepted as true and there are principles from which one can derive these facts. Therefore, the objective theories of morality are usually constructed around one major moral principle supporting the idea that impartial morality is an aim that might be attained, and these theories operate on in compliance with this principle. Objectivist theories of morality are present in the literature of moral philosophy and their practical implications might be found in the literature of moral education: Duty Based Theories (or Deontological Theories) as generally represented by Kantian moral theory and Consequentialist Theories (or Teleological Theories) as generally represented by Utilitarianism.

1785/1993; O'Dowd, 2012; Singer, 2005). As discussed in Chapter 1, Noddings's TC was presented as an argument in defense of a situational and sentimental understanding of ethics which discredits the objective, universal, principled, and impartial understanding of ethics. Therefore, Noddings's defiance of the objective/universal/impartial understanding and framework of ethics has caused TC to be an important contributor to the ongoing debate between moral rationalism and moral sentimentalism (Bergman, 2005; Wike, 2011).

Philosophers developing principled theories of ethics have long associated philosophy and rationality with each other (Kant & Ellington, 1785/1993; Korsgaard, 1996; O'Dowd, 2012). These philosophers have defended the idea that any satisfactory theory of moral philosophy needs to be constructed on a rational principle, not on moral sentiments. Unlike sentiments (experiences, feelings, and personal tastes) these principles tend to provide the fertile ground to build solid arguments. Hence, rational theories of morality are also known as the principled theories of morality and they are primarily founded on a major principle, which focused on the theoretical ground and practical implication of this principle.

Noddings's TC is a theory of ethics promoting the human experience of caring over pre-set moral rules; therefore, it has become a natural member of the debate between moral rationalism and moral sentimentalism. This is a very large debate and to fully report this debate requires more space devoted beyond a literature review chapter; thus, I have provided only the most representative and detailed arguments generated in this debate as they become relevant to Noddings's TC. To provide a good picture of the influence of Noddings's TC in the field of moral philosophy, I have included how Noddings and her supporters have participated in this debate and responded to these claims.

The universal understanding of ethics is the common characteristics of the rational ethical theories, which justify the moral action based on a major principle. For the developers and supporters of the preferred ethical theory, this first or major principle is sufficient to address all the moral concerns (Kant & Ellington, 1785/1993; Mill, 1864/1998). Supporters of care ethics, including Noddings, have argued that these theories of ethics represent the justice ethics based on male thinking (Clement, 1996; Gilligan, 1982; Noddings, 2013); and these theories of ethics rely on extremely abstract principles when they motivate the individual(s) to perform the desired moral action(s). Being uncomfortable with the capability of these rules in motivating the individuals to moral living and decision-making, Noddings (2013) stated:

What we do depends not upon rules, or at least not wholly on rules—not upon a prior determination of what is fair or equitable—but upon a constellation of conditions that is viewed through both the eyes of the one-caring and the eyes of the cared-for. (p. 13)

According to Noddings (1984/2003a/2013), there is another problem with these theories of ethics: they voice a Western cannon, which dismisses or mutes the woman's language. In fact, in the care literature, "Justice ethics' denotes canonical Western ethical theories based on universal rules or principles" (O'Dowd, 2012, p. 407). Care-favoring critics of justice ethics prefer context, particularity, and the uniqueness of situations over principle, abstraction, and universal rules when they argue how one tackles moral dilemmas in real-life. Kantian moral theory and utilitarianism rely on the principled thinking and belong to the Western canon of rational man because they use the rational thinking process associated with male thinking and voiced through father's language criticized by Gilligan (1982, 1995) and Noddings (1984/2003a/2013, 2002a).

Scholars promoting justice ethics over care ethics have constructed several lines of arguments describing the need for a principled way of thinking and a rational

understanding/framework in moral philosophy while defending this understanding/framework against Noddings's TC. In this chapter, I have first provided the representative line of arguments constructed by philosophers promoting Kantian ethics, and then the arguments constructed by the utilitarian philosophers. Philosophers defending the virtue ethics have been involved in this debate, but, since they have been more sympathetic to Noddings's TC compared to the utilitarianism and Kantian ethics, the discussion that involves them is placed after the debate between the proponents of TC and the proponents of justice ethics.

As part of the debate between Noddings's TC and the Western canon of justice ethics, Kantian philosophers have debated whether or not all principled thinking, which is harshly criticized by Noddings (1984/2003a) in the first and second editions of her *Caring* book, is a sign of abstract thinking. They have also debated whether TC could be converted to Kantian thinking or vice versa. Utilitarian scholars, on the other hand, have analyzed the possibility of TC being a legitimate theory of ethics, even though it opposes to the objective/impartial and global understanding of morality. As was discussed in Chapter 1, with TC, Noddings (1984/2003a/2013) reversed the main claims of these two principled theories of ethics and, eventually, located herself as an opponent to both of these theories.

TC is a relational and emotional theory of moral philosophy. Through this theory, Noddings (1984/2003a/2013) claimed emotions are not inferior to reason in guidance to moral thinking and behavior, and this is a serious challenge to Kantian ethics, in which reason is considered superior to emotions in guidance to good moral thinking and moral behavior. According to Noddings (2013), utilitarian thinking is at best "presumptuous to suppose that we can determine the greatest good for large numbers of people with whom we have no direct contact" (p. 154). The principled theories of moral philosophy, theories promoting the reliance

of an impartial and objective framework of justice ethics in moral philosophy, tend to operate with objective principles of morality, which guide individuals to moral actions.

Noddings's TC, and an ethics system constructed upon this theory, challenge the Kantian ethical thinking in several ways. In Kant's theory of ethics, an action is morally right if it conforms to the universal rational law, and this universal law is named as the Categorical Imperative.¹³ In fact, Lawrence Blum (1982) claims that "Kant's moral philosophy is perhaps the most explicit, most powerful, and most influential example of a philosophy which founds morality on reason" (p. 288). As a moral rationalist, Kant provided a very straightforward definition of moral behavior, while arguing that emotions were distractions encountered in the path to moral thinking and living (Kant & Ellington, 1785/1993).

Immanuel Kant¹⁴ has constructed his theory to be principle-based in the sense that the moral principle, Categorical Imperative, determines what individuals must or must not do in every situation possible, and this moral principle is the product of pure reason (Kant & Ellington, 1785/1993). In fact, according to Blum (1982), "For Kant being moral is being really or 'purely' rational" (p. 288). A moral human being is a naturally rational man who applies this principle to

13. Kant's moral theory is constructed around the Categorical Imperative, and he bases this imperative on reason (Beauchamp, 2008; Kant, 1785/1993; Rachels, 2003; Strike and Soltis, 2004). Categorical Imperative is also a test statement, a rule which is stated as "Act only according to that maxim whereby you can, at the same time will, that it should become a universal law" (Kant & Ellington, 1785/1993, p. 30). In fact, any moral action human beings perform may be originated from this rule, and the moral actions rational human beings perform are categorized as moral in all around the world regardless of the geographical or cultural context, consequences of these actions, time, emotions or social relationships. Finally, no action can be considered as moral if it is violating the principle of Categorical Imperative or offering an exception to it or is not defined within it (Kant & Ellington, 1785/1993).

14. Immanuel Kant was a German philosopher who lived during the Enlightenment period in the continental Europe and contributed significantly to the development of several branches of philosophy including logic, metaphysics, moral philosophy, and epistemology. He was influenced by several philosophers (Aristotle, John Locke, and David Hume) and his theory of ethics is the representative theory of deontological ethics, or in other words, duty ethics. In his work, *The Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals*, Kant (1785/1993) has argued that the moral principle guiding an individual to the moral action should be derived from reason and he has influenced many philosophers succeeding him.

all of the moral dilemmas he or she experiences and reaches for the correct moral behaviors (Frederick, 1991; Korsgaard, 1996). If the principle instructs one to perform the prescribed action in this moral dilemma, then, for that individual, that action becomes a moral duty to perform. In Kant's *Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals* (1785/1993) book (James Ellington, Trans.), Kant discussed that moral duties are obligations for everyone to perform and they may only be originated from reason.

Kant (1785/1993) has argued that the moral principle guiding people to the appropriate moral actions is absolute and universal, meaning that this principle does not change depending on the conditions, characters, and emotions. In mathematics, it is self-evident that two plus two equals four, and anyone who has a capability of rational thinking knows this. Similar to mathematics, in moral thinking, certain behaviors are moral and certain behaviors are immoral; and this is self-evident, meaning that anyone who has a capability of rational thinking knows this. Therefore, the only thing human beings need to be moral is to hold onto the reason and adhere to the unchanging, and universal principle of morality derived from pure reason.

In Noddings's (1984/2003a/2013) view, this is a problematic approach employed in describing the moral thinking of an individual and the motivating source of moral behaviors. Hence, according to Noddings (1984/2003a/2013), the validity of Kant's argument on moral thinking and the motivating source to behave morally needed to be reconsidered for several reasons. First, reason should not hold an elevated status compared to emotions, as emotions can very well be the motivating force to moral behavior. Second, it is difficult to separate reason from emotions, as if there really is a switch in a person that is designed to turn off the emotions on behalf of reason when that person decides to behave morally. Third, treating morality as only

composed of reason is troubling because it does not reflect the truth about why one carries out certain actions:

Many object to the grimness, to the Puritanical tone, of ethics of duty. Most of us prefer to be the recipients of acts done out of love, care, or inclination rather than duty. Recognizing this, Kantians have shrunk the moral universe. Those things that are done out of love are often considered not to be moral matters at all. (Noddings, 2002a, p. 143)

Another problem with relying on the guidance of the rules as tightly as Kant (1787/2007) does is that it has resulted in the equation of moral problems to math problems in Kantian moral theory. In real, practical life, morality refers to a complex set of behaviors and Kant's straightforward definition of moral behavior, as he has argued, may not be compatible with real, practical life. In Noddings's (1984/2003a/2013) view, this is an impractical approach taken to morality because moral problems are not abstract math problems that can be solved using the pre-established rules and formulas (a priori¹⁵ statements) as Kant offered. Pre-established moral rules and formulas, such as the Categorical Imperative, push one to the reign of abstraction, and that is an unwanted destination to reach because in there one can find "but the lonely wilderness of abstraction" (Noddings, 2013, p. 98).

Kant's followers have been right to argue that human beings depend on reason to decide whether something is right or wrong (Anderson, 1999; Bittner, 1989; Dudley & Engelhard, 2014; Korsgaard, 1996; O'Neill, 2013, 2016); however, with TC, Noddings (1984/2003a/2013, 2002a) claimed that they have overrated the role of reason in moral decision-making. Moral rules' origination from reason may explain why some behaviors are accepted by the society as moral

15. A priori statements are philosophical terms first originated in Latin, but later popularized by Immanuel Kant. A priori statements are statements of knowledge, which are considered as true by the concept they are discussed, they do not need to be justified through experiencing, testing and experimenting; however, their validity might be understood through thinking and reasoning. For example, the a priori statement of "lying is immoral" is essentially a true statement, and the accuracy of this statement is universal. One can acquire this knowledge represented by an a priori statement simply by relying on reason, without testing it. Kant has argued that moral knowledge is a form of knowledge best represented through synthetic a priori statements; therefore, reason may solely provide the necessary common ground to form this knowledge (1787/2007).

behaviors and why some behaviors are not accepted. However, they have been inadequate for seeing why certain behaviors may not be explained by rational thinking yet should be categorized as moral behaviors. For them, this is against the grain of the function of the major principle found in a moral theory, which is built upon reason and rational thinking. Being observant of this inadequacy, Noddings (2013) opposed the belief that rational rules provide the required satisfactory motivation guide for moral actions in real life and claimed her care ethics framework would be a better guide, which relied “upon a constellation of conditions that is viewed through both the eyes of the one-caring and the eyes of the cared-for” (p. 13).

With TC, Noddings has reversed the argument that Kant and his supporters made discussing reason provided a better, more reliable ground compared with emotions in the path to moral thinking and behavior. First, Kant (1785/1993, 1787/2007) argued that sympathy was an emotion, and, like other emotions, it provided an unstable and unreliable basis for moral decision making not only because it was difficult to prove the relevance of this emotion to the moral dilemma, but also it changed frequently. Second, in Kant’s (Kant & Ellington, 1785/1993) view, the capacity for sympathy was distributed unequally around the population; hence, sympathy was not universalizable and should be considered as irrelevant to moral thinking and moral behavior. Disagreeing with Kant on these arguments, Noddings (1984/2003a/2013, 2005, 2007) defended that emotions like joy and sympathy might guide us to moral behavior.

Through the theory she developed, Noddings claimed that emotions, especially joy, might be an inspirational, motivating guide to ethical living and moral decision making. In Noddings’s (1984/2003a/2013, 2002a, 2003b) view, emotions, for example, joy, might assist people to build ethical caring relationships; therefore, it can play an important role in the realization of a better and caring moral world. In fact, Noddings (2013) believed that joy was different from other

emotions; therefore, its inclusion in moral thinking and the realization of the ethical ideal in living was necessary. In her book, Noddings (2013) stated that joy “accompanies our recognition of relatedness and reflects our basic reality. Its occurrence and recurrence maintain us in caring and, thus, contribute to the enhancement of the ethical ideal” (p. 147).

In her article titled “Canonicity and Critique: A Feminist Defence of a Post-Kantian Critique,” Pamela Sue Anderson (1999) argued that Kantian morality should and will be excluded from the Western Canon if scholars reread it with a different lens.¹⁶ She proposed to assess Kantian morality as a whole product of his era, and she offered to read other texts written in that era as part of the project. She claimed that feminist critiques of Kant, including Noddings, fail to do this, as they tend to be stuck with the traditional reading of Kant. The traditional reading of Kant suggests that rationality is an active skill usually associated with men, and people employing this skill are the moral ones who may build the kingdom of ends, the moral world. Considering that women are rarely associated with rational thinking in the Western world of that era, scholars have interpreted Kant’s view “of women as passive by nature, as determined more by inclination than reason” (Anderson, 1999, p. 203). Therefore, Anderson (1999) continued scholars have mistakenly interpreted Kant’s argument of reason and morality might be used to discredit the validity of women’s thinking because:

they cannot be capable of scholarship [moral thinking]. Right from the beginning..., there is thought to be something deeply problematic for women (and for some men at least) in Kant’s conception of ‘pure reason’: its supposed independence from, but also its capacity to order, the realm of nature would seem to exclude the experience of women from all rational reconstructions. (Anderson, 1999, p. 203)

In her paper, Anderson (1999) argued that the traditional reading of Kant has been both inaccurate and incomplete; therefore, feminist Kantian scholars need to reconstruct a feminist

16. The word ‘defence’ present in the title of “Canonicity and Critique: A Feminist Defence of a Post-Kantian Critique” article is not a typo, it is the British spelling of the word ‘defense.’

reading of Kant based on the criticisms he received from Noddings and other feminist theorists. As one of these feminist Kantian scholars, Anderson claimed to provide a reading of Kantian morality which includes feelings about the moral thinking with reason and argued that Kant's framework of morality is designed for all human beings with the capacity to think. Throughout the article, Anderson (1999) discussed her belief that the traditional reading of Kantian morality is problematic as it currently offers only one version of it, and the feminist readers of Kantian morality, including Noddings, need to read other texts of Kant to avoid this problematic reading. For example, she invites them to read the conclusion section of the Appendix of Part One in the *Critique of Judgment*, in which Kant states, "Humanity signifies, on the one side, the universal feeling of sympathy, and, on the other, the faculty of being able to communicate universally one's inmost self" (Anderson, 1999, p. 208).

Similar to the point Anderson has made, Alison Jaggar (1991), in her book chapter called *Feminist Ethics: Projects, Problems, Prospects*, attempted to design a feminist account of Kantian moral theory and builds a Kantian world in the eyes of the reader which is based on "respect." Jaggar (1991) claimed that the inferiority of women to men is morally wrong and in none of his texts, is there proof that Kant has argued in defense of this inferiority; hence, scholars should not be advocating for that inferiority using Kant's framework of morality, or, in other words, moral theory. On the contrary, Jaggar (1991) suggested that the notion of respect in Kantian moral theory might be used to oppose all types of subordination, as it defends all kinds of moral experience and behaviors regardless of gender. In Jaggar's (1991) opinion, Kantian moral theory is a humanistic moral theory, which demands "the moral experience of women should be treated as respectfully as the moral experience of men" (p. 97-98). In her argument, Jaggar (1991) stated Noddings's belief of the caring experience of the mother is a moral

experience, and as long as Noddings agrees to include respect in her definition of morality Kantian feminists like Jaggar should be fine with this belief. Confident with her concluding statement, Jaggar (1991) indicated TC was a humanistic theory of ethics, not a feminist one. [Remember that Noddings (2013) has responded to this claim of “care ethics is gender focused” in the third edition of her *Caring* book, and has attempted to remove the gender label her theory possesses.]

Another claim established by the Kantian philosophers contrary to Noddings’s TC is that TC has been similar to Kantian moral theory if we treat principles as simple guidelines to rely on, not a strict set of rules that restrict actions. Noddings (1984/2003a/2013) opposed Kant’s moral theory and other principle-based theories of ethics, as they promote rules over relation, and this is represented in the language they have used. Since Kant’s moral theory argued for objective morality, which is obtained by following abstract moral principles and prefers the reliance on rules over relationships and conditions; Noddings (2003a) treated it as a moral theory free of emotions, a cold theory of morality.

As a response to Noddings’s treatment of Kant’s moral theory, in her book *Bounds of Justice*, Onora O’Neill (2000), tried to distinguish rules from principles based on their meaning and their function. She argued that one problem with Noddings’s reading of Kantian morality lay in the misinterpretation of the rules. Noddings understands the moral rules in Kantian morality as rules that are rigid, universal and regulative, similar to the Honor Codes found in the colleges (DeGeorge, 1990). Disagreeing with Noddings, O’Neill (2000) claimed that this is a problematic reading of the function of the moral rules found in Kantian morality, as these moral rules were only intended to draw some limitations to the actions of the moral agents in the general sense, using an ordinary language. In O’Neill’s (2000) opinion, Noddings’s TC might

very well be a principled theory of ethics if one sums it up as “always act in a way that would enhance the ethical caring relationship.”

Agreeing with O'Neill, Marilea Bramer (2010) advanced O'Neill's argument, and she harshly criticizes Noddings's TC. Bramer (2010) argued that the correct reading of categorical imperative has no problem with having close relations or benefiting people close to us. In fact, according to Bramer (2010), Kantian morality “not only allows but requires that we give particular consideration to family and friends. Thus, such actions are not just morally permissible, they also have moral value” (p. 124). It may be a theory of reason, but it also pays attention to human relations when necessary.

This line of argument, that Kant's moral theory is not a cold theory designed to promote principled people without feelings, has been advanced by several other scholars (Meyers, 1994; Paley, 2002; Wike, 2011; Wood, 2008), and Ornaithe O'Dowd (2012) is one of them. In her work, O'Dowd (2012) pointed out that caring people might very well be principled people even though they do not consider themselves to be principled in the Kantian sense. Their morality is not grounded in a stated abstract principle, but these caring people may have embraced the principle of caring and continued to live morally in this way. In her article, O'Dowd (2012) suggested the debate should not be on preferring one way of ethical thinking over another. On the contrary, according to O'Dowd (2012), the debate should be on promoting “to work for a life in which one's relationships and principles align in a mutually supportive way” (p. 416).

There exists another party in this debate between Noddings's TC and the rational theories of morality, and this party stands on the side of the rational theories even though it runs counter to the Kantian understanding of morality. Utilitarianism¹⁷ is another theory of ethics, which is

17. Utilitarianism is a moral theory developed by Jeremy Bentham (1748-1832) and John Stuart Mill (1806-1873). This moral theory makes the distinction between right and wrong, good and evil, by looking solely at

considered to be a natural member of the Western Canon and the rational theories of morality discussed previously. It supports an objective and global understanding of ethics, and it commands the rational moral agent to perform the moral actions after evaluating the consequences of his or her actions. Since the time it was first originated in the 18th and 19th centuries, scholars have studied it (Biggar, 2015; Dorraj, 1997; Estlund, 2008; Schofield, 2006). In fact, the journal *Utilitas*, which is a high-quality journal publishing in the field of ethics, has limited its focus to publishing articles discussing only this theory.

Noddings's TC calls for a situational and relativist approach to moral living, meaning that TC defends a partial understanding of morality. In TC, an individual's obligation/motivation to act decreases as the circles of care extend (Noddings, 1984/2003a/2013, 2002a); therefore, the distance between the carer and the cared-for becomes an important factor in the discussion of moral duties to others. With TC, Noddings argued that our duties to the people close to us have a larger place in our lives compared to the duties to strangers living in a distant place.

In Peter Singer's (2004) view, this is an inaccurate understanding of moral duties, and the moral individual knows that his/her intention, obligation to care/to aid is not dependent on the distance. Singer is not the only utilitarian philosopher and scholar who debated with Noddings over this issue; however, his claims regarding TC are representative of this line of thinking.

In his book *One World* (2004), Singer has posed the question "Am I obliged to give care to desperately poor strangers?" and he answers "yes." In his book, Singer (2004) argued that TC

the outcomes/consequences of preferring one action over other actions and performing or not performing that action. This being the case, if a moral agent is committed to this kind of thinking, the individual proceeds forward beyond the net of his/her own interest(s); and he/she eventually takes into account the interests of others too. Ideally, this agent has to treat his/her own projects as one among many and frequently needs to give up his/her commitments to be moral. As the critics of this theory successfully pointed out, this is a very strict requirement to fulfill (Scheffler, 1992). To counter the stressing objections (unalienable rights vs. principle, and calculation problem of people) of utilitarianism, scholars have developed different versions of utilitarianism. Act Utilitarianism and Rule Utilitarianism are the most frequently cited ones in the literature of ethics and their range of application is very broad.

answered “no” to this question by preferring the needs of the people close to the caring individual over to the less fortunate people living in the Global South; TC encouraged being immoral. According to Singer (2004), the moral individual should move beyond the interests of his/her close friends and treat the world as a big community. Therefore, Singer (2004) continued TC provided a faulty lens when discussing one’s obligations to other people and feminist philosophers are in default of supporting TC and its reasoning because with TC Noddings “limits our obligation to care for those with whom we can be in some kind of relationship. Hence, she says, ‘we are not obliged to care for starving children in Africa’” (p.158-159).

Singer (2004) challenged the argument Noddings makes regarding the starving children in Africa, and questioned whether an individual has the right to ignore the needs of others simply because they are living on a continent far away. He aimed to redesign the world in our eyes as if the world is a big community, and people, who have the necessary means to aid, have to meet the needs of the ones dependent on these aids if only to survive one more day. In this book (2004), and his other subsequent publications, Singer (2005, 2011) argued that Noddings’s TC was biased in itself, and, with her theory, Noddings tended to choose the needs of people close to the carer compared to the needs of people distant to the carer. If Noddings claimed her theory to be a theory of practical ethics, then it is troublesome for this theory to be ignorant of the practical, real life problems of the people living in Africa, as surviving is one of the problems they experience. [In Chapters 3 and 4, articles discuss whether TC is a legitimate theory since it promotes an impartial morality of this kind.]

As a utilitarian philosopher, in his writings, Singer (2004) promoted the impartial and objective understanding of morality, which is the main tenet of the justice ethics, and criticized the frameworks of ethics like TC if they lacked this main tenet. Singer (2004, 2005, 2011)

characterized morally exemplary people as impartial and objective human beings. He also defended the idea that people who are morally impartial/objective reach better and fairer solutions to moral problems, such as the mass starvation problem in South Africa, by weighing their roles as actors regardless of the personal interests in or distance from the outcome. As a representation of this defense, throughout the book, Singer (2004) posed the question to the reader: “What impartial reasons can there be for favoring one’s compatriots over foreigners?” (p. 167), and unlike Noddings (1984/2003a/2013), his answer is none.

Singer is not alone in his criticism of Noddings’s TC and how TC has been unsatisfactory in solving the real starving problem in South Africa. In her article, “Starving Children in Africa: Who Cares?” Lisa Cassidy (2005) challenged both Noddings’s TC and Singer’s utilitarian argument, and she built a utilitarian account for caring morality. Her core argument was a synthesis of TC and utilitarianism and might be summed as “I should care for Africans with whom I will never have a personal relationship. However, this obligation can be generated without relying on the impartialist understanding of morality” (Cassidy, 2005, p. 84).

In Noddings’s (1984/2003a/2013) opinion, both lines of arguments are problematic as they fail to include certain characteristics of moral thinking in real, practical life. Singer’s argument is problematic because the road to moral living is not as easy as Singer defends, and it is impossible to care for everyone (Noddings, 2013). According to Noddings (2013), giving five dollars to a charity functioning to end the starvation problem in Africa, as Singer defends, might provide relief and comfort to the individual. However, this relief is only temporary, and Noddings is interested in the behaviors that would provide permanent relief to the individual. In fact, she argued that “We are not behaving morally if we turn our backs on the present other in order to give some good to a large number of others. At best, we are behaving expediently”

(Noddings, 2013, p. 154). The only permanent relief an individual would receive is the relief felt after the caring behaviors.

In Noddings's (2003a/2013, 2005) view, Cassidy is also inaccurate because any perspective constructed to synthesize TC and the utilitarianism is flawed. Noddings (2003a/2013, 2005) argued that this perspective purposefully ignores an important fact about the ethical caring relationships; to build caring relationships with everyone around the world and to care for them equally is an impossible goal to reach. On the contrary, each caring relationship, even the one between the mother and the child (the most intense and the purest form of caring relationships) is unique. Any effort to transform this caring relationship to the universal and impartial statements of moral actions might weaken this caring relationship and, hence, is problematic in nature. Noddings (2002a, 2003a/2013; 2005) discredited these efforts of universalizing care, and she noted that the caring relationship needs to be thick and deep if we want this relationship to result in a caring action.

The discussion over the influence of Noddings's TC on moral philosophy and how it is treated in that field would be incomplete without providing a discussion over the debate between TC and Aristotle's Virtue Ethics Theory. In the next few paragraphs of this section, I first describe the virtue ethics theory and then explain how certain scholars connect it to TC.

Virtue ethics is a term used for moral theories that highlight the role of character and virtue in moral philosophy rather than either doing one's duty stated in a moral principle (Kantian ethics) or acting to bring about good consequences (utilitarian thinking). In Aristotle's virtue ethics, the individual performs a virtuous action solely because that action is good or right in itself (Aristotle, Thomson, & Tredennick, 2004). The virtuous moral action is the

representation of virtues and, like the desire and the need of caring, virtues, and vices are found in human beings naturally (Carr, 2005b).

In Aristotle's theory, virtue is the only influence that can guide people to ethical actions (Hardie, 1980; Price, 2011). According to Aristotle, only virtues and vices exist in human character, and human beings should develop their virtues by repeating virtuous actions and excelling in their virtuous, moral character (Whiting, 1988). A virtuous action is a good action by nature, and these virtuous actions will lead a person to have a good life, filled with *eudaimonia*.¹⁸

Aristotle¹⁹ developed his moral theory without stating a major, foundational principle to rely on, and throughout this theory, he argued that there needed to be a balance between excess and deficiency in human virtues. In Aristotle's (Aristotle, Thomson, & Tredennick, 2004) opinion, different kinds of virtues, such as justice, courage, and generosity exist in human beings, and human beings demonstrate these virtues in their actions. Moral virtues can be listed as generosity, justice, and temperance, and intellectual virtues can be listed as contemplative wisdom, understanding, and practical wisdom (Curren, 1999). To live a life filled with *eudaimonia*, one needs to practice and excel in them both.

18. *Eudaimonia* is translated into English from Greek as happiness, but Aristotle's understanding of happiness is different from Bentham's and Mill's concepts of happiness (Bentham, 1789/2010; Mill, 1864/1998). Mill considered individual happiness as something that could be traded on the exchange of the societal happiness (Mill, 1864/1998). Improving the societal happiness is the goal of a utilitarian society, and Aristotle would not defend this goal. On the contrary, Aristotle treated happiness as an individual goal for a virtuous person to achieve. According to Curren (1999), "virtue is not simply an instrumental good, related to happiness only unreliably through external sanctions, but an internal good of the psyche, without which no one can have any prospect of happiness" (p. 76-77).

19. Aristotle was an ancient Greek philosopher whose works were acknowledged both in the Western and Eastern philosophy. He became the student of another great philosopher, Plato at a very young age; and his contributions are significant to modern philosophy and he tutored Alexander the Great. *Nicomachean Ethics*, his cornerstone work in ethics, is composed of 10 books in which Aristotle poses important questions regarding ethics, good living, and moral knowledge.

Aristotle defined the moral virtue as a particular state of a human being, and it is concerned with feelings and actions. However, the moral virtue is not a temporary feeling; it is something permanent. Virtue is part of a character that leads its owners to have a good life filled with eudaimonia if it is developed accordingly (Lickona, 1991). When someone has a virtue in his/her personality, he or she does not refrain from acting on that virtue and feeling a predictable way in certain situations.

According to Aristotle (Aristotle, Thomson, & Tredennick, 2004), people act virtuously in different degrees if they have virtue in their character. The virtue ethics theory is a theory of action, meaning that people need to internalize virtues and perform virtuous acts habitually in order to become virtuous. Excelling in and mastering a particular virtue, for instance, practical wisdom, requires learning and internalizing it through practice and getting more experience in the face of events (Whiting, 1988). Through practice, an individual develops practical wisdom, an intellectual virtue necessary for a life filled with eudaimonia.

Unlike previously discussed theories of ethics, Aristotle did not rely on moral laws and principles when he was first establishing his theory (Aristotle, Thomson, & Tredennick, 2004). As the reader of this dissertation remembers, TC has this feature too. Since the two theories, TC and virtue ethics theory, share this common feature; the debate between them has occurred differently compared to the debate between TC and the principled theories of ethics.

One representative argument commonly found in the debate surrounding Noddings's TC and the virtue ethics theory is that TC has the potential to be converted to a feminine version/variant of the virtue ethics theory. In Raja Halwani's (2003) opinion, Noddings's TC is an underdeveloped theory of moral philosophy, and some of the objections raised by the scholars promoting the language of justice ethics are valid. To counter these objections, Halwani (2003)

claimed that “care ethics should be subsumed under virtue ethics by construing care as an important virtue” (p. 161) and in her paper, she has thoroughly investigated the possibility of subsuming care ethics under virtue ethics framework.²⁰

As a virtue ethicist, Halwani (2003) argued that, for TC, one possible way of countering these objections is to incorporate within the virtue ethics theory. In fact, for Halwani (2003), if care is defined as a relational virtue,²¹ then it can still rely on the feminine language and avoid being tested with the consequences of an individual’s actions as Michael Slote (1998) has suggested. If care scholars agree to treat care as a relational virtue in the Aristotelian sense, then they have two important advantages. First, they will be able to protect the tempting characteristics (moral partiality, relational care thinking, and woman’s voice) of the moral core. Second, the status of care ethics, especially debate on the status of TC as a legitimate theory of ethics, will no longer be a further issue to discuss within the circles of academia since it will have merged with another well-grounded theory of ethics that has been present in the history of ethics for a very long time.

Certain scholars (Mann, 2012; McLaren, 2001; Slote, 2007) have positively responded to Halwani’s call and have offered different versions of care-virtue ethics theory. In fact, before Halwani, Michael Slote (1988) examined this probability, and he has argued that the status of moral value care will be elevated if it is understood as a version of “agent-based” virtue ethics (p. 173). In Slote’s (1988) opinion, the moral virtue of care, shaping Noddings’s TC, has the

20. Michale Slote has worked on this possibility, the possibility of converting TC to a feminine version of the virtue ethics theory prior to Halwani, but in her article, Halwani has developed this idea in the fullest version possible.

21. Halwani adopts a perspective that synthesizes virtue with relational thinking. Her definition of relational virtue pays attention to motives and ends, not to consequences: “[virtue is] a deep and enduring acquired excellence of a person, involving a characteristic motivation to produce a certain desired end and reliable success in bringing about that end” (Halwani, 2003, p. 70).

capacity to undertake this role only if it becomes gender neutral and focuses more on the actions and the consequences of these actions. As a result of this change in TC, the motivation to be moral will transfer from the relation to individual virtues and actions.

Margaret McLaren (2001) disagreed with Slote over how to change the structure of Noddings's TC. Unlike Slote (1998), McLaren (2001) argued for the preservation of caring as a relational and feminine virtue. Moreover, McLaren claimed that the union between TC and virtue ethics is easy because they both voice their concerns regarding the ethical and political concerns in a similar way. Finally, according to McLaren (2001), since both of these theories keep their distance from the principled moral theories, it might be claimed that they promote the same partial and contextual understanding of morality.

Similarities exist between virtue ethics and caring ethics; however, for Noddings (2003a), they are still different because ethical caring is a relational concept, not an individual character trait understood and encouraged in the Aristotelian framework of morality. In the second reprint of *Caring: A Feminine Approach to Ethics and Moral Education*, Noddings (2003a) has highlighted this difference by stating that "The virtue described by the ethical ideal of one-caring is built up in relation" (p. 80). According to Noddings (2002a, 2003a, 2005), any deviation from treating care as ethically basic and essentially relational might result in a combined concept of virtue and care; however, this concept would not reflect Noddings's concept of the ethical caring ideal.

In Noddings's (2002a, 2013) view, considering ethics as an individualistic thing is a problematic approach employed in morality because it isolates people from their real-life conditions and social relationships, which cause the actions they perform. The theory of virtue ethics evaluates moral thinking using a moral perspective and focuses on the individual's virtue-

based actions. However, this viewpoint is not promoted in Noddings's TC because it evaluates the actions by focusing on the relationships two parties have with each other. Even though the moral value care has shared certain characteristics with virtue, care itself is more than an individual virtue because as Noddings stated (2013):

The genuine ethical commitment to maintain oneself as caring gives rise to the development and exercise of virtues, but these must be assessed in the context of caring situations.... We must not reify virtues and turn our caring toward them. If we do this, our ethic turns inward and is even less useful than an ethic of principles, which at least remains indirectly in contact with the acts we are assessing. The fulfillment of virtue is both in me and in the other. (p. 96-97)

Noddings's framework of relational feminist ethics and her desire to maintain the relationships at almost any cost has concerned certain feminist philosophers. These feminist scholars (Card, 1990; Davion, 1993) have opposed Noddings's understanding of relationships, and they have criticized TC's significant reliance on relationships. In her work, Diemut Bubeck (1995) voiced this concern and stated that the definition provided in Noddings's TC "lies at the heart of women's exploitation as carers" (Bubeck, 1995, p. 176). According to these feminist philosophers, Noddings, while constructing her definition, focused primarily on the well-being and the care of others, cared-for instead of the well-being and the care of the carers, and this is a serious limitation to be fixed.

Scholars criticizing Noddings's TC use of this line of argument stated that there are relationships which are abusive and exploitative; therefore, they are harmful to human development (Hoagland, 1990; Keller, 1997). These scholars claimed that if Noddings wants to ground her theory of ethics on the relationships, then she needs to provide a better definition of the caring relationships which would help people distinguish caring relationships from the abusive and exploitative relationships commonly found between abusive husbands and weak wives (Bartky, 1990; Houston, 1985). Considering the situation observed between the abusive

husband and his caring wife, TC is immoral and promotes a dangerous framework of morality (a slave morality) because it defends the preservation of all the relationships whenever possible. Moreover, they (Card, 1990; Hoagland, 1990) continued if Noddings claimed that TC represents the voice of the women in ethics and advocates for the women's rights and well-being, then she needs to provide a better definition of caring relationships and discuss when a carer is allowed to withdraw from the relationship.

According to these feminist philosophers (Card, 1990; Hoagland, 1990), drawing a framework of morality only based on women's relationships and their caring experiences is an inaccurate approach. If Noddings wants to advocate for women's rights, advocate for the women's well-being, and improve the women's position in their society. These feminist philosophers (Card, 1990; Hoagland, 1990) have also argued that Noddings's TC was incapable of representing the woman's voice, particularly if it continued to remind to the advocates of the public sphere that men and women use different processes of moral thinking and behavior.

Another group of scholars criticizing Noddings's TC and her willingness to base her theory on these relations have asserted that relations may be the complementary source of motivating human beings to moral behaviors (Leffers, 1993; Rachels, 1999, 2003). For them, relationships are only secondary sources of being moral and improving moral knowledge; therefore, Noddings is overestimating the power of these relationships (Rachels, 1999). These feminist scholars argued for Noddings to combine her theory with other theories of morality, and examples of their arguments have been provided in the previous sections of this dissertation.

In response to the first group of critics, Noddings has clarified her statement about caring relations and the characteristics of these relationships. In the third and the most updated edition of her *Caring* book, Noddings (2013) stressed that, even though the moral development of an

individual is closely associated with his or her involvement in the caring relationship, this individual should withdraw from the relationship if it is limiting the carer's potential to grow. In most abusive relationships, for both parties, the potential to grow ethically is unlikely when "the demands of the cared-for become too great or if they are delivered ungraciously" (Noddings, 2013, p. 48). When a caring individual finds her/himself in this kind of relationship, for the one caring, the moral thing to do is to "withdraw her caring" (Noddings, 2013, p. 48) and leave the relationship.

Noddings's response to the second group of critics might be combined with her response to the other groups of critics who argued that her theory concentrating on the importance of relationships is not a sufficient guide to moral living and improving moral knowledge. In the third edition of her *Caring* book, Noddings repeated that she is only offering a fresh perspective to moral education and moral thinking and is not aiming to build a theory providing justification(s) for an individual's actions (Noddings, 2013). In Noddings's (1984/2003a/2013, 2002a) view, any ethical theory needs to have a practical usage in real life, and TC is all about real life experiences and practical moral thinking.

Another major objection raised against Noddings's theory is that TC is either culturally color blind or naïve because she is silent on the cultural practices of oppression experienced by several groups of women, including lesbian, Black and Latina women. According to the scholars (Cannon, 1995; Collins, 2002; Hooks, 1981; Thompson, 2003) voicing this concern regarding TC, the ethical ideals promoted in Noddings's TC may be the ideals of White women, but they may not be the ideals of Black women or Lesbian feminists. Therefore, Noddings's TC cannot be a theory for all the women around the world. [In Chapter 3 of this dissertation, there is a

section about how Noddings's TC has been present in the articles discussing culturally relevant teaching.]

In response to this group of scholars, Noddings herself has disapproved of any effort that will limit the scope of TC to one group of people or one gender. On the contrary, Noddings (2002a, 2013) has extended her concept of caring to anyone who is interested in building ethical caring relationships, regardless of their gender, or ethnicity. With TC, Noddings (2002b, 2005) treated the diverse points of experience as richness, and she did not limit the potential of this theory to echo the voice of only one group of people.

Since the first edition of Noddings's *Caring* book (1984), several scholars have studied Noddings's TC and their works have been discussed throughout this dissertation. In my opinion, there are two problems with studying Noddings's TC and documenting its influence in the field of moral philosophy. One problem is that they (Anderson, 1999; Bramer, 2010; Cassidy, 2005; McLaren, 2001) concentrate on developing this theory further by connecting it to other theories of moral philosophy as provided in the exemplary arguments. By connecting TC to other theories of moral philosophy or subsuming TC to these other theories, and they miss a crucial point: TC is an independent theory of moral philosophy, not a form or version of the other moral theories.

Another issue with documenting the influence of TC in moral philosophy is that the authors (O'Dowd, 2012; O'Neill, 2000; Singer, 2004) analyzing TC and constructing the arguments surrounding TC evaluate its position, status, and validity in moral philosophy based on this one feature. This proves to be a problematic way of analyzing a theory of ethics as TC is not limited to the one feature studied. This dissertation contributes to moral philosophy by analyzing TC as a whole theory of ethics and moral education and providing a comprehensive

understanding of the influence of Noddings's TC in two related fields of education; moral education, and philosophy of education.

Noddings's TC has posed a serious challenge to the principled theories of morality with the relational framework of morality and the care-based language composed of the alternative tenets she provided. In fact, the tradition of studying TC has extended and contributed to other fields of inquiry, including moral education and philosophy of education. In the next section of this chapter, how Noddings's TC has been perceived in the fields of moral education and philosophy of education and how it has contributed to the ongoing arguments present in these fields is discussed.

Noddings's TC and its Influence in Educational Research: The Case of Moral Education and Philosophy of Education

Moral philosophy has been an important field of research since the time of Aristotle, and it has interacted with other academic disciplines, including political science, medicine, justice, feminist thinking, law, and education. Originally, the word "moral" is from Latin (moris), and it represents the rules, the code governing people's lives. The term "moral education" refers to two things: efforts to shape moral development and the academic discipline concerned with research into the moral development (Noddings, 2013). The discussions occurring in this academic discipline are usually parallel with the discussions occurring in the disciplines of ethics, moral psychology, developmental psychology, and philosophy of education. The term moral education is an umbrella term that includes values education and character education.

Values education focuses on helping children identify and cultivate the values the education system and the surrounding society prefer (Powney et al, 1995). Activities that promote the maintenance of this value cultivation process can occur anywhere; thus, the scope of values education is not limited to schools. International efforts have been made to construct

value education programs that appeal to children, and as a result of these efforts, several foundations (Human Values Foundation, Human Values in Action Foundation, The Living Values Education) were established around the world.

The Human Values Foundation (henceforth HVF) was founded in 1994. According to the information posted on its website, this foundation provides materials to individuals who are interested in value education, and these materials include lesson plans, stories, and group activities (HVF, 2017). Even though this foundation was the first of its kind, other foundations and institutions, such as the Human Values in Action Foundation and the Living Values Education were established after the HVF and promoted the acquisition of the similar educational goals of the HVF.

Most value education programs highlight teachers' roles in cultivating the appropriate values in young children. Several countries, such as Singapore (Thomas, 1992), Thailand (Kriengsak, 2006), and Australia (Lovat, 2006) have benefited from the advantage of teaching values education to their teacher candidates and included values education courses in their teacher education programs. Different versions of value education programs exist, such as value clarification programs, value cultivation programs, and religious teaching programs.

In the moral education programs embracing the values clarification approach, it is argued that students should be directed to the desired values' learning process. In these programs, the goal is to help the youngster develop authenticity in the moral decision-making processes and the commitment to a set of personal moral values. Ideally, these programs concentrate on the individual's own process of developing values and moral codes to live by; therefore, they value diverse values. Finally, these programs avoid indoctrination because they promote the

individual's personal value development and learning process rather than teaching a set of structured, rigid list of values (McClellan, 1999).

Esther Schaeffer (2003) defined character education as “educating for understanding, caring about, and acting on such core universal values as respect, responsibility, honesty, and caring” (p. 37). In her work, Schaeffer (2003) identified the main goal of character education as assisting students in learning to make decisions based on a set of values they have internalized. Ideally, the moral programs embracing this philosophy, assist students to develop their own skills to define, understand, and appropriately deal with emotions in problematic situations. Character educators also claim that these programs may help students to demonstrate a genuine interest and concern for others while they are producing decisions that are responsible and well thought (Lickona, 1996; McLaughlin & Halstead, 1999).

Character education is rooted in the thought of the Ancient Greeks, Plato and Aristotle, and throughout history, and indeed to this day, many schools have used moral education programs embracing this theory (Carr, 2005b; Lickona, 1997; McIntyre, 2007; Prior, 1991). Character educators have assumed that one is usually born with a rough form of character trait, and teacher instruction, along with extensive practice, are needed to develop this character trait (Bergman, 2007a; Ryan & Bohlin, 1999). Ideally, the character education is a long process in which students are taught to appreciate a character trait by using various methods of teaching (Arthur, 2008; Campbell, 2008; Fenstermacher, Osguthorpe, & Sanger, 2009; Hunt & McCurry-Mullins, 2005; Lickona, 1991, 2004). In her book, Noddings (2003a) argued this way of teaching morality and improving one's character might be appealing to Aristotle, because the lessons found in these programs “were organized by ‘traits of character’: obedience, honesty,

unselfishness, consecration to duty, industry, courage, justice, patriotism, and many others” (Noddings, 2003a, p. 12).

Character education programs are designed to improve the character and alter the behavior of the students in small steps (Bulach, 2002; Williams, 2000). Most industrial societies approach the profession of teaching as a moral activity that is mostly carried out in schools. In fact, these societies consider that teachers have the opportunity to shape the characters of their students and, hence, recognize that teachers are in the business of character education (Bergem, 1993; Carr & Landon, 1998; Revel & Arthur, 2007). Being aware of this fact, most societies encourage teachers to use at least one of the character education programs if using multiple sets of character education programs is unlikely. Both for-profit and not-for profit organizations design multiple sets of character education programs, and politicians (Bush, 2002) support the application of these programs in the schools of the United States. For teachers, the problem is to decide which program to use as there are multiple choices in these programs and there are multiple pedagogies, trends, and philosophical perspectives of teaching in moral education.

Several definitions of moral education exist,²² and these definitions are constructed upon the various frameworks and perspectives of moral education—by reference to the diverse perspectives of aims and methodological thinking in moral education (Carr, 2005b). The field of moral education is a transitive field; therefore, it is natural for different frameworks employed in this field to originate first in another field of research. For example, Kohlberg’s (1971) framework of moral education was first originated in the field of moral psychology, but then it was transferred to the field of moral education. The differences between the frameworks of

22. Other definitions of moral education are provided in Chapter 3.

moral education are the result of the differences in the perspectives of the scholars working in relevant fields of interest.

With the moral cognitive model, Kohlberg (1958, 1971) has constructed one of the most frequently cited frameworks of moral education. In this model and the framework based on this model, Kohlberg (1958, 1971) embraced a cognitive approach employed in moral education, and Howard (2005) described his model as the cognitive trend in the literature of moral education. According to Kohlberg (1971), moral education is “the attempt to promote the development of children’s and adolescents’ moral cognitive structures (moral reasoning stages) in school settings” (p. 53). In the 1970s and 1980s, Kohlberg’s definition of moral education and his Moral Judgment Scale representing this framework were frequently cited in the field, but Kohlberg had his critics then (Gilligan, 1982, 1995; Noddings, 1984/2003a/2013).

Noddings’s TC has been a competing trend in moral education, which is often discussed as a rival to Kohlberg’s definition of moral education and framework of morality. With TC, Noddings (1984/2003a/2013, 2002b, 2005, 2007) challenged Kohlberg’s approach to moral education and argued for a developmental and relational framework of moral thinking and practical definition of ethics that might reflect the women’s voice. I present here the main arguments and the heated debates formed around the TC to locate this research in this field of education after providing Noddings’s definition of moral education. According to Noddings (2003a), moral education is:

a community-wide enterprise... not a task exclusively reserved served for home, church, or school. ... It refers to education which is moral in the sense that those planning and conducting education will strive to meet all those involved morally; and it refers to an education that will enhance the ethical ideal of those being educated so that they will continue to meet others morally. (p. 171)

Noddings's definition of moral education includes two important components. First, moral education is an inquiry, and the success of this inquiry is dependent on the other members of the community. Second, this inquiry, this framework of education, is relational as it functions through the interactions of individuals; therefore, the success of this inquiry is dependent on the quality of caring relationships individuals construct and, ideally, through these relationships, the caring teachers guide students to the moral life that is sustainable and based on caring (Noddings, 1989, 1995c, 2002a, 2003a/2013, 2003b).

The debate between the scholars (Arthur, 2008; Hunt & McCurry-Mullins, 2005; Lickona, 1991, 2004) publishing on behalf of character education and Noddings is a continuing debate between these two parties, and it might provide an important insight regarding TC's influence in the field of moral education. Noddings is not a fan of character education programs, and she differentiates her work,²³ TC, from character education or any moral education perspective based on Aristotle's virtue ethics theory. In fact, she criticized character education as an unsatisfactory and passive model of teaching moral education (Noddings, 2002a, 2003a) and identified two main issues with character education. The first issue is that it is very difficult for a large community to agree upon a list of virtues to be taught, and even if the community agrees to the teaching of these values, it may be uncomfortable for certain members of the community. The second issue is that teachers try to assess the influence of these stories and the effect of their teaching by looking at the behavioral changes of the students.

23. Noddings differentiates her work, TC from character education by noting several important points. First, moral educators embracing care TC "are far more concerned to concentrate on establishing conditions [through modeling, dialogue, practice, and confirmation] that will call forth the best in students, that will make being good both possible and desirable" (Noddings, 2002a, p. 2). Second, the moral education curriculum constructed upon TC is not a defined long list of abstract virtues, on the contrary, it is situational and relevant to life. Third, any moral education based on Noddings's TC uses personal narratives to teach care; however, character educators use inspirational stories of heroes representing the chosen virtue in their teaching (Noddings, 2002a).

In her book, *Educating Moral People: A Caring Alternative to Character Education*, Noddings (2002a) reported the issues provided in the paragraph above and identified character education as a passive and problematic framework employed in moral education. Noddings (2002a) continued her argument by highlighting that TC is a more active, hence a better, framework of teaching and education and stated that educators need to implement TC in their classrooms rather than sticking to the passive character education. Reading stories might be an educative and effective approach employed in moral education, but limiting moral education to simply reading stories and not supporting this method with other things, such as an honest and caring dialogue, is troublesome (Noddings, 2002a).

Character educators generated two major contra arguments to defend the status of character education against TC in moral education. The first argument concentrated on the fact that there are multiple methods of teaching in character education, and, when examined carefully, Noddings is purposefully choosing the simplest version of character education programs (Davis, 2003). In James Arthur's (2003) view, by sticking to the simplest teaching method employed in character education and criticizing the whole framework of education, Noddings is trying "to enter a minefield of conflicting definition and ideology" (Arthur, 2003, p. 1) with a defective armor.

In a more advanced form of this argument, character education scholars (Campbell, 2008; Carr, 2005b; Hunt & McCurry-Mullins, 2005; Steutel & Spiecker, 2004) reminded Noddings that practice is an important component of character education and it has an active aspect. According to them, no wise teacher would expect students to internalize virtues without practice (Lickona, 2003; McIntyre, 2007; Steutel & Spiecker, 2004). Therefore, they (Arthur, 2003,

2008; Carr, 2005b; Kristjansson, 2005) concluded that Noddings is mistaken when she claimed that character education is passive and troublesome for moral education.

Another line of defense originated by character education scholars is that Noddings's understanding of community and how this community shapes our moral understanding and moral behavior is unsatisfactory. Character education scholars argued that community has a significant effect on shaping one's moral behaviors; therefore, they paid particular attention to the improvement of the moral culture in a school community by making visible the desired virtues of that community (Berkowitz & Bier, 2005; Sergiovanni, 2005). Noddings (1996, 2002a) agreed with the importance of community in moral education; however, she warned the practitioners by stating that some members of the community might be uncomfortable with the values chosen and taught in the school. In fact, according to Noddings, the decision process of the values taught should be open to everyone; otherwise the obligatory teaching of these values may pave the way to the indoctrination of the students (Noddings, 2002a).

In several articles, character education scholars touched upon this issue and defended this model of education by defending the need to build morally united school communities after agreeing to the definition of morality and moral behavior (Algeria & Sink, 2002; Hunter, 2000). For them, Noddings's (1996) observation of the role of community in moral education was inaccurate and outdated, and by relying on this observation, she was focused on the so-called dark side of the community. They questioned Noddings on how to teach moral knowledge to students by relying only on the possibility of creating good social relationships between the teacher and the students. Therefore, they concluded that, compared to TC, character education is a better model of teaching to be employed in moral education (Carr, 2007; Kristjansson, 2012; Lickona, 2004). For example, in his article, David Carr (2007) argued that Noddings's heavy

reliance on these relationships demonstrates it to be a theory of moral psychology, which pays particular attention to the attachment qualities of human beings, not moral philosophy.

Another major contribution of Noddings's TC might be discussed under the inclusion of women's thinking to moral thinking, ethics, and education. The inclusion of the women's experience and voice to moral thinking, ethics, and education is well beyond Noddings and her theory, as there are other scholars whose works have been important and should be noted.²⁴ However, TC provides a strong argument in defense of the woman's thinking in moral education; therefore, the debate on the status of women's thinking in moral education should include Noddings's TC. Considering this, a discussion of women's thinking and its connection to TC should be provided if one wants to report the contribution and influence of TC in moral education and philosophy of education.

Women's inclusion in moral education includes the debate centered around relational thinking, which is mostly associated with women, and the philosophy of education. As a theory of education and moral thinking underlining the connection between forming caring relationships and moral living, TC promotes relational thinking in education, and certain scholars (Arnot & Dillabough, 1999; Diller, 1998; Thayer-Bacon, 1993, 1997, 2003) have focused on this point. One representative argument discussing TC's connection to women's inclusion in moral education and philosophy of education and how TC contribute to the advancement of these fields is the argument of Madeleine Arnot and Jo Anne Dillabough (1999).

24. Other feminist educators (Beauvoir, 1949; Greene, 1978, 1993; Martin, 1985, 1987, 2002, 2011; Nussbaum, 2000, 2004, 2005; Wollstonecraft, 1787/1972, 1793/2017) prior to Noddings have argued that women thinking needs to be part of the academic discussion in moral education and philosophy of education. They have significantly contributed to the feminist educational thought. For example, in her book *The Schoolhome: Rethinking Schools for Changing Families* which is published in 1992, Jane Roland Martin has claimed that the inclusion of the three 'Cs' (care, concern and connection) is necessary for a better education; for an education which is humanist and feminist at the same time.

In their article, Arnot and Dillabough (1999) defended that Noddings's TC may be used best to bridge the gap between these two voices, two ways of knowing, or male and female to be precise. In fact, Arnot & Dillabough (1999) reported in their study that when teachers use TC in their classrooms and connect theoretical knowledge to practical knowledge, "students are empowered" (Arnot & Dillabough, 1999, p. 172) to construct their own frameworks of education and moral knowledge. Moreover, Arnot and Dillabough (1999) claimed that any educational program constructed upon the relational practices promoted in TC has a moral purpose, because it discredits the implication of fragmented knowledge in the classroom. Noddings (1997) claimed, and Arnot and Dillabough (1999) agreed with Noddings on her claim that this fragmented knowledge is undesired in the classrooms as the society needs its children to be taught a more humanistic and integrated curriculum.

In his dissertation, Roger C. Bergman (2005) analyzed several important paths taken in moral education as a field of research to develop a critical theoretical perspective on the education of the moral self. He described Noddings's TC as a perspective, a trend in moral education focused on the education of the self, which offers a contemporary analysis using the language of women, the language of the other, and contributing to the field through this perspective. Bergman (2005) identified Noddings's TC as the "innovative language of engrossment and motivational displacement" found in moral education, and this identification implied Noddings was a "key contributor to the theory of the moral self and its education" (p. 176).

In his dissertation, Bergman (2005) referred to Noddings's opposition to the individual selves defined in the Western canon of ethics. Moral theorists (e.g., Immanuel Kant, and John Stuart Mill) contributing to the Western canon of justice ethics defined self as the individual

moral agents; however, with TC, Noddings challenged the notion of the individual self and argued on behalf of the relational self. She employed an entirely different lens in defining and educating the self, and this lens is the care-based educational pedagogy which treats human beings as relational selves, not individual selves (Noddings, 1984/2003a/2013, 1995a, 2002a, 2005). Certain scholars, such as Barbara Thayer-Bacon (1993, 1997, 2003),²⁵ publishing in the field of moral education and philosophy of education have been very sympathetic to Noddings's concept of relational selves, and they have discussed the potential of this relational lens in the improvement of critical thinking and in doing philosophy of education.

The relational feature of TC has its critics, and Robert Nash (2002) is one of these critics. In his book, Nash (2002) criticized Noddings's TC (2003) and its weighty reliance on caring relations. According to Nash (2002), TC's heavy reliance on relational thinking and how TC nominates relationships as the main source to be relied on in moral education is dangerous for this theory. He continued with his discussion by stating that, without relying on a principled foundation, its contribution to the fields of moral education and ethics of teaching is limited at best.

In their article, "An 'Ideal' Home for Care: Nel Noddings, Thomas Hill Green, and an Ontological Support for a Phenomenology of Care," Decoste and Oise (2009) shared the concern of Nash even though they were more sympathetic to Noddings's TC. Due to this sympathy, they offered to improve the status of TC by combining it with another philosophical theory. Their candidate theory was Green's pragmatic work in philosophy. Using Green's work in their article, Decoste and Oise (2009) attempted to provide a principled and theoretical foundation to TC.

25. I interpret Barbara Thayer-Bacon's analysis of Noddings's TC in a later section of this chapter and discuss how she has used TC in her writings.

The fields of moral education and philosophy of education overlap with each other; thus, certain debates in these fields tend to co-occur. Moreover, it is difficult to draw a hypothetical line separating moral education from philosophy of education, as most scholars ask questions that might be the focus of both fields of research. One reason for this situation is that solid and innovative educational theories have both moral and philosophical aims regarding education. I think Noddings's TC is an example of these educational theories, but there are other educational theories that may be categorized as contributing to these two fields of education at the same time.

As stated earlier, the influence of Noddings's TC and its contribution to the ongoing conversations in the field of philosophy of education might be discussed mainly under the research about women's inclusion in educational philosophy and educational theory. In fact, Suzanne Rice (2016) reported that "There is perhaps no clearer example of feminist thought informing scholarship in the philosophy of education broadly than that provided by Nel Noddings's (1984) *Caring: A Feminine Approach to Ethics and Moral Education*" (p. 2). In this last section of Chapter 2, the first issue discussed here is how Noddings's TC is generally understood as women's inclusion in the field. Second, the status of the relational epistemology in the philosophy of education and how its philosophical tenets offered an alternate personal pedagogy of teaching are analyzed. Third, in representative of this personal pedagogy of teaching how Noddings's TC offered a different aim for the ideal education, while offering a new definition of education and teaching is investigated. As the concluding issue in explaining the influence of Noddings's TC in the philosophy of education, Thayer-Bacon's (1993, 1997, 2003) account of critical thinking, which is established upon Noddings's TC is provided.

As a field of inquiry, the philosophy of education might be traced back to the Ancient Greeks since they were the first ones to write and inquire about the nature of education using the

tools of philosophy. As a professional field of research, it is relatively young compared to other fields of educational research. For example, according to Linda Stone (2003) the formal establishment of the Philosophy of Education Society in the United States dates back only to 1941. There are several scholars who have studied in this field, and their definitions of philosophy of education are presented in Chapter 4.

The philosophy of education is a field of research that might be thought as the child of a marriage between philosophy and education, and it has been traditionally male dominated. In her article “Mothers of In(ter)vention,” Mary Leach (1991) analyzed the situation and observed that only 52 essays were written and published by women philosophers of education compared to 664 essays written and published in the leading journal of this field, *Educational Theory*, between the years of 1951 and 1982. In their article, Thayer-Bacon and Turner (2007) claimed that the main reason for this situation is that, even though education has been eager to reflect the women’s perspective, philosophy has been extremely slow to respond to women’s perspective, language, issues and writing. This slow response drew the attention of other feminist philosophers and theorists of education, including Jane Roland-Martin (1995), who summarized the problem as “philosophy of education cannot provide an adequate answer to the question of what constitutes an educated person” (p. 16), particularly when it is time to include women to the definition of an educated person.

With TC, Noddings has been one of the few authors who managed to publish in this journal representative of the field of educational philosophy. In her chapter, Stone (2003) considered Noddings to be one of the post-modernist philosophers of education because Noddings envisioned the path to knowledge to be in multiple forms, including women’s knowledge and used a situational/standpoint way of doing ethical and philosophical inquiry to

obtain knowledge. This path to obtain philosophical knowledge may require the implication of relational thinking; hence, the current debate on relational epistemology in the pedagogy of teaching and critical thinking is relevant to the influence and contribution of Noddings's TC in philosophy of education.

Noddings's TC supports a relational pedagogy of learning and teaching in educational thought and, according to Michael Katz (2007), this relational pedagogy is a personal pedagogy, a choice. However, Katz (2007) continued that the teachers should embrace a professional pedagogy, preferable the pedagogy he offered as he claimed the professional pedagogy, a professional form of caring is needed in the classrooms of today. In his article, Katz (2007) acknowledged the contribution of TC to the field of philosophy of education has been notable; however, he argued that it will be limited if it is not transcended to a professional form of thinking, namely to professional caring.

In his article, Katz (2007) defended the idea that Noddings's TC has been insufficient to describe the *professional caring* framework using the experiences of a teacher within the classroom. Moreover, according to Katz (2007), the personal account of caring TC supports only a limited account of caring, and the teachers serving in the classrooms need something beyond, something better than this personal account of caring. Katz (2007) claimed the teachers need a professional caring framework, a perspective of caring that might be categorized as contractual caring. In contrast to Noddings's TC, this professional framework of caring treats students as learners who need to commit to the learning of the subject matter and excel in the subject through professionally caring teachers. The professional caring teacher cares conditionally, meaning that he or she withdrew his or her caring if the student does not commit to the learning of the subject matter.

Katz (2007) treated the caring pedagogy of teaching promoted in Noddings's TC as a personal thing; therefore, he equated it to a personal choice. One crucial point missing in his argument is that Noddings is explaining things in the way that they should be, not in the way that they are. Moreover, it is hard to find a contract, written or unwritten, in which the teacher has divided his/her attentive caring into percentages and equated these percentages to grade letters for students to obtain. Finally, the caring of a teacher is not an extra reward for a student to receive in exchange for committing to learn a subject because students should already excel in the learning of the subject (Noddings, 2007).

In caring pedagogy, the teacher acts as a guide to the knowledge, not a dispenser of knowledge. This guide concentrates on helping students deliver their own thinking and knowledge (Belenky, Clinchy, Goldberger, & Tarule, 1986; Noddings, 1988, 1989, 1995b, 2013), and addresses the emotional needs of the students as well as their academic needs. This caring teacher has a framework of "connectedness," in which understanding, trust, and seeing the student as a whole identity is important (Noddings, 2003b). In his work, Donald Blumenfeld-Jones (2004) identified the caring teacher described in Noddings's TC as a professional who is "responsible for seeing each other as human beings rather than as representatives of categories (including the social categories of race, social class, ethnicity, gender, and so forth" (Jones, 2004, p. 276).

In his work, Blumenfeld-Jones (2004) argued that the relational pedagogy offered by TC is an important, alternate; yet unknown pedagogy of learning in educational thought and philosophy of education. Blumenfeld-Jones (2004) continued his discussion by stating that even though the relationship formed between the teacher and the student "is not a peer relationship," it still is an important acquisition on behalf of both parties because it is "a relationship of mutual

respect built on the mutuality of not knowing” (p. 276). Therefore, he concluded that we need to think about TC as an alternate perspective focusing on the relationships formed between human beings in the classrooms. I think it is a perspective helping us redefine the frameworks of “pedagogy,” “learning,” “teacher-student relationships,” “the role and identity of the teacher,” and “critical thinking,” and its most significant contribution to the philosophy of education is through these redefinitions. As an alternate perspective in the history of educational thought and philosophy of education, TC is aimed at improving students’ academic learning by improving their social and emotional learning capacities, and it argued that the aim of the education should be to educate students so that they will be happy and caring members of the community.

The influence of Noddings’s TC can also be seen within the debate about “the aim of education,” which is an important debate in the field of educational philosophy. This debate is an interactive and ongoing conversation found in the field of the philosophy of education and is composed of the cumulative reflection of several philosophers of education to the question of “What is/should be the aim of education?” As an important philosopher of education, Noddings (1995b/2011, 2002a, 2003b, 2005, 2015) has not been indifferent to this debate either, and her response has attracted the attention of several scholars.

Noddings’s response (2003b) to the aim and education question is that the aim of education should be to educate the individuals so that they become happy and caring members of the community in which they live. Noddings’s TC’s contribution to this debate has been mostly through TC’s efforts to redefine the aim and the function of education, and this contribution has made up an important part of TC’s influence in the field of philosophy of education. In this debate, the focus of the scholars has been mostly on evaluating the degree of satisfaction of Noddings’s answer to the questions of “What is the aim of education” and “Who is an educated

person?” For instance, Susan Verducci (2013), Hanan Alexander (2013), and Andrew Gibbons (2013) have discussed whether or not it is an attainable aim and who is qualified to be an educated person in compliance with Noddings’s TC and the aim to which it is leading us.

Verducci (2013) is one of these philosophers, and in her article titled “Happiness and Education: Tilting at Windmills,” she investigated whether or not Noddings’s aim of happiness in and through education is an accessible aim. Verducci (2013) acknowledged Noddings has proven to be a visionary educator who understands education has a meaning beyond tests and college applications. However, unlike Noddings (2003b), Verducci (2013) thought educating for happiness in schools is impractical considering the conditions of the schools of today, and Verducci concluded her article by stating that Noddings’s aim of happiness is an ideal, not an aim in itself. According to Verducci (2013), Noddings’s courage and insistence on discussing happiness as an aim is significant in the aims talk of today; however, in the end, Noddings is pointing towards an ideal, and “Ideals are not themselves ends, objectives, or goals; we understand that they cannot be achieved” (Verducci, 2013, p. 499). The ‘aims talk’ is important in the philosophy of education because it is intended to answer one of the essential questions posed in the field of philosophy of education, which is “What is the aim of education and schooling?” Even though Alexander (2013) sided with Verducci in this debate, Gibbons (2013) disagreed with them.

In his article, Gibbons (2013) disagreed with Verducci (2013) and stated that it is not only possible but also necessary to create an educational system aimed at happiness in education. Attempts to hinder this system, such as combining two different levels of education, is problematic and decreases the opportunity of having an open conversation that would improve the critical thinking skills of the students. In Gibbons’s idea (2013), and I think Noddings will

sympathetically also agree, the aim of education is more than educating the individual for a particular career, it is educating the individual to learn and teach care, and be happy in their careers of choice.

Another debate documenting the influence of Noddings's TC in the field of philosophy of education, concentrates on its contribution to critical thinking. Thayer-Bacon (1993, 1997, 2003) is a prolific scholar contributing to this debate, and she stated that through TC, it is possible to extend the scope of critical thinking and who is a critical thinker, a philosopher of education in this regard. In fact, according to Thayer-Bacon (1997), Noddings's TC has the potential to establish a much larger framework of critical thinking, which is a reflective, sensitive, and transformative way of acquiring and constructing philosophical knowledge and critical thinking that is based on women's care-based relational thinking.

In her concept of "constructive thinking," which is a reflective and feminine form of critical thinking, Thayer-Bacon (1993, 1997) argued that there is an important need to redefine objective critical thinking. She based this need on her observation that there are more multiple forms of critical thinking found in the field of philosophy of education and educational thought compared to the 1980s, and more and more women philosophers of education participate in the discussions occurring in these fields using one of these forms of thinking (Thayer-Bacon, 1993). In her article, Thayer-Bacon (1997) claimed Noddings's frame of critical thinking through caring provided a "vital [step] to a nontranscendent [relational] (e)pistemology" (p. 119). According to Thayer-Bacon (1997), this relational epistemology is required in understanding the different forms of critical thinking and thought generating processes present in the philosophy of education.

In her article, Thayer-Bacon (1997) detailed relational epistemology and reported that it is a new form of critical thinking, the feminist constructive thinking dependent on care-based critical thinking, or in other words, care reasoning. Moreover, Thayer-Bacon (1997) argued that her concept/form of critical thinking, care reasoning promoted the concept of active and experiential learning because it “considers being (knowers) as directly connected to knowing, which makes this theory pragmatic in a traditional philosophical sense” (Thayer-Bacon, 1997, p. 243). Due to this direct connection between the knower and the known, Thayer-Bacon (1997) categorized care-based critical thinking and the relational epistemology it employs as a social form of critical thinking which “views knowledge as something that is socially constructed by embedded, embodied people who are in relation with each other” (Thayer-Bacon, 1997, p. 243).

In this kind of feminine constructive critical thinking, caring reasoning is an act of care, and it involves acknowledging the presence of the other while listening the other’s concerns and issues before making a critical decision. With, and as a result of, the caring reasoning, Noddings (1984/2003a/2013, 1995b/2011) and Thayer-Bacon (1993, 1997, 2003) continued, we have an alternative framework of critical thinking while not relying on reason as tightly as the male philosophers of moral thinking and educational philosophy do. According to Thayer-Bacon (1997), the constructive thinker possesses and employs a different lens of critical thinking and practicing educational philosophy. The constructive and relational thinker embraces the fact that:

from other hu,ans [*sic*] we learn to differentiate, and we learn what is correct and incorrect. The concept of what is correct and incorrect, the concept of truth, is necessary for knowledge to exist. Since we learn what is truth from our interactions with others, knowledge can only exist in creatures which are capable of interrelationships that have something of the character of the personal. (Thayer-Bacon, 1997, p. 254)

As the reader of this dissertation realizes, the influence of Noddings's TC in educational research, particularly in the fields of moral education and philosophy of education has been vast as it has contributed several different academic conversations. To document how this influence is perceived in the educational research and how it has contributed different academic conversations is a need that has not been adequately fulfilled yet. This dissertation tackled this problem in the literature of educational research, especially in the literature about the moral education and philosophy of education, by documenting how this theory has been influential in these fields issues from 2003 through 2013.

There have been works (Diller, 1998; Goldstein, 1998; Lake, 2012; McKenzie & Blenkinsop, 2006; Shelby, 2003) analyzing the influence of Noddings's TC and documenting how it has contributed to the more general educational research; however, these works either are outdated or provided shallow analyses by discussing only one feature of this theory. This constitutes a big limitation for other scholars in need of understanding the influence and contribution of this theory to educational research. Considering this, I think this dissertation fills a potentially important gap in the relevant literature by answering how Noddings's TC has been influential in moral education and philosophy of education while pinpointing the conversations it significantly contributed as appropriated by the authors analyzing it in their articles.

Noddings's TC offers a different framework to be used in moral education and in the philosophy of education, and one may find important studies which analyze and document the influence of Noddings's TC and how it contributes to educational research (Beck, 1992; Crigger, 1997; Goldstein, 1998) in more practical fields of education compared to the theoretical fields of moral education and philosophy of education in which one expect to find it is a theoretical framework of education. This is a surprising, yet problematic, result considering that these are

the two fields that harbor the major lines of discussions relevant to TC. The only works attempted to deal with this problematic result are produced by Roger Bergman (2004)²⁶ and Robert Lake (2012).

In his book, *Dear Nel: Opening the Circles of Care (Letters to Nel Noddings)* Lake (2012) attempted to document the influence of Noddings and her work in the field of educational research; however, his work falls short of this task for several reasons. First of all, he limited his discussion of Noddings's influence in the field of educational research to the letters, in which authors personally describe their memoirs and report important discussions with Noddings. Second, Lake divided his book into thematic chapters and employs a thematic lens to make his case as I do. However, his argument regarding the thematic discussion of the influence of TC, needs more detail. Third, the conclusion of this book is somewhat vague as it fails to pinpoint what these themes mean for general educational research. Considering this situation, I constructed my own solution to this problem and explained the influence of TC in moral education and the philosophy of education by providing the debates of which it became a part, and, finally, reflecting on these debates.

Conclusion

In this chapter, I provided a detailed picture regarding the influence of Noddings's TC in the relevant areas of research: moral philosophy, moral education, and the philosophy of education. In an attempt to locate Noddings's TC in these areas of research, I explained its relation to other theories of moral philosophy and offered several lines of arguments as the proof of how Noddings and TC have attracted the attention of the scholars publishing in these fields. Their attention has come in several ways and has built an interesting debate surrounding the

26. Roger Bergman has written an evaluative article on the influence of Noddings's TC in the field of moral education, and this article is analyzed in Chapter 3 of this dissertation.

theoretical essence and the practical implications of Noddings's TC in these areas of research. As the reader of this chapter will see, there is no comprehensive work analyzing the influence and the potential contribution of Noddings's TC to the ongoing discussions in these fields and with this dissertation I intend to fill this gap.

This chapter ends, after locating the need for this dissertation. In Chapter 3, the discussion continued to interpret the influence of Noddings's TC in moral education by analyzing how scholars publishing in the representative journals of education treat TC.

CHAPTER 3: THE INFLUENCE OF NODDINGS'S TC IN MORAL EDUCATION: 2003-2013

In this chapter, several definitions of moral education and an introduction to the *Journal of Moral Education* (henceforth *JME*), including an explanation of the scope of this journal and the selection of the articles used as data in this dissertation are presented. The main focus in this chapter is an analysis of the authors' ideas, which are the main sources of the themes, present in the published articles of *JME* as related to Noddings's TC and a discussion of how the authors of the selected articles viewed and have used this theory. There are 20 articles that fit the criteria selected in this study, and the results of their analysis under five different themes are discussed. The word "theme" only refers to the group of ideas found in these journal articles.

What is Moral Education?

In his book *Nicomachean Ethics*, Aristotle described moral education as the habitual development process of intellectual and moral virtues, and he drew attention to the regular performance of these virtues in different situations (Aristotle, Thomson, & Tredennick, 2004). In Aristotle's (2004) view, there was no final stage of perfection to be reached in moral education because one needs to practice these virtues and be virtuous throughout one's life. Hence, according to Aristotle (2004), moral education is a lifelong process largely dependent on the practice of the good character traits, in other words, virtues through the repetition of the "similar activities" (Aristotle, 2004, p. 32).

Jean Jacques Rousseau was a philosopher and educational theorist who lived during the 18th century, and his framework/definition of moral education differed from Aristotle. In *Emile*, Rousseau (1762/1979) defended the idea that true moral education needs to nurture the growth of a child's inner-self and explained that this inner development may not be observed in the child's

behaviors in a short period of time. Rousseau (1762/1979) claimed nurturing this inner-self as the beginning of moral education, and he identified moral education to be the “true study” of knowledge, in which the human condition is analyzed. According to Rousseau (1762/1979), the ideal moral educator:

knows how to bear the goods and ills of this life is to my taste the best raised: from which it follows that the true education consists less in precept than in practice. We begin to instruct ourselves when we begin to live. Our education begins with us. (p. 42)

In Rousseau’s (1762/1979) understanding, moral education should begin in the early years of childhood, and the ideal educator responsible for providing this education should be able to synthesize reason with compassion to develop the inner-self of the child while educating the child morally. In his book, *Discourse on the Origin of Inequality*, Rousseau (1755/1992) claimed both reason and compassion (an emotion) to be the important components of moral education. According to Rousseau (1755/1992), without reason being included in moral education, the uneducated child could harm himself, and without compassion being included in moral education, the morally uneducated child could harm other students. In his writings, Rousseau (1755/1992, 1762/1979) defended the idea that the child should be educated in a natural environment distant from society’s ills if we want the child to have a real education, and the practice shall provide sufficient ground for this kind of education, not the rote memorization of the selected texts found in the curriculums of that day.

John Dewey, an important philosopher of education and an educational theorist of the 19th and 20th centuries, wrote *Human Nature and Conduct: An Introduction to Social Psychology* in 1922. Dewey’s (1922/2012) ideal framework of moral education, which is discussed in this book, is a social one, and in this framework of moral education, moral knowledge is created from the “real stuff” of life. In Dewey’s (1922/2012) framework of moral

education, the aim of moral education for the learner should be to form his or her own knowledge after experiencing the real stuff of life. In this experiential and social framework of moral education, Dewey (1922/2012) identified moral education as the process of “learning the meaning of what we are about and employing that meaning in action” (p. 280). Moreover, according to Dewey (1922/2012), moral education should include the knowledge of how one may control his/her behaviors because “The good, satisfaction, “end,” of growth of present action in shades and scope of meaning is the only good within our control, and the only one, accordingly, for which responsibility exists” (p. 280-281).

In Dewey’s (1922/2012) thinking, to have a satisfactory moral education, one needs to develop good habits that will be the building blocks of moral and educated life. In Dewey’s (1922/2012) opinion, good habits are the kind of habits that would promote growth in the individual, and these habits are the resulting products of the social and experiential learning. These habits form the individual’s concept of moral life, and they are relevant to the real-life experiences of the individual. Unlike some religious teachings, which are extremely theoretical, these habits do not promote any disconnection from the real life to prepare for heaven or reach to Nirvana.

In his book, *Moral Principles in Education*, Dewey (1909/2009) opposed the passive framework of moral education present in the schools of the United States in the 19th and 20th centuries, as this method was composed of the teacher reading moral and religious texts and having students memorize them. Dewey (1909/2009) observed that “The influence of direct moral instruction, even at its very best, is comparatively small in amount and slight in influence, when the whole field of moral growth through education is taken into account” (p. 17). Thus, Dewey (1909/2009) claimed that an experiential/practical framework of moral education

provided by schools might be more beneficial to the students in the process of solving real life moral dilemmas.

In addition to Noddings²⁷ and Dewey, other scholars have provided definitions/frameworks of moral education that reflected their perspective. For example, in their article titled “Seven Worlds of Moral Education,” Pamela Joseph and Sara Efron (2005) described moral education as “a process by which students engage in ‘moral conversation’ centered on dilemmas” (p. 531). Joseph and Efron (2005) argued that a satisfactory framework of moral education should include a clear set of goals describing who is responsible for doing what in the classroom environment, and ideally, teachers need to expand this framework of moral education to use outside of their classrooms depending on their goal.

In his article, Robert Howard (2005) defined moral education as the “education [that] helps students to recognize and respond to ethical issues” (p. 44). Unlike Noddings and Rousseau, Howard (2005) categorized moral education as a kind of subject knowledge which needed to be taught to students using the school curriculum. Ideally, according to Howard (2005), this school curriculum should state the goals of education and schooling; and the commonly agreed and standardized definition of moral education should be added to the school curriculum.

Different frameworks/definitions of moral education originated from the trends present in the field of moral education and in the fields interacting with moral education. As a field of research, moral education is focused on the ethical dimensions of the individual and society and examines how certain standards of right and wrong are developed (McClellan, 1992). In the field of moral education, scholars use a variety of research methods and do not limit themselves

27. Noddings’s framework of moral education are present in the earlier chapters of this dissertation.

only to theories from the field of ethics. They also use theories originated in the field of moral psychology, and they base their research on the definitions coming from this field. For example, Kohlberg first developed his moral theory in the field of moral psychology, but then it became the most influential theory in moral education in the 1970s and 1980s (Carr, 2007) until the challenge of primary care ethicists (Gilligan, 1982; Noddings, 1984). In fact, Kohlberg's (1958, 1971) definition of moral education²⁸ and Noddings's TC can conceivably be seen as two competing definitions.

Noddings's TC has been influential in the field of moral education since the 1980s, and her influence through TC is represented in articles in the selected journal. To explain TC's influence in moral education, I analyzed in this chapter a representative sampling of articles within a selected time frame from *JME*, a journal dedicated to moral education. According to Scimago Journal Ranking and Journal Metrics, *JME* is a well-respected journal representing the discipline of moral education. It has been published for more than two decades, and the University of Kansas library system has online access to its issues published after 1990. This journal is representative of the field of moral education because it only publishes papers associated with research conducted in moral education and limits its focus to:

the discussion and analysis of moral education and development throughout the lifespan. The journal encourages submissions across the human sciences and humanities that use a range of methodological approaches and address aspects of moral reasoning, moral emotions, motivation and moral action in various contexts (e.g., cultural, gender, family, schooling, community, leisure, work) and roles (e.g., parent, teacher, student, civic, professional). The journal encourages proposals for special issues that address a topic relevant to these aims and scope. (*JME*, 2017)

1. 28. Detailed information regarding Kohlberg's framework of moral education has been present in Chapter

The articles selected as the data set for this study drew extensively on Noddings's TC, and they were published in *JME* from 2003 through 2013. There were 20 articles which fit these criteria, including a few book review articles. The content of these articles revealed how Noddings's TC has been influential in the field of moral education and how this influence has been received by other authors publishing in this field, as their discussions of Noddings's TC contribute to the discussion of several problems/issues of education. In this chapter, I described this influence by analyzing the content of these articles and interpreting them.

Themes Present in *JME* in Relation to Noddings's TC

Noddings's TC and School Culture

The first group of the authors, who were analyzed, discussed the connection of Noddings's TC to the discussion of school culture in the academy. Several descriptions and frameworks of school culture exist in the literature; however, among the others, Michael Fullan's (2007) framework of school culture—the guiding beliefs and values evident in the way a school operates—relates best to moral education. Fullan's (2007) framework of school culture shares an important common ground with moral education because, like school culture, moral education is also deeply concerned with the guiding beliefs and values present in the school environment. This common ground has attracted significant attention from a number of authors, including four different authors who have published in *JME* between 2003 and 2013, and connected Noddings's TC to the school culture.

One of these authors, whose article is analyzed, is Chi Ming Lee (2009). In her article, Lee (2009) introduced a moral education program that improved the school culture through caring relationships, which was implemented in a Taiwanese elementary school. Even though the moral education program of concern in this article is constructed upon three different theories

of morality; the moral education program is primarily centered around and constructed upon Noddings's TC.

In Lee's (2009) view, one of the main characteristics of this moral education program is its focus on the building of a positive school culture through caring relationships, and she argued that the behaviors of the students have improved through these relationships. Lee (2009) argued, prior to the implementation of the moral program, that the school culture was focused on academic success and testing, not on human interactions. According to Lee (2009), after the implementation of the moral education program, although the focus has shifted from academic success and testing to the improvement of the school culture and student behaviors, the students' academic success has not declined. On the contrary, both the students' academic success and the school culture have improved after the implementation of Lee's program, in which she drew upon the importance of ethical caring relationships promoted in Noddings's TC. Lee's (2009) study supported Noddings's claim that schools become a community and school culture improves through caring relationships promoted in TC.

The importance of having quality caring relationships has been stressed through Lee's (2009) entire article, including the findings section. In the findings section, Lee (2009) mentioned that one of the advantages of the moral education program developed and implemented in this Taiwanese school is that it has significantly improved both the students' moral thinking and their reasoning capacity. In fact, according to Lee (2009), at the end of the study, some students have identified this moral education program as a great program, because the program helped them not only to change their behavior, but also to increase awareness:

Because I have participated in this project, I am now more concerned about the moral behaviour of my [*sic*] classmates. I will give advice to those whose behaviour I feel is not correct. And I always remind myself that I have to be a role model for other students as well. (Lee, 2009, p. 179)

Ideally, moral education programs are designed to assist the students in improving their moral thinking and moral behaviors. However, students are not the only ones benefitting from these programs, as they frequently interact with their teachers. In fact, teachers may very well increase their awareness of moral knowledge and learn how to be the caring members of the larger communities, such as schools, if they are willing and equipped with a specific skill set of thinking and acting. According to Noddings (2008), teachers learn to care and be a caring role model to their students using this specific skill set of thinking and acting “to respond to the expressed needs of students and to build a moral climate in school which reinforces students’ selfworth [*sic*] and moral decency” (pp. 166-167). This particular skill set of thinking and acting is already present in good and solid moral education programs because it helps to build a positive school culture constructed upon the maintenance of these ethical caring relationships in schools.

In the findings section of her article, Lee (2009) reported why and how multiple parties of people benefit from the ethical caring relationships formed in this Taiwanese school through the implementation of her moral education program. According to Lee (2009), “the entire school culture and the professional development of staff [are] just as important as students’ character development” (p. 182) because the program identified everyone in the school as individuals capable of reflecting on their caring behaviors and moral actions. Lee’s (2009) analysis of who benefits from the ethical caring relationships is important because it supported Noddings’s (1995a, 2003a/2013, 2005) discussion that the act of caring is not limited to one party in an ethical caring relationship, and the roles of carer and cared-for are interchangeable.

In Noddings’s (2002a, 2003a, 2005) view, both the caring teacher and the cared-for student should participate in the ethical caring relationship for two reasons: (a) they benefit from the relationship and (b) their active contributions to the caring relationship are equally important.

Unlike those who structured the teacher-student relationships in more authoritarian ways, with the teacher delivering and the student receiving, in TC, Noddings (1995a, 2003c, 2006) structured the teacher-student relationship as an active interaction between the parties involved in these relationships. In her book *Educating Moral People: A Caring Alternative to Character Education*, Noddings (2002a) indicated that the ethical caring relationship is a mutually satisfying relationship formed between the carers and the cared-for that would influence the behaviors of the individuals and improve the school culture in a positive way without relying on the authoritarian methods of teaching and school discipline.

In Joan Goodman's (2006) article, she stated that "Discipline is central to a school's ethos" (p. 214) and discussed the role of school rules and school discipline in building a school culture. According to Goodman (2006), school discipline is usually constructed through school rules, and these school rules include the descriptive statements either of conditions in which punishment is required or a reward is offered to a student. Following the conclusion Noddings (2002a) reached (mentioned in the previous paragraph), Goodman (2006), in her book, argued that we should not rely heavily on the strict, rigid school rules while building a positive school culture, especially if these rules treat very minor moral problems and more serious moral problems as equal. One consequence of treating these problems as equal might be that students perceive these "rules and sanctions...as irrational, trivial, unfair or arbitrary" and causing "other school efforts to support a moral outlook [which] are likely to be dismissed" (Goodman, 2006, p. 214).

In her article, Goodman (2006) identified the moral problems that might potentially be present in a school environment and assigned them to different categories based on how serious they are. In assigning them to different categories, Goodman drew on Noddings's TC to support

her reasoning of the construction of her categories (Goodman, 2006). Citing Noddings's 2005 book, Goodman (2006) claimed that not only every problematic behavior of the student is a huge problem to fix, but also school discipline and prescribed school rules are incapable of fixing every problematic behavior and the moral problem it is rooted.

Being aware of this incapability, Goodman (2006) argued that if a teacher aims to build a positive learning and moral environment in her classroom and school, then he/she needs to be interested in acquiring more information about problematic student behaviors. Similar to Noddings (2003a, 2005), Goodman (2006) defended acquiring more information on the problematic behavior may assist a teacher to prevent the behavior to be repeated and prevent the same teacher to jump to irrevocable conclusions that might result in important decisions affecting the students' lives. To strengthen her argument, Goodman (2006) identified the behavior of the caring teachers promoted in Noddings's TC, who go beyond the school rules and "investigate possible causes" (p. 219), as the turnsole test.

Ideally, the caring teacher described by Noddings (1995a, 2003a) analyzes all types of information that might be the cause of a moral problematic behavior performed by the student, and he/she uses this information to fix the problem and establish a positive and academically encouraging school culture, not the student's behavior. Advancing this argument of Noddings, according to Goodman (2006), this caring teacher also uses Goodman's categories on moral problems. Relying on these categories, the ideal caring teacher realizes that tardiness is an unimportant moral problem, not "a wrong to punish" (Goodman, 2006, p. 219); hence, instead of effectively implementing school procedures such as decreasing the student's grade or sending the student to the school principal's office the teacher tries to change the student behavior by becoming a role model for the student. Goodman (2006) claims that each student behavior

improved is a step taken to building a positive and caring school culture resulting in better school performance and safer schools.

Another group of scholars who have discussed the connection of Noddings's TC to school culture is Mingchu Luo, Wenmin Huang, and Lotfollah Najjar (2007). Their article is an analysis of the impact of the caring relationships on the ethical climate of a school and the students' school performance. In their article, Luo et al. (2007) argued that the existence of positive ethical caring relationships between the school personnel and the students might improve the academic success of the students because these students would benefit from these relationships and are educated in a positive and ethical school climate. Based on the article Luo et al. (2007) published, the positive relationships they have in mind are the ethical caring relationships described and promoted in Noddings's TC. In their article, Luo et al. discussed that the positive, ethical school climate we need is only possible through the formation and establishment of these caring relationships.

In their article, Luo et al. (2007) defended the idea that the most important purposes of education are the moral ones: improving students' moral thinking within a positive, ethical school climate and developing moral and humane citizens who are concerned about the feelings and welfare of others. In this article, after highlighting the importance of the moral purposes of education, Luo et al. claimed that "a school's ethical climate, an integral component of school climate or even school culture, may be one of the key determinants of students' school success in the Chinese school context" (p. 108). In fact, according to Luo et al. (2007), the school culture is the studio of the community, where the student's behavior is reshaped and redefined; therefore, the school culture needs to be positive and caring as promoted by Noddings's TC (1995b, 2005). This school culture should be built very carefully and Noddings's (1996) warning should be

taken seriously, otherwise, we would end up with a troubling school community as discussed in David Resnick's (2008) article.

In his article, Resnick (2008) analyzed the film *Mean Girls* (originally aired in 2004) to discuss the power of the school community over the students' behaviors while elaborating the connection between the unstated school rules [for Resnick (2008), these are a cumulative image of the dominant school culture] and students' moral thinking and behaviors. In this film, moral thinking/behavior and its connection to school culture and unstated school rules was described through the eyes of an outsider, a new student (Cady). Cady is a student whose parents are zoologists, and who has been previously home schooled in Africa before transferring to an American high school containing a morally twisted school environment. Throughout his movie review article, Resnick (2008) analyzed the tension between individual morality and communal morality and, based on this analysis, he claimed the community has been more influential in shaping the individual's moral thinking and behavior than we think. In fact, according to Resnick (2008), this is an influence to be feared or at least to be cautioned, or the results, as portrayed in this movie, would be tragic at best.

The movie represents a high school in which students demonstrate morally problematic behaviors and an oppressive system of popularity monarchy that was constructed based on the arbitrary and unstated rules. The tension between individual moral decisions and communal moral decisions constructed as a result of these unstated rules is shown through the somewhat bitter experiences of Cady. Over time, in order to adapt to the school environment Cady begins to trade her own moral codes for the school community's moral codes and changes her behaviors, even though those behaviors do not represent her values and moral thinking. As represented in the movie, in Cady's new school, students are categorized through their

compliance with the artificial and unstated moral rules of the school community and are assigned to certain groups/casts. The student's relation/membership to these groups/casts define the student's social status within the school up to the point of where he/she should sit in the cafeteria:

Where you sit in the cafeteria is crucial 'cause you've got everyone there' says Janis who then literally draws a map for Cady (and us) of the various cliques: JV Jocks, Asian Nerds, Cool Asians, Unfriendly Black Haughties [*sic*], Sexually Active, [fat] Girls who Eat their Feelings and—the centre of the film's plot—the 'Plastics, teen royalty.' (Resnick, 2008, p. 100)

In his article, Resnick (2008) explained the trade portrayed between Cady's moral values and the school community's moral values; and he used Noddings's TC in order to explain the power of community over an individual's moral thinking. In several of her publications, Noddings (1997, 2002a) highlighted the function of community in the shaping of one's moral behaviors and how compliance with the community becomes a vital issue for the members of the community, as each individual in this community is dependent on the good of other individuals. In these publications, Noddings (1997, 2002a) also warned her readers regarding this power of community and described what might happen when community values go awry, as if she has seen the movie Resnick has analyzed. According to Resnick (2008), Noddings's warning is reasonable because "*Mean Girls* [the movie] acknowledges the power of social groups, but does so primarily in their negative mode" (p. 112). As represented in the movie and discussed in Resnick's article in detail, these problematic social groups/casts transcend the values they embrace, which become harmful to the nature of a true caring and sustainable community.

Fortunately, not all the social groups or school communities are morally problematic or harmful as portrayed in *Mean Girls* or analyzed in Resnick's (2008) article. In their article, Sanger and Osguthorpe (2009) introduced the Child Development Project (henceforth CDP), an

approach employed in moral education, in which they argued that the establishment of a “caring school community” is actually possible. They described the CDP as “a comprehensive longitudinal intervention project designed to enhance the social and moral development of children through systematic changes in the classroom, school [*sic*] and home environments” (Sanger & Osguthorpe, 2009, p. 20), and this project has been influential because it functions through the biological need of the children’s belonging. Using this need, it cultivates morality and the correct moral behavior in children by promoting the need to belong to a caring school community. According to Sanger and Osguthorpe (2009), this long-term project has the potential to promote the construction of a positive and caring school culture because it focuses on the positive influence of the community over the individual’s moral thinking and behaviors.

One of the important characteristics of this caring school community constructed through the CDP is that it promotes the formation of caring relationships within the community. The supporters of the CDP embrace and employ a principle which was advocated by Noddings (2003a): “In ... education, ... we have to ask how best to cultivate the moral sentiments and how to develop communities that will support, not destroy, caring relations” (Preface Section). According to Sanger and Osguthorpe (2009), by implementing CDP they aimed to have a caring school community in which students have engaged in ethical caring relationships and discussed democratic citizenship and justice with integrity. The aim in their project was to promote a moral education that is thematic and integrated across content areas, and school activities and norms. With TC, Noddings (1995a, 2002a, 2005) advocated for this thematic approach employed in the teaching of how to care and be moral; however, it is Sanger and Osguthorpe (2009) who have really transferred this idea to real-life learning in schools. Sanger and

Osguthorpe (2009) heavily drew on Noddings's TC when they implemented their theoretical moral education within the classroom.

In the CDP, the presence of good moral behavior in the classroom is highlighted, and teachers are encouraged to use it as a tool to create a positive and safe learning environment for everyone, rather than connecting this good moral behavior to grading or academic learning. One way of building this positive and safe environment is to promote the existence of diverse cultures in the schools and understand the connection between care-based thinking that, ideally, results in a caring moral behavior and teaching through culture, a second theme found in the analysis of articles about TC.

Noddings's TC and Teaching Through Culture/Teaching as a Culture

One theme frequently discussed within the articles analyzed as part of this dissertation is how Noddings's TC contributed to the discussion of the culture of teaching and the cultural teaching. TC is used to analyze different layers of connection between teaching and culture, including the teaching of students of different cultures, and a different lens used to explain the moral and cultural concepts found in distant geographical places such as South Africa. Teaching through culture is a relatively new approach practiced in teaching, which has attracted significant attention from scholars over the years (Banks, 2009; Gay, 2002; Ladson-Billings, 2009; Nieto, 2009). With the passage of time, it has interacted with other fields of research, such as multicultural education, the teaching of English as a second language, moral education, and teacher education. Five different articles published in this journal discuss Noddings's TC in connection with teaching through culture (the teaching of African American students and African morality) and teaching as a culture.

In her article, Mari Ann Roberts (2010) discussed the potential contribution of TC in teaching African American students and takes a critical lens to analyze this potential more deeply. At the beginning section of her paper, Roberts (2010) reported that the current rhetoric representing care-based teaching is color-blind, and she claimed this rhetoric has to change if Noddings wanted TC to address the concerns of different groups of people. In fact, Roberts (2010) stated that care-based teaching needs to take into account and represent the different cultural norms in/of teaching because, when educators integrate culturally relevant critical teaching with a care perspective in education, they may acquire a rich potential of high-quality teaching. Robert's article published in *JME* is all about combining Noddings's TC with culturally relevant critical teaching. Roberts (2010) argued that her combination is both possible and necessary and is confident that her program, Culturally Relevant Critical Teacher Care (henceforth CRTC), has been the first and the most advanced step taken in this direction and has the potential to change the ongoing rhetoric both in the fields of culturally relevant teaching and moral education.

In her study, Roberts (2010) interviewed eight African American teachers who used culturally relevant caring activities in their classrooms when they teach. Based on the interviews, she reported that these eight successful teachers used CRTC in their classrooms, and "clearly defined their racially-motivated actions on behalf of their students as care" (Roberts, 2010, p. 462). According to Roberts (2010), their care-based teaching activities have a natural concept of race and color, as these individuals' frames of caring and successful teaching are established upon the concepts of race, culture, and color. Moreover, these care-based teaching activities are rich in meaning and experience as the students find the opportunity to relate to the subject material through these activities (Roberts, 2010). In describing these activities, Roberts

(2010) drew on Noddings's discussion of the inclusion of care to teaching and education and supported her argument that teachers need to promote care-based teaching in their classroom activities if they want to ensure the participation of students from different social groups and cultures. Care-based teaching has a natural connection to culture based teaching for two main reasons. First, Noddings's TC has a connection to culture and race because caring teachers understand the "difficulties of knowing another's nature, needs, and desires when one party holds power over the other or is a member of a group that has historically dominated another" (Noddings, 1992, p. 3). Second, with TC, Noddings (1992, 1995a, 2002a, 2005, 2013) encouraged teachers to employ several methods of teaching when they have a diverse group of students in their classrooms, even though these students share one basic need: to be cared.

Similar to Roberts article, Crystal Johnson (2011), in her article, introduced her theory/framework of moral education: Cultural Historical Activity Theory (henceforth CHAT), which I think is heavily influenced by Noddings's TC. According to Johnson (2011), her theory and the moral education program constructed upon this theory have the potential to bridge the gap between TC and culture-based teaching. In fact, according to Johnson (2011), her theory may bring a fresh perspective to the culturally specific methods of caring/teaching and the moral education practiced using care perspective. Johnson (2011) described one African American teacher's activities, which were constructed around CHAT, that contribute to students' moral thinking and in class learning.

In Johnson's (2011) article, she set up the stage by using Noddings's TC, then drew upon how TC insists on the diversity of human beings and their uniqueness to education. In the beginning section of her article, Johnson (2011) reported that Noddings's TC was first thought of as a theory of white, middle-class, heterosexual women. Therefore, it has been criticized as being

unable to express the needs of minority women and minority students. Johnson's (2011) article challenged this criticism against Noddings's TC. Throughout the article, she argued that TC has the potential to counter this criticism if CHAT is considered as an advanced version of TC, because CHAT discussed the influence of race and racism in a caring moral education. Confident with her theory, Johnson (2011) stated: "I contend that Cultural Historical Activity Theory (CHAT) serves as a potent approach for comprehending the moral agency associated with culturally identifiable care perspectives" (p. 472).

In her article, Johnson (2011) provided field observations and interview notes to improve the validity of her argument about the caring African American teacher who uses CHAT in her classroom teaching. Through the portrait of this caring teacher, Johnson (2011) argued that caring classrooms and schools may be a real thing, rather than an ideal, when other teachers use CHAT too. According to Johnson (2011), one significant characteristic of this caring teacher is that she is more concerned with the moral development of the students than with passing these students to the next grade. Moreover, the favorite question this teacher poses to her students is "How are we going to be?" and this question signals that learning is a plural process dependent on the contribution of all the students present in the classroom. Considering that this question highlights the importance of the students' connection to the whole caring classroom, as well as to the surrounding community, it is no wonder that this is the favorite question of this teacher. This question also signals that moral education is a process, in which not only the students but also the teachers need to reflect on themselves.

In her paper, Johnson (2011) argued that CHAT has the potential to improve the culturally identified care-based teaching practices because the moral caring activities implemented in this program promotes the presence of diverse cultures in the classroom, rather

than encouraging the teaching and the promotion of one standard culture. Ideally, any caring-based teaching method and the program in which this method is implemented advocates for the uniqueness of human beings (Noddings, 1984/2003a/2013, 1995a, 2002a, 2005, 2008, 2015). The presence and teaching of unique cultures are considered as an enrichment to have in the learning environment, not an obstacle to deal with. The promotion of the concept of ‘human beings are unique’ in Noddings’s TC is the beginning point of Johnson’s (2011) CHAT theory, and in her article, Johnson (2011) reported that teachers embracing CHAT use care-oriented activities of teaching to build a trusting, compassionate, and solid classroom community. CHAT differs from the other culture-based teaching activities because it connects TC to teaching through culture. As Johnson (2011) reported:

By itself, CHAT underscores the importance of cultural-historical situations in action and goals; as communal experiences situated in the past, culture and history structure a person’s possibilities and identity. This concept is significant in understanding culturally-oriented theories of care, as it signifies that the African American experience is not morally irrelevant or defective. (p. 477)

Johnson (2011) connected Noddings’s TC to cultural teaching and she drew attention to the fact that the culture we live in shapes our frameworks of morality. Interested in this fact, Metz and Gaie (2010), in their article, discussed how Noddings’s framework of caring might share certain characteristics with Ubuntu, a framework originated from the African continent. Ubuntu is a concept that is closely associated with the moral thinking present in South Africa, and it is the product of the sub-Saharan culture. Metz and Gaie (2010) used the phrases “A person is a person through other persons” (p. 274) or “I am because we are” (p. 274) to familiarize the reader with Ubuntu. According to Metz and Gaie (2010), these phrases represent a strong sense of a commitment to the community (i.e., to the other people), and this strong sense

of commitment to the other people is also present in Noddings's TC because Noddings (1984a) stated in the first edition of the *Caring* book:

As one-caring, ... I seek ... completion in the other-the sense of being cared-for and, I hope, the renewed commitment of the cared-for to turn about and act as one-caring in the circles and chains within which he is defined. Thus, I am not justified but somehow fulfilled and completed in my own life and in the lives of those I have thus influenced. (p. 95)

In their article, Metz and Gaie (2010) also introduced the reader to other characteristic traits of Ubuntu; however, they mainly drew on Noddings's TC when they described how the morality of a community mirrors the culture of the community. As discussed in the article, one of the most important and distinctive characteristics of Ubuntu is that it does not prescribe moral infractions as burdens for individuals to bear (Metz & Gaie, 2010). Metz and Gaie (2010) argued that, on the contrary, when someone does a moral wrong, it is a wrong of everyone in the community; and one way to correct this moral wrong is to revise the conditions of the community. In order to strengthen their discussion, Metz and Gaie (2010) compared Ubuntu with Western originated theories of moral philosophy (Kantian moral theory and utilitarianism); and criticized the dominance of these theories in moral thinking and moral knowledge:

In Western societies, there are two dominant rationales for state punishment of adult offenders: retribution and deterrence. The retributive rationale, often associated with a Kantian morality, is the view that punishment is justified simply as a fitting response to the nature of the crime that was committed, that is, merely because the offender deserves it for what he has done. The deterrence rationale, naturally at home in a utilitarian ethic, is the view that punishment is justified as a way to instil [*sic*] fear in the offender and others so that they will avoid committing other crimes in the future. (p. 278)

Noddings's TC and Ubuntu are two important approaches discussed in moral thinking and moral education, and they share certain important features (commitment to the surrounding community and defiance of the need for principles as argued in certain Western theories).

Although TC and Ubuntu share these important features and advocate for the commitment to the

community, they differ from each other on identifying who is considered as a member of the community. Compared to Noddings (2003a), Metz and Gaie (2010) embraced a much larger scope in defining community and argued that, with Ubuntu, “all human beings are deemed part of a family who provide some reason to be responded to out of love” (p. 84). In fact, unlike Noddings (1984/2003a/2013, 2002a), according to Metz and Gaie (2010), being moral in the global scale is possible.²⁹

Noddings’s defiance of the possibility of a global theory motivating people acting morally has been the center of an important criticism, and it is frequently mentioned in the arguments discussing the status of TC. Drawing on this limitation, David Carr (2003) questioned whether TC might provide a satisfactory ground to describe the culture of a globally respected profession, the culture/essence of teaching. Throughout his article, Carr (2003) explained what teaching is as a profession and what education is in the moral sense, and discussed the different approaches of ethical theories to teaching as a moral profession. Unlike the authors previously discussed in this chapter, Carr (2003) did not focus on the connection between teaching and education through culture and Noddings’s TC; rather, he focused on the culture of teaching and the culture’s certain theories of teaching such as Noddings’s TC promotes. He identified these theories as metaphors of education which provide “different perspectives on the sources of morality in the interests of a student deserving better systems of learning” (Carr, 2003, p. 219)

In his article, one of the categories Carr (2003) used is Noddings’s TC; and he analyzed whether this philosophical perspective is satisfactory enough to define teaching as a profession.

29. As the reader of this dissertation might remember from Chapter 1, Noddings (2002a) claims that being moral and forming ethical caring relationships in the global scale is impossible because the influence of the caring act will be diminished when the distance between two people, the care and the cared-for increases.

Carr (2003) argued that teaching is a moral profession which might be classified using five different categories, and each one of these categories is a philosophical perspective used to describe teaching as culture. Carr (2003) conceptualized TC to be an ethical theory, specifically designed to echo the voice of women, hence, limiting the care-based teaching to the profession of women, aka a job that has a predominantly feminine culture. According to Carr (2003), if teachers internalize this maternal, care focused thinking in their profession, then the teaching profession will have a low status within the society because:

Although the idea of teachers as caring professionals (construed as members of vocations rather than professions) is to some extent generalizable, it may have most immediate application to the initial educational years of nursery, infant and primary schooling. Indeed, some such assumption seems to have been present in the rather provocative suggestion of an erstwhile British politician (John Patten in 1993) that a ‘mum’s army’ might be recruited to address staff shortages in early-years education. (p. 228-229)

In his article, Carr (2003) claimed that care-based teaching is feminine because it uses the language of the mother, the personal, relational language. He argued that if the teaching is to be categorized as a profession acknowledged in the society, then it should not embrace the culture of one group and use the language this group promotes (Carr, 2003). Carr’s criticism of Noddings’s TC and how she limited her theory to one group/gender of people has been part of a larger debate occurring in the fields of educational theory, philosophy of education, and moral education. In this debate, scholars have argued why the woman’s voice is required for a better education system and how this voice is represented best (Martin, 1987, 2002, 2011; Nussbaum, 2000, 2004, 2005). Other authors publishing in *JME*, whose works are discussed in this dissertation, have contributed to the debate between maternal thinking vs. paternal thinking in

education, and most connect TC to maternal thinking because TC uses the language and decision-making process of maternal thinking.^{30 31}

In her article, Jane Zhang (2007) investigated the potential contribution(s) of the maternal theories of education to the role of teacher and the culture of teaching found in schools, including Noddings's TC. Zhang (2007) claimed that the roles of mother and teacher should not be combined because we need teachers in classrooms, and combining these two roles would "prescribe behaviours for teachers that are often associated with the maternal role; in other words, teachers become more like mothers" (p. 516-517). Throughout her article, Zhang (2007) intentionally used the term "mother" instead of "care-giver" to draw attention to the connection between the roles of these two individuals while she strengthens her argument.

Zhang (2007) began her article by providing a detailed description of the influence of the maternal theories in education, including how they have contributed to educational research and the concept of schooling as we have known since 1960s. According to Zhang (2007), although there have been several characteristics of the maternal theories of education, one common characteristic that defines these theories is that they all argue "the home is the place where children begin their moral development" (p. 516). Drawing on this characteristic, the scholars (Dalton & Watson, 1997; Goldstein, 1997; Martin, 1992; Noddings, 1984/2003a) defending the status of the maternal theories representing this kind of thinking in education and teaching have argued that the current gap between the school sphere (public and professional) and the home sphere (private and personal) should be narrowed, if not closed completely. These scholars

30. In Chapter 4, there is a section discussing the connection between Noddings's TC and the influence of maternal thinking in education.

31. For detailed information on how Noddings specifically advocates for the implementation of maternal thinking in moral education, see her book *The Maternal Factor: Two Paths to Morality* (2010a).

(Dalton & Watson, 1997; Goldstein, 1997; Martin, 1992; Noddings, 1984/2003a) also argued that the educational system should be designed to include different voices, particularly the voice (experience, ways of thinking and knowledge production) of the woman because maternal values are “richly applicable to teaching” (Noddings, 1988, p. 220).

In her article, Zhang (2007) argued that teaching should be provided a more professional identity, and one way of providing this identity is to separate it from the identities of mothering and caring. Zhang (2007) continued her article by stating that, without drawing boundaries between teaching and mothering/caring, the profession of teaching might be considered as burdensome for teachers. In Zhang’s (2007) opinion, a teacher may acknowledge the fact that he/she may make mistakes while teaching as he/she knows that nobody is perfect. However, “A mother knows that only perfect care and perfect teaching is good enough for their kids” (Zhang, 2007, p. 523).

Another argument Zhang (2007) constructed in defense of the separation of teaching from mothering/caring is that, in most classrooms, teachers are accountable for up to 40 students, and they have professional obligations (disciplining the classroom, teaching the curriculum, and grading their learning) to take care. In contrast to teachers, mothers only deal with “either a single child or on a relatively small group of siblings” (Zhang, 2007, p. 522), and they are only responsible for that kid. In contrast to Noddings (2005),³² Zhang (2007) claimed that to care for a student in the classroom like a mother does for her child is problematic because attending to

32. In her article, Noddings (2005) refutes the strict professional framework designed for teaching and defends that a teacher has to have enough time to care for each student like a mother does. According to Noddings (2005), good teaching requires good caring and ideally, teachers will have enough time to care and to educate their students through the ethical caring relationships they formed in their classrooms if the teachers are not pressured to teach for the tests.

the needs of “a single child or relatively small group in the classroom will result in the exclusion of others” (p. 522).

In her article, Zhang (2007) claimed that, as a profession, teaching requires more than caring; hence, the professional teaching should not be understood merely as caring, as suggested in TC. Concerned with the perspective of treating teaching as caring, Zhang (2007), in her article, stated that “Rather than viewing a mother as a second-class educator, or a teacher as a second-class care-giver, we must learn to treasure the distinctions that exist in those two complementary but different roles” (p. 525). Since Zhang’s critiquing statement is the representation of a criticism frequently voiced by certain scholars (Isenbarger & Zembylas, 2006), how Noddings (1988, 2002a, 2013) has responded to it is presented here.

In several publications, Noddings (1988, 2002a, 2013) responded to the critics (Isenbarger & Zembylas, 2006) who argued that caring is a burdensome task for teachers as teachers do not have the luxury of devoting time to form caring relationships with their students or care for each student. To respond to this criticism, Noddings (1988) first clarified the true meaning of teaching, then explained that caring is a natural task a good teacher undertakes as he/she already spends a significant amount of time to relate to his/her students and care for them (Noddings, 1995b, 1995c, 2003b). Being confident with the framework she has constituted for the teachers, Noddings (2013b, 2015, 2016) has continued to discuss that caring is not an extra or burdensome task for teachers and argued that teaching for testing is a burdensome task for teachers to deal with.

Because of the language Noddings preferred to employ while constructing TC and how she identified caring as the motivating guide to be moral, many critics of Noddings pointed out that TC is a gender-centered theory of moral education. Acknowledging the validity of these

critics' concerns in the last edition of her *Caring* book, Noddings (2013) stated: "I think critics are right, however, to point out that the connotations of "feminine" are off-putting and do not capture what I intended to convey. Relational is a better word" (Preface section).

The next theme present in this chapter is the representation of the debate discussing the status of this gender-centered theory of moral education, and this debate may also be found in other relevant fields of research, such as moral philosophy and philosophy of education.

Noddings's TC as a Theory in The Field of Moral Education

Several articles used in this analysis discussed Noddings's TC and its "fit" with the field of moral education as a full and legitimate theory of moral education. It is not surprising for one to encounter this debate in the field of moral education as it has occurred in other frequently interacted fields of research. While discussing whether TC should be considered as a full and legitimate theory of moral education, three different authors have focused on the foundational weaknesses and strengths of Noddings's theory and have compared it with other theories of morality and moral education, including the well-known theory of John Rawls(1971), Theory of Justice.³³ Stephen Sherblom (2008, 2009) is one of these authors, and he has written two articles about the scope and the legitimacy of Noddings's TC in the field of moral education.

In his first article on this subject, Sherblom (2008) reported the new improvements in this debate and provided more information regarding the current state of this debate; then he

33. John Rawls has created the mature form of his Theory of Justice at 1971; and his theory is based on two major concepts: freedom and equality. In his work, Rawls (1971) drew attention to the relation between the concept of justice and the concept of equality and argued that without the distribution of equal rights there will be no just society. To make his point, he wants us to imagine standing behind a hypothetical Veil of Ignorance and decide what kind of society we would choose to live if there is no way to know which position (privileged or not) we would occupy. His answer to this question is "in a society, in which one has a good chance of living due to the equal rights provided even if he or she ends up in the worst position possible" because the rational individual knows that equal distribution of the rights and duties are necessary to have this good chance of living. This answer frames an ideally just society in which one has no special privileges and rights due to the relationships or special circumstances he/she has as these relationships or privileges have nothing to do with moral or just thinking.

documented the power/influence of care ethics in the research on moral thinking while assessing the legitimacy of TC. After briefly summarizing the debate between care ethics and objective/justice ethics, Sherblom (2008) identified the real intention of care ethicists when they challenge justice ethicists as “to complement and integrate the philosophical and the psychological aspects of carebased [*sic*] moral response into a broader and more global conception of moral development” (p. 82).

In this article, Sherblom (2008) structured his analysis/evaluation of the care challenge in moral education and moral psychology using a plan composed of two phases; thus, he divides his article into two main sections. In the first section of his article, Sherblom (2008) detailed the empirical question(s) surrounding care ethics, and this section is more focused on how Gilligan has changed the interpretation of Kohlberg’s scale. In the second section of his article, Sherblom (2008) investigated how care ethics contributed to the field of moral psychology, and this is the section in which Sherblom pays significant attention to Noddings’s TC and how TC has replaced, or at least attempted to replace, certain philosophical tenets in moral thinking and moral behavior.

In the first section of his article, Sherblom (2008) argued that the empirical evidence provided by Gilligan (1982) has been powerful enough to change Kohlberg’s Moral Judgment Scale constructed upon individual justice thinking and to include the moral value care, the woman’s voice to the field of moral psychology. Sherblom (2008) approached the gender bias claim of Gilligan to be the “smaller [less important] claim regarding bias in early versions of Kohlberg’s MJI scoring procedure” (p. 94). This change has also led to other changes in the fields of moral psychology and moral education, and Sherblom (2008) considered Noddings’s TC to be one of these changes.

In the second section of his article, Sherblom (2008) provided a detailed explanation of how Noddings's TC has been successful in changing the rhetoric in the field of moral thinking and moral psychology by describing Kohlberg's treatment of the women's moral values. In Kohlbergian moral thinking, the moral values promoted in Noddings's theory are "nice values to have" (Sherblom, 2008, p. 92); however, it does not identify these values as necessary to make ethical decisions. According to Sherblom (2008), care ethicists have encouraged others to study these values (building relationships, being sensitive to others' needs, and being in a caring dialogue with others to learn more information about the problems affecting them) and been able to sell these as a new skill set necessary to defining moral thinking and moral behaviors in the fields of moral philosophy, moral education, and philosophy of education. Sherblom (2008) described this to be a bigger challenge for the care ethicists to tackle, and he believed they have been successful with this challenge. His second article, which was published in this journal a year later, is a sequel article documenting why care ethicists, particularly Noddings, has been successful.

In his second article (chronologically speaking), Sherblom (2009) argued that care ethicists, especially Noddings, have been successful with the inclusion of the moral value care and women's experiences in moral thinking and moral education while analyzing the factors behind their success. In Sherblom's (2009) opinion, these care ethicists have been successful because they have articulately defended the inclusion of certain concepts of care ethics in moral education in a way that these concepts would make sense to everyone. Moreover, since "The care perspective embraces a moral epistemology and deliberative process that legitimates affectively acquired knowledge, such as empathic perspective-taking or other compassionate attention to the welfare of others" (Sherblom, 2009, p. 92), it has become an appealing approach

to be implemented in the field of moral education or any kind of education that has a moral purpose. Therefore, Sherblom (2009) appraised TC and concluded that it deserves its place as a legitimate theory in moral education.

In this second article, Sherblom (2009) was especially drawn to the concept of engrossment, one of the major components of the ethical caring relationships that Noddings's TC is built upon. Sherblom (2009) reported that the most significant contribution of Noddings's TC in the field of moral education is her noble effort of bringing new concepts, such as attention and engrossment, to discuss in the field of moral education. Even this effort is satisfactory enough to consider as a legitimate theory in this field because TC "allows us to concern ourselves with aspects of moral engagement that are otherwise unavailable" (Sherblom, 2009, p. 72), and we need these aspects of moral engagement as they are part of the real, practical human life. When I analyzed the articles published in *JME* between the years of 2003 and 2013, I noticed that Sherblom is not the only one interested in the foundational concepts of TC. David Carr (2005a) has also paid attention to the foundational concepts of TC, particularly to the concept of engrossment.

In his article, (Carr, 2005a) analyzed the scope of engrossment in moral thinking, while he discussed the place and function of emotions in moral thinking and moral education. Understanding the real-life conditions of other people, and using emotions, including engrossment, empathy, and compassion as tools to frame and evaluate one's moral thinking is a relatively new perspective attracting attention in the field of moral education. In his article, before announcing its success, Carr (2005a) inquired whether this new perspective—Noddings's TC—may or may not provide satisfactory answers to the questions posed in this field. In his

article, Carr (2005a) identified Noddings's TC as a theory of affective thinking and one of the main trends found in the field of moral education.

In his article, Carr (2005a) explained the main trends prevalent in moral education while setting up the stage for the reader. According to Carr (2005a), these trends are Kantian thinking, utilitarian thinking, character education, Kohlberg's moral development theory, and, finally, Noddings's TC. Being unconfident with Noddings's challenge to the reliance on moral reasoning and principled thinking in the traditional sense; Carr (2005a) approached TC with an understandable level of doubt and he expressed a potential limitation/caveat on this theory: "For one thing, it is far from clear how or in what sense the more affective aspects of human attachment or value are implicated in moral formation" (p. 138).

In his paper, Carr (2005a) reported that Noddings's stark challenge to/departure from the moral reasoning and principled thinking has become a serious limitation for the TC. It has become a serious limitation because this departure may result in having an unprincipled, or in other words, an untheoretical nature and this is an undesired situation for TC because if TC does not have a theoretical foundation, then: "It is hard to get a very clear theoretical handle on care ethics" (2005a, p. 139). Also, without this theoretical foundation, the status of TC as a legitimate theory of moral philosophy and moral education will always be questionable.

In Carr's (2005a) view, there is one way out of this problematic situation for the care ethicist, and particularly for Noddings. Carr (2005a) determined this way as re-identifying care as a virtue in the Aristotelian sense; however, Noddings (2000) dismissed that possibility by claiming it would not represent the true nature of care and she missed the opportunity of development. Being unhappy with Noddings's dismissal of this suggestion, Carr (2005a) claimed TC should not be considered as a full and legitimate theory in moral education and

equates Noddings's TC merely to a new perspective, which has been very influential in moral education. One aspect of this influence has presented itself in the debate on how to educate students to be moral individuals, and this is the next theme to be discussed in this chapter.

Noddings's TC and Educating Morally

One theme that has been discussed in the articles in *JME* is how Noddings's TC contributes to the discussion of moral education and global moral thinking. Since 1984, the first time Noddings fully articulated her theory in the *Caring* book, the advantages and the limitations of TC have drawn the attention of scholars. This attention has lasted for decades, and has been the focus of this dissertation, and I do not think it will die out soon as the citation numbers for all three editions of this book increase day by day. In *JME*, speaking for the selected time frame, three different authors have discussed how this theory contributes to the construction of the new programs implemented in moral education in micro scales and to the teaching of morality as in increasing an awareness of being moral and morally educating the individuals on a macro scale.

In his article, Graham Haydon (2006) analyzed the potential of constructing a global perspective in moral education and moral citizenship, and his analysis includes Noddings's TC. He argued that moral respect provides a more solid ground compared to love or care if the aim is to build a clear perspective of global moral citizenship (Haydon, 2006). Throughout the article, Haydon (2006) inquired whether there is a moral value that might have the potential to be the basis of moral global citizenship. His answer to this question is not one single value. It is a plurality of values; however, one value is of special importance to Haydon when it came to the cultivation of moral citizenship in the global sense, and this value is moral respect.³⁴ Haydon

34. Haydon (2006) derivates the concept of moral respect from the concept of human respect, which is already present in Kant's moral theory. According to Kant (1785/1993), one should not use another individual as a mean to his or her own end because each human being is worthy of respect.

(2006) structured moral respect as an umbrella value that “involves recognizing value in someone or something independently of its relationship to one’s own desires, preferences [*sic*] and goals” (p. 466).

One of the characteristics of Noddings’s TC that Haydon (2006) drew on is its incapability of responding to the needs of everyone in this world, for example, to the needs of people starving or the education policies harming students’ rights in Africa. In Haydon’s (2006) view, this is a serious limitation for Noddings because, understandably, the concept of moral citizenship in the global sense includes the students in Africa regardless of their distance from Noddings. Haydon (2006) compared moral care to moral respect and preferred moral respect over care as “There is an element of distance—of the recognition of the other as other—inherent in respect that does not seem to be similarly inherent in love or in caring, interpreted in Noddings’s way” (p. 463).

Haydon (2006) criticized Noddings’s TC by stating that the theory has been inadequate to provide a solid ground for the discussion of the rights of citizens in the global society. Moral citizenship in the global sense is a much broader concept to discuss compared to the concept of citizenship in the state sense. According to Haydon (2006), in TC, it is almost impossible for the act of caring to carry itself beyond personal relationships of an individual to a state’s citizen because:

When it (caring) is detached from the contexts of direct interpersonal relationships, the idea of the citizen having a caring attitude towards others can easily slip into the sort of benevolence that can be patronizing, in which the one caring operates with their own idea of what is good for the other. (p. 161)

In Haydon’s (2006) view, moral respect is a better ground for constructing a framework of global moral education because a moral education program designed accordingly with Noddings’s TC is more concerned with how people positively respond to each other within

ethical caring relations. Additionally, in contrast to caring, moral respect does not have this limitation of benevolence to the citizens of one state and one society. In fact, Haydon's (2006) definition of moral respect is required in moral education because, through moral respect:

people can see themselves as global citizens (though whether they will do so is heavily dependent on the kind of education they receive) and thereby can also see others as global citizens, who as citizens of the same world have an equal standing. People can, therefore, have respect for others as citizens of the same world, and this does add something to simply having respect for persons. (p. 463)

Haydon (2006) accurately interpreted Noddings's TC as a moral theory of education which motivates students and teachers to do the right thing through implementing "care." If a scholar wants to build a moral definition of global citizenship embracing Noddings's theory, then to that definition he or she will have to include that a caring teacher should teach the care for other cultures too. At first, this noble idea might please the individuals; however, without knowing and being related to other cultures, it is impossible for a teacher to do this. Haydon (2006) argued—this requirement—to teach the care of other cultures and relate to each one of the students' culture while teaching is very difficult to fulfill. Thus, according to Haydon (2006), if the educators and students want to have a full understanding of global moral citizenship, then they might find the moral respect framework he proposed to be beneficial:

To focus on respect rather than celebration may help educators and their students to take a more sober [*sic*] view. Diversity in human culture is important because it opens up possibilities for human achievement and flourishing that would otherwise never have developed. At the same time, unavoidably, it opens up possibilities of disagreement and conflict. We should respect the diversity of human cultural contexts, not only in the sense that we respect a positive achievement, but also in the sense that we can respect something of importance that is outside our individual control, not to be ignored or trifled with. (Haydon, 2006, p. 469)

In her article, Hermenegilde Rwantabagu (2010) discussed the position Haydon held was wrong and argued that Noddings's theory has not been in a disadvantageous position. On the contrary, according to Rwantabagu (2010), Noddings's TC may be applied in other countries and

may provide a fertile and satisfactory ground to a global perspective that might be used in moral education. Rwantabagu is a scholar from Burundi, which is a country located in East Africa, and she analyzed that a moral education program (a pilot program) has the potential to prevent future conflicts to happen in this violence-shaken country. The pilot program she analyzed was utilized in the schools of Burundi in 2005, and according to Rwantabagu (2010), it employed a care centered perspective in education, particularly practicing moral education benefiting from the influence of community.

In her article, Rwantabagu (2010) argued that the aim of this program was “to realise an ‘all-round human education’ based on the appropriation, by children and youth, of basic moral standards and their integration into daily life at school, in the family, and in the community” (p. 349). To achieve this aim, according to Rwantabagu (2010) the instructors of this program have identified a core, umbrella orientation which “is based on what Noddings and Slote (2005) called the ‘communitarian’ approach” (p. 349). The instructors determined this approach would be more suitable to their country specific needs; therefore, be more advantageous to be utilized around the schools because the caring “‘communitarians...hold, contrary to Kant, that it is only in relation to community values, traditions [*sic*] and good habits acquired in their context that we can become morally virtuous’ (Noddings & Slote, 2007, p. 342). They add that we become moral individuals only within a community with its tradition” (Rwantabagu, 2010, p. 349).

In her article, Rwantabagu (2010) claimed that one of the fundamental values of the Burundi society is the wellness of the community, and education is the way to preserve this value while improving the wellness of the community at the same time. The wellness of the community and the commitment to it have also been an important part of Noddings’s TC because one learns to be moral through the relationships he/she has with his/her community.

Advancing this argument further, Rwantabagu (2010) stressed the importance of the community in a child's education by stating that:

Education was too important to be left to parents alone. ... the community may be considered [as] a wall-less school, each community member is expected to supplement the family's efforts in the upbringing of young people. The extended family and the public at large acted as ... objective judges and examiners of the behavioural standards attained by the young people in their communities. As a result of this community-based feedback to their parents, young people had the opportunity to adjust or to reinforce their action in the light of the evaluation received. (p. 348)

In Chapter 1, I have discussed that Noddings's TC objects to one's or any education program/curriculum's heavy reliance on rules or principles (Noddings, 2002a, 2003a/2013, 2005). Rwantabagu (2010) embraced this feature of Noddings's theory while designing the pilot moral education program utilized in Burundi; thus, the program introduced in this article has no strict rules to follow or does not prescribe how a teacher should conduct lessons to cultivate the traditional values of the educational caring society. On the contrary, according to Rwantabagu (2010), this program has had only six important educational tenets to follow and the lessons structured around these tenets may be conducted in outside settings, particularly in settings where caring activities naturally take place:

Lessons may take place within the walls of the classroom or outside, with occasional visits to hospitals or to homes of destitute elderly people as an outworking of the moral values of compassion and solidarity. Above all, the learners are encouraged to practise and 'live by' what they have learnt, because a moral value that is known but not practiced is of no value. (Rwantabagu, 2010, p. 350)

In her research, Rwantabagu (2010) argued that her program was successful in transferring the values of the community to the students, meaning that the education program structured around Noddings's TC was influential enough in improving the moral development of the students. Roger Bergman (2004) undertook a larger project compared to Rwantabagu (2010); however, his aim was similar: a comprehensive evaluation of the influence of

Noddings's TC in the field of moral education. While undertaking this project, Bergman (2004) investigated the possibility of incorporating women's morality into educational thinking using Noddings's perspective of moral care, and to understand this perspective better, Bergman (2004) posed the questions "What is Noddings's vision of the moral life? How do moral obligation and motivation arise? How can education contribute to the moral life of students?" (p. 150).

Throughout the article, Bergman (2004) not only analyzed TC in detail, but also discussed the similarities between two important approaches employed in moral education: care-based education and virtue based character education.

In his article, Bergman (2004) set the stage by introducing TC before discussing these similarities. In the first half of this article, he explained how Noddings envisioned ethical life through caring. Ethical care uses the language of the mother, and Noddings pointed out the fact that the cared-for is dependent on the carer. This section looks like a detailed instruction manual for understanding Noddings's TC and her vision of moral education through caring. Simply stating, in this section Bergman (2004) explained what constitutes moral thinking in this perspective and what to expect from Noddings's TC in the field of moral education. According to Bergman (2004), "Noddings's probing analysis of the phenomenon of human caring is perhaps her single most significant contribution to our understanding of the moral life" (p. 150).

The second half of this article is the part where Bergman (2004) particularly drew on TC because it is this part of the article, in which he analyzes the stance of Noddings's TC in comparison with character education constructed upon Aristotle's virtue ethics theory. In Bergman's opinion (2004), a moral education program based on Noddings's TC might be classified as a feminine variant of character education if one modifies it thoroughly, as the two share important characteristics. According to Bergman (2004), these important characteristics

are important to mention as they are the foundational tenets of care-based moral education and virtue-based character education:

Both character and care proponents agree that moral education should be directed at producing better people and not just better principles or reasoning. Nonetheless, and secondly, both care and character educators do value moral reasoning, ... neither group believes moral principles themselves provide sufficient motivation for moral action. Thirdly, care theorists certainly respect the virtues. (p. 156)

Bergman (2004) continued his analysis by arguing that Noddings was mistaken when she claimed that virtue-based character education is promoting only a passive, individualistic, and rigid system of teaching and learning by stressing character education model is offering more than that. Moreover, according to Bergman (2004), caring might be considered as a different form of virtue because Aristotle has introduced relation centered virtues in his theories such as friendship. Therefore, Bergman (2004) concluded Noddings's criticizing/distinguishing argument of character education model and Virtue Ethics Theory is not strong enough

In Bergman's (2004) opinion, another problem Noddings encountered with separating the two approaches employed in moral education from each other is that similar to care centered education, virtue-based character education is also condition dependent. In his article, Bergman (2004) reported that even though some virtue ethicists promoting character education argued for the direct instruction of the teaching of virtues, in his book *Nicomachean Ethics*, Aristotle (2004) never suggested the direct instruction of the teaching of virtues in a classroom. On the contrary, Aristotle (2004) identified moral education as an active process of learning because the practice of the virtues is crucially important for one's internalization and excelling of the virtues. Moving from this point, Bergman (2004) claimed that interpreting character education as a passive model of moral education is inaccurate and scholars such as Noddings (2002a) are simply mistaken if they interpret character education so. With his article, Bergman (2004) reminded these scholars

the point that practice is at the center of Virtue Ethics Theory and ideally, at the center of the character education approach before discussing the strengths and the weakness of Noddings's TC.

The third and last section of Bergman's article (2004) is about how Noddings has accomplished incorporating women's values to theoretical moral thinking and the field of moral education through several of her publications. In Bergman's (2004) opinion, in implementing a two step plan, Noddings has attempted to redefine ethics using the perspective of women. Bergman (2004) identified the first step as pointing out why women's thinking has been categorized as problematic and evil in the Western tradition of theology³⁵ and in a field of research internalizing this theology. According to Bergman (2004), Noddings's second step is to incorporate female thinking into moral thinking and to prove that the language of this evil, the woman, does not command diabolic things.

Feeling satisfied with Noddings's argument on women's language only aims to develop a better self by supporting a more practical and earthly moral thinking, Bergman (2004) claimed in her crusade to prove that women do not deserve the titles (evil, diabolic, or half) dehumanizing them, Noddings has been successful. While feeling satisfied, Bergman (2004) warned the reason for Noddings's success is only based on her redefinition of moral thinking. Unlike the men's language representing the Western tradition of theology, this new and alternate language based on caring relationships discusses one does not have to be in "pain, separation, and helplessness"

35. John Milton (1667/2007) was a representative of this tradition, and in his long poem titled *Paradise Lost*, he poetically argued that one needed to embrace the ways of male thinking in moral living to re-enter the paradise. Noddings opposes to this argument and offers not just an alternative way of moral living to reach to paradise, but also an alternative concept of paradise in her book titled *Women and Evil* (1989). According to Noddings (1989), since Milton has already equated the moral ways of living male thinking, he leaves women no choice but possessing the category of evil if they insist on not to conform to the male thinking. In Noddings's (1989, 2003a) view, this is an inaccurate picture of moral living as women's way of moral thinking also has the capacity of building a paradise constructed upon ethical care, attentive love and happiness.

(Bergman, 2004, p. 160) to be moral and live morally. According to Bergman (2004), the road to live morally through caring is free of these limitations; however, has its own flaws, particularly with its reading of Virtue Ethics Theory and character education.

One of the building blocks of care education is to relate to students and help them benefit from these relationships when they are in the process of developing a better self and being moral. This connection between Noddings's TC and relational thinking in moral education is the next theme analyzed in this chapter.

Noddings's TC and Relational Thinking in Moral Education

The final theme that has been constructed through the ideas discussed in these articles is on how authors publishing on the aspects of relational thinking have included TC in their conversations and pointed out the connection between TC and relational thinking. Since the very beginning, Noddings's TC has been a relational theory of ethics that promotes the cultivation of moral thinking through the implementation of the ethical caring relationships. TC stressed the importance of having caring relationships in the educational settings and educating the students through these relationships. Caring educators know the importance of these relationships, while they also know that they "affect the lives of students not just in what we teach them by way of subject matter but in how we relate to them as persons" (Noddings, 2003c, p. 250). Focusing on this relational tenet of Noddings's theory, four different authors have discussed how Noddings's TC contributes to the concept of relational thinking in moral education.

In his article, Mark Tappan (2006) inquired how care perspective can be used to interpret the judgments of young people and to improve these judgments. During his inquiry, Tappan (2006) drew on one of the main abilities promoted in Noddings's TC: putting yourself in other's shoes. Tappan's perspective, the socio-cultural action perspective, is structured upon this ability

as Tappan (2006) connected Noddings's TC to his perspective and determined it is capable of describing the motivation for the moral behaviors of human beings.

The research data provided in this article is composed of Tappan's interview with a young woman describing how she has solved her moral problem/dilemma with her roommate. While reflecting on this woman's moral dilemma and the decision-making process she uses to handle this troubled situation, Tappan (2006) elaborated on his "socio-cultural action" perspective and told the reader how Noddings's TC might be used to analyze this woman's decision. According to Tappan (2006), the purpose of the socio-cultural action perspective is "to explore the relationship between the individual and the social, cultural, historical and institutional contexts in which the individual lives" (p. 3) and it imitates Noddings's TC in its approach, while explaining how one solves the moral problems in real life.

In his article, Tappan (2006) discussed how the individual he interviewed with, a student using this socio-cultural perspective, has altered her behavior based on the cultural values and the people with whom she interacted. In fact, according to Tappan (2006), the social relationships formed within her environment had been more influential in altering or shaping these behaviors compared to the written moral rules as the data proved. In his article, according to Tappan (2006), the student using Tappan's socio-cultural perspective discussed that she had to rely on her social and cultural experiences because the written rules had failed her in solving her problem and making the right decision.

In his article, Tappan (2006) also defended that moral thinking is a developmental process, which includes two important components: emotional thinking and putting yourself in the other's shoes to understand the situation while making a decision. These also happen to be the important characteristics of Noddings's TC, as TC encourages individuals to understand the

conditions of the cared individual (Noddings, 2003a). Through TC, Noddings (2003a) discussed one needed to have a certain degree of the capacity of emotional learning and this capacity is improved through these relationships. In his article, Tappan (2006) embraced this discussion of Noddings, while including TC in his socio-cultural perspective and detailing how TC has contributed to our understanding of the role of emotions in the framing of moral thinking and moral behaviors.

According to Tappan (2006), the social conditions one lives in defines one's capacity of emotional and moral thinking as these conditions determine with whom and how one builds relationships. Through these relationships (ideally, they are ethical caring relationships), one improves his/her capacity of emotional thinking. This capacity of emotional thinking is connected to our capacity of moral thinking, because emotions enrich/improve our moral thinking as we learn to socialize with other people (Tappan, 2006). Tappan (2006) acknowledged that Noddings's most important contribution to moral thinking and moral education is her explanation of the place of emotions in moral thinking, particularly how these emotions may explain the change(s) in our behaviors. In her research, Eva Skoe (2010) found how emotional thinking is linked to the moral thinking of an individual and presented the findings of her study supporting Noddings's argument of emotions.

In her article published in *JME*, Skoe (2010) investigated how emotional thinking is related to men's and women's care-oriented moral development. Skoe (2010) employed a quantitative research design, in which she used control and experiment groups of human beings. According to Skoe (2010), the data representing the results of her experiment supported Noddings's argument that emotional responses enrich the critical thinking skills we have and the behaviors we perform because they help us to adapt to our environment. Skoe (2010)

determined that motivational displacement and engrossment are the sampling emotional responses that help us to adapt to our environment; and these emotional responses have an important place in Noddings's TC.

Working through one of these emotional responses, motivational displacement, we can relate to the people surrounding us, move beyond our own interests, and react to their situation using our capacity of emotional thinking. In Noddings's (1984/2003a/2013) words, motivational displacement happens when the moral agent begins "feeling with" and "receive the other" (p. 30). Moreover, through motivational displacement, the caring moral agent begins to think for two different people, himself/herself and the other, and this is a skill needed in the practical real life because it helps people to become better reflective and transformative thinkers and better persons, who are caring and emotionally well (Skoe, 2010; Thayer-Bacon, 1997, 2003).

Continuing with the theme of TC and its connection to relational thinking and moral education, Jonathan Friday (2004), in his article, analyzed the problematic characteristics of moral theories that embrace universal and impartial thinking in acting morally and how these theories are implemented to moral education. Throughout his article, Friday (2004) also argued that even though certain moral theories (utilitarianism and Kantian moral theory) have claimed to offer satisfactory solutions to moral dilemmas in real life, their claims may not be so strong because "the procedure by which the theory-driven applied ethicist arrives at moral conclusions does not involve moral thinking at all" (Friday, 2004, p. 23). Friday (2004) did not list the names of the theories that did not involve moral thinking; however, he hinted that utilitarianism and Kantian ethics were the ones he focused on.

Earlier chapters of this dissertation provided information describing utilitarianism and Kantian moral theory, but a summary of these ethical theories here might be of assistance to the

reader. Utilitarianism is a theory developed by Jeremy Bentham (1748-1832)³⁶ and John Stuart Mill (1806-1873).³⁷ This ethical theory makes the distinction between right and wrong, good and evil, by looking solely at the outcomes/consequences of preferring one action over other actions and performing or not performing that action. In utilitarian thinking, there is only one guiding principle to behave morally, and that principle commands to “perform the action that will improve the greater good around the society” (Mill, 1864/1998). This principle is universally valid, meaning that it does not depend on the conditions or the personal traits of the individual performing the action. The assumption in this moral theory is that the moral thing to do is universal, and Friday (2004) summarized the basic assumption of utilitarianism as “good moral thinking (doing the right thing) consists of the unbiased application of normative moral theory to particular circumstances” (p. 24).

In contrast to utilitarianism, Kantian moral theory focuses on the intention of the moral agent when he/she performs the action while considering the consequences of the agent’s action as irrelevant. Kant’s moral theory does not attribute any importance to the consequences of actions because the consequence of an action should not have any bearing on the decision one

36. Jeremy Bentham was an English philosopher and a politician, who contributed and/or shaped the philosophical thought in the continental Europe. He had a wide range of area of research; yet he is mostly known for his work in moral philosophy as he became one of the founders of utilitarianism with John Stuart Mill. He provided the solid theoretical ground necessary for this theory as he discussed why individuals should aim to improve the greater good among the society when they acted. When making his case in *An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation* (1789/2010), he benefited from his intellectual richness in economics, laws, and politics; and offered a number of reforms in these fields. Considering the conditions of his era, Bentham was a radical as he defended the improvement of the women’s rights, abolition of the slavery, and the separation of the state from the church in the 18th and 19th centuries of the UK.

37. John Stuart Mill was an English philosopher and a social reformist, who constructed the theoretical foundation(s) of the utilitarianism. Just like his predecessor Jeremy Bentham, Mill had a wide range of area of research; but he is widely known for the establishment and development of utilitarianism. In his work, *Utilitarianism*, Mill discussed what utilitarianism is, what might provide the most happiness to the individual (the categorization of the utilities/pleasures), and claimed he found the proof for utilitarianism. He argued that women should have equal rights with men because like men they should have a right to vote and participate to the governing system. He also discussed that the hindering of the woman was an unwanted heritage of the ancient times, the dark ages of the Europe; therefore, it should be ended.

makes. Instead, in Kant's (1785/1993) view, the consequences prove to be unreliable and irrelevant; therefore, we need to be concerned whether the action conforms to the universal law, and focus on the performing agent's intentions. This is something to which Friday (2004) drew attention:

The distinction between good and bad moral thinking is not to be found in the conclusions reached through such thought, but rather in whether or not the thinker has structured their thought in accordance with the demands of moral theory. (p. 24)

According to Friday (2004), even though the philosophers arguing in defense of these theories and their practical implementations in moral education programs have good intentions, they ignore one important fact: the teaching of a moral theory through teaching its rules does not guarantee to improve the moral development of the individual. In his work, Friday (2004) was particularly concerned with this limitation and how it influences the decision-making process of utilitarian thinking compared to other theories of moral philosophy, as it promotes the impartial/neutral/objective reasoning in moral thinking. According to Friday (2004), the moral theories structured to be conditional do support the development of moral thinking better as these theories are not dependent on the rules or teaching of these rules.

In his article, Friday (2004) identified TC as a conditional/situational theory of moral education and argued that Noddings's TC is in a far more advantageous position in the successful teaching of morality compared to universal theories of morality because it teaches individuals to assess each condition independent of a moral rule. Thus, the success of a care-based education program is not dependent on the teaching of the moral rules; rather, it is dependent on the individuals and their understanding of the conditions. Considering this, Friday (2004) argued that lacking this feature, principled theories of moral philosophy and "the study of such moral theory and its application to moral problems will not make one a better moral

thinker” (p. 24). On the contrary, Friday (2004) concluded that, since TC is conditionally a care-based educational program may produce better thinkers who are capable of making decisions based on the conditions.

In Friday’s (2004) opinion, what makes one a better moral thinker and improves one’s moral judgment is not the premise and the description of the procedure applied relying upon this premise. On the contrary, the study of a moral theory and its implementation in moral thinking make one a better person and a better thinker when one realizes that it is the right thing to do for that person at that time, and this right thing changes based on the conditions in which he or she lives. This is reflective of the framework Noddings’s TC provides as Noddings (2003a) explained why she opposed the belief that good moral thinking is equivalent to principle based moral thinking:

What we do depends not upon rules, or at least not wholly on rules— not upon a prior determination of what is fair or equitable— but upon a constellation of conditions that is viewed through both the eyes of the one-caring and the eyes of the cared-for. (p. 13-14)

Friday’s (2004) analysis supported the argument that Noddings’s TC is a relational theory of moral thinking and promotes the formation and maintenance of these ethical caring relationships by educating morally rather than the implementation of the strict moral imperatives on which other moral education theories/frameworks rely. The final article discussed in this section analyzed the quality of the specific arguments made by Noddings. In his second article on Noddings’s TC, Bergman (2007b) reviewed the quality and the strength of the theoretical discussions of *Happiness and Education* (2003b), and *Critical Lessons: What Our Schools Should Teach but Do Not* (2006), both written by Nel Noddings. [Recall that in a different article, Bergman (2004) analyzed TC and compared it with Virtue Ethics Theory.]

In the review of *Happiness and Education* (Noddings, 2003b), Bergman (2007b) discussed Noddings's care-based framework of education, including the scope and the role of it. In her *Happiness and Education* (2003b), Noddings identified the purpose of education as happiness and in his analysis, Bergman (2007b) revealed where one can acquire this happiness: "in action, the practical life of human relationships in community" (p. 258). Being partially satisfied with Noddings's answers to the questions he posed in his article, such as "What does it mean to be happy? To be good? What is the relationship of my happiness to your suffering, to the suffering of children in other parts of the city, the country, the world?" (Noddings, 2003b, p. 258), Bergman (2007b) was sympathetic to Noddings's care-based framework describing the purpose of education and how these questions may work to educate one to be a moral individual.

In her book, Noddings (2003b) argued that these questions can be the very center of a moral education class; however, Bergman (2007b) disagreed with her, stating that these questions could only be the beginning, not the center of a whole class. According to Bergman (2007), Noddings at best overrated the influence of posing ordinary questions on the moral development of the students and on the students' critical thinking because, even though these are good questions, they are abstract questions in themselves. In his article, Bergman (2007b) continued to say that educators need a sound educational theory with a sound educational practice to apply and Noddings's TC is incapable of meeting this need. This sound educational theory should be implemented to have critical discussions in classrooms under the supervision of a caring teacher. The traits of this teacher and how he or she can improve the student's critical thinking skills is the main theme of Noddings's (2006) *Critical Lessons: What Our Schools Should Teach but Do Not*, and Bergman (2007b) turned his view to this theme in the second section of his book review article.

In his review of *Critical Lessons: What Our Schools Should Teach but Do Not*, Bergman (2007b) challenged Noddings over her definition of a good teacher, and how this teacher improves students' critical thinking skills through discussions. As Bergman (2007b) pointed out in his article, the good teacher is the teacher who dares to talk to students about critical issues and practices the art of talking. Moreover, Bergman (2007b) continued that even though being an expert in the subject knowledge this teacher teaches is the requirement to teach in schools, in the end, the art of talking is different from delivering this subject knowledge to the students. The art of talking includes the necessity of discussing critical issues when it is time, and the caring teacher could begin with the questions stated in Bergman's (2007b) article:

Is the best education for the best students really the best education for all? ... Is the reason we go to school to pass this test, to advance to the next grade, to earn a degree, to make a living—and how much of a living is or should be enough to make us happy? (p. 259)

The caring teacher knows that these questions are the very center of true education and “must never impose an answer, much less denigrate the beliefs or practices of any child, family, religion or culture” (Bergman, 2007b, p. 260). Asking the questions provided above is neither a job for teachers who are faint of heart, nor a task to be approved by parents who are obsessed with their students' Ivy League college applications. However, according to Bergman (2007b) and Noddings (2003a, 2013, 2015), it should be the job of all teachers if they want their students to be a happy and educated person in the real sense. In the end, through TC, Noddings mapped out (at least claimed to do so) a way to live happily and be a moral caring person through experiencing the ethical caring relationships. Noddings also mapped out how TC has been influential in the field of moral education and has contributed to the discussion of certain themes

Conclusion

In analyzing 20 articles about Noddings's TC from the *JME* from 2003 through 2013, the ideas of the authors discussing Noddings's TC might be grouped under five different themes as this theory related to their topics of interest and contributed to their discussions. These themes might be listed as:

1. School Culture
2. Teaching Through Culture/Teaching as Culture
3. TC as a Theory
4. Educating Morally
5. Relational Thinking

There are two different ways to reflect on and interpret these themes and how the authors used Noddings's TC in their writings. One way of interpreting them is to divide these articles into two main groups, whether they have acknowledged/praised TC. Another way of interpreting these themes as they demonstrate how Noddings's TC has been present in the field of moral education is to discuss how they relate to the relevant literature provided in the previous chapter. Here, both are provided.

The authors, using Noddings's TC to construct and present their ideas in their articles might be divided into two main groups. The authors of the first group of articles were quite critical about Noddings's theory. In their papers, these authors highlighted that, since it is a theory of emotions, TC is limited in scope and may provide unsatisfactory answers when it comes to answering questions that include the words "rights" and "obligation" and who is responsible for educating morally. In their articles, they usually constructed their concepts and compared these concepts with Noddings's theory and other theories of morality. These authors

usually concluded by saying that their concepts are more advantageous compared to the concept of moral care. For example, in his paper, Haydon (2006) discussed the need for a global theory of moral education and stated that his concept of moral respect has been a better candidate to this need compared to Noddings's TC and the moral value care promoted in her theory. The authors in the first group expressed their concerns regarding the shortcomings of Noddings's TC and defended the fact that these shortcomings are in fact, important limitations of TC.

In contrast to these authors, there exists another group of authors, who applauded Noddings's TC, and they explained the positive contributions of her theory to moral education research. In sum, they argued that this relational theory of ethics has been a solid foundation on which to build new concepts in education. For example, Johnson (2011) discussed how Noddings's TC has contributed to the Cultural Historical Activity Theory (CHAT) she developed.

A second way of reflecting on and interpreting these themes is to understand how they are addressed in the relevant literature. For example, the authors of the selected articles categorized under theme #one have connected TC to the construction of a morally better school environment. As a careful reader of the care in/as education literature and the person conducting this dissertation project, I expected this theme to be present in the articles discussing Noddings's TC, since the literature discussing TC was mainly concentrated on the positive effects of TC in building a morally better school culture, and a safer school environment (Baker, Terry, Bridger, & Winsor, 1997; Garza, 2009; Noddings, 2003b).

Similar to this point, the articles categorized under theme #five discussed relational morality, and their discussion concentrated on Noddings's TC, as it is the relational framework of ethics and education that has provided a large room in which to talk about relational morality

in education and teaching. The literature of moral philosophy and the philosophy of education provided in Chapter 2, have drawn attention to this feature of Noddings's TC (Thayer-Bacon, 1993, 1997, 2003); and the articles published in this journal proved that this large room has expanded.

As theme #three suggested, the debate regarding the status of TC, whether or not it is a legitimate theory of ethics and moral education, continued. This debate was mentioned in Chapter 2, and scholars have evaluated its scope and the unprincipled language of Noddings's TC and have shared their opinions and concerns on this issue. This debate has been part of a larger debate—moral rationalism vs. moral sentimentalism—and it eventually extended to other fields of research, as these fields of research have frequently interacted with each other. I expect this debate to be continued in the field of philosophy of education since this field has interacted with the fields of moral philosophy and moral education, and educational philosophers have also been involved in the construction and the analysis of new theories of education.

Theme #four presented an important insight regarding the utilization of TC as a theory of education. Noddings and her supporters interested in care-based moral education have defended the idea that TC is an important contribution made to moral education, as it has provided an alternative framework on which to rely (Maxwell & Reichenbach, 2007; Noddings, 1984/2003a/2013, 2002a). Educators and curriculum programmers like Rwantabagu (2010) have applied TC to the real practical life in the classrooms, and this served one of the main goals of Noddings in the construction of a practical theory of moral education, a theory that would bridge the gap between the theoretical knowledge and practical knowledge of morality.

The influence of Noddings's TC in the discussion of teaching through culture, Theme #two, was a theme expected to be present in the articles discussing Noddings's TC and its

connection to teaching through and teaching as a culture for two main reasons. First, Noddings presented her theory to voice the concerns and the experiences of people sharing at least one main culture, the culture of the home. Second, in Chapter 1, information has been provided regarding how Noddings treated the topics of diversity and different cultures within her theory.

In Chapter 4, the discussion regarding the influence of Noddings's TC in the field of philosophy of education from 2003 through 2013 is continued. Specifically, I employed the same methods of analysis on the data present in another journal representative of the field of the philosophy of education, analyzing and documenting the influence of Noddings's TC in the broader discipline of the philosophy of education from 2003 through 2013.

CHAPTER 4: THE INFLUENCE OF NODDINGS'S TC IN PHILOSOPHY OF EDUCATION: 2003-2013

In this chapter several definitions of the philosophy of education, an introduction to the *Journal of Philosophy of Education* (henceforth *JPE*), the journal selected as representative of the field of philosophy of education, and an explanation of the selection of the articles used as data in this dissertation are presented. The main focus in this chapter is to provide an analysis of the authors' ideas, which are the main sources of the themes, presented in the published articles of *JPE* as related to Noddings's TC. In this chapter, also interpreted are how the authors of the selected articles have approached and used this theory in their discussions. There were 16 articles that fit the criteria selected in this study, and I discuss the influence of Noddings's TC on the ideas discussed in these articles under four different themes. The word "theme" refers only to the group of ideas found in these journal articles. The analysis of these articles utilized the same techniques employed in Chapter 3, in which I documented and studied the influence of Noddings's TC in relation to the field of moral education.

What is Philosophy of Education?

The word "philosophy" means the "love of wisdom" (Noddings, 1995b/2011, Preface Section), and ancient Greek philosophers defined it as the pursuit of knowledge for its own sake while identifying it as a means of examining one's life. For example, in Plato's famous dialogue, *Apology*, Socrates argued that philosophy is the way to live a satisfactory life and is credited with saying that "an unexamined life is not worth living" (Plato & Tredennick, 1954). Different concentrations of philosophy have emerged (philosophy as language, philosophy as

women' studies, philosophy as education) within its several main branches (epistemology,³⁸ ethics,³⁹ metaphysics,⁴⁰ and logic⁴¹).

According to the editors of *The Blackwell Guide to the Philosophy of Education* (Blake, Smeyers, Smith, & Standish, 2002), the philosophy of education has been a relatively young field of research which “established its presence—as evidenced by publications, conferences, and academic appointments—slowly in the first half of the twentieth century” (p. 2). Several trends exist in the field of philosophy of education and, according to Noddings (1995b/2011), philosophers of education aim to address the questions of education: “What should be the aims or purposes of education? Who should be educated? Should education differ according to natural interests and abilities? What role should the state play in education?” (p. 4) depending on the trends or philosophical perspectives they embrace.

Philosophy of education tends to analyze the issues of education by “taking [them] apart” (Stone, 2003, p. 57) and clarifying these issues after a thorough discussion. Today, there are different branches of philosophy, including moral philosophy, analytic philosophy, philosophy of social science, and feminist philosophy, all of which fall into one or more of the four main branches mentioned above. For instance, some philosophers have studied education as a social

38. Epistemology is the branch of philosophy concerned with understanding the ways of knowledge. Scholars interested in this branch of philosophy usually ask questions similar to “What is knowledge?”, “How do we know what we know?” to acquire true knowledge if it is possible to acquire it (Maritain, 2005).

39. Ethics is the branch of study concentrating on the question of “What is the right thing to do?” and it is also known as moral philosophy. Throughout the history of ethics, philosophers have dealt with this question and have produced theories of ethics as their answers to this question (Maritain, 2005).

40. Metaphysics is the branch of philosophy where philosophers study the questions of existence and reality (Maritain, 2005).

41. Logic is the branch of philosophy, in which scholars systematically study philosophical statements, arguments, and theories (Maritain, 2005).

problem, and they have constructed educational theories through their studies (Dewey, 1916/2004; Freire, 1968/1996; Greene, 1973; Martin, 1984; Noddings, 1984/2003a/2013).

Pinning down a definition of the philosophy of education is somewhat difficult; different scholars offer quite different definitions. This difficulty is mainly the result of its characteristics, because it is considered to be an amalgamation of the various branches of traditional Western philosophy applied directly to the concepts and practices of education and schooling. With that in mind, I think it is possible to draw a general framework around the issues of philosophy of education.

Philosophy of education is the field of research in which scholars work on the problems of education using tools from the various branches of philosophy, such as clarifying language, analyzing issues using theoretical concepts, asking more questions regarding these concepts, and building theories that would answer problems in real life situations (Noddings, 1995b/2011). In her book, *Philosophy of Education*, Noddings (1995b/2011) stated that philosophers of education “are interested in analyzing and clarifying concepts and questions central to education. Long before there were professional philosophers of education, philosophers and educators debated questions familiar to contemporary philosophers of education” (p. 4).

John Dewey has been one of the most influential philosophers and educational theorists of the 19th and 20th centuries, and his influence has been present throughout his works. As one of the educational theorists and philosophers of his era, Dewey was very much concerned about the problems of education and schooling, and he posed philosophical questions that centered around the concepts of education. He also established the Laboratory School in Chicago in 1896, and experimented with education as he connected theory to practice.

Throughout his publications, Dewey argued that philosophy of education is essentially an experiential method of understanding the problems of education and schooling. Although Dewey worked on many issues centered around philosophy and education, the list of the questions he posed might be summed as: What is meaningful education? What should be the aims of education? What is the relationship between philosophy and education? Why is education important to the construction of a democratic society and how it functions in this society?' In one of his works, Dewey (1916/2004) has defined the philosophy of education as:

the educational point of view (which) enables one to envisage the philosophic problems where they arise and thrive, where they are at home, and where acceptance or rejection makes a difference in practice. If we are willing to conceive education as the process of forming fundamental dispositions, intellectual and emotional, toward nature and fellow men, philosophy may even be defined as the general theory of education. (p. 383)

Dewey continued to be an important figure in the history of philosophy of education, but he is not the only philosopher of education who has tried to offer a definition of philosophy of education. With his works, Dewey aimed to bridge the gap between the theoretical knowledge and the practical knowledge that has certainly been an effort to be applauded, considering that it is considered to be rarely possible. Susan Semel (2010) had the same aim in mind; however, she constructed a different definition of philosophy of education. In her book, *Foundations of Education: The Essential Texts*, Semel (2010) described the philosophy of education as the perspective that:

[It] helps practitioners to interrogate the 'how' and 'why' of life in classrooms, the choices that they make in their daily contexts of schools and beyond in the larger world of schooling. In order to comprehend fully the world of schooling, educators must possess a social and intellectual context (the foundations perspective). An understanding of the philosophy of education is essential in building this perspective. (p. 12)

Maxine Greene (1973), a pivotal feminist philosopher of education in the 20th century, has called for a liberating philosophy of education and has defined the philosophy of education

as “a conscious attentiveness to the actualities of lived experience in the classroom, to the common-sense realities in which sense-making begins. ... It is a free act, undertaken by a person as [the] center of consciousness” (p. 49-50). In her books, employing a philosophical lens, Greene (1973, 1978) analyzed the position of women in the history of educational theory and how women may contribute to the education and social life in an equal society. Even though, in some of her books, she asks the same questions posed by Dewey, her answers to these questions differ from Dewey’s because of her feminist standpoint.

The connection between the education and the consciousness has been analyzed more deeply by Paulo Freire and, in several of his works (1968/1996, 1993, 1998), Freire argued that true education aims to increase the consciousness of the individual, so that one could have a philosophical and critical stance, a presence in his/her life. In fact, Freire (1998) identified his perspective of the philosophy of education as “A presence that can reflect upon itself, that can intervene, that can compare, evaluate, decide, dream, and give value to. It is in the area of decision, evaluation, freedom, breaking with, option, that the ethical necessity imposes itself” (p. 26). In Freire’s (1998) view, the perspective of philosophy of education has dialogue at its center because it is an act of liberation which “takes place when there are two learners occupy [*sic*] somewhat different spaces in an ongoing dialogue” (p. 8).

As these definitions indicate, there are different perspectives that philosophers of education embrace, even though some of these philosophers are considered to be the members of the same school of thought in the field of philosophy of education. For example, both Greene and Noddings are identified as feminist philosophers of education, yet their definitions of the philosophy of education and how women’s voices should be included in the educational theory and research differ significantly. In her writings, Greene (1978, 1993) argued for the liberation

of women from household chores because she treated the connection of women to the home as a limitation. In contrast to Greene, Noddings (1984/2003a/2013, 2002b), with her TC, argued that the connection to the home is not a limitation, but is the ground for educational (moral) improvement.

Debates over the definition, scope, and focus of philosophy of education have lasted for a long time (Burbules, 2000; Burbules & Knight-Abowitz, 2008; Dewey, 1916/2004; Giarelli & Chambliss, 1984; Greene, 1973, 1995; Noddings, 1995b/2011; Stone, 2003), and a comprehensive analysis of these debates is beyond the limit of this dissertation. Considering the questions that philosophers of education posed and how these scholars answered these questions, it is sound to claim that philosophy of education is characterized as a theoretical field of scholarship. As a theoretical field of research, it has interacted with and integrated aspects of other theoretical fields of research, such as ethics, psychology, religion, moral education, history, and sociology, to name a few. Nevertheless, as an acknowledged field of inquiry, the theories generated by the philosophy of education are used as frameworks for scholars working in applied fields of research in education. The significance of philosophy of education is not limited only to theoretical fields of research.

Noddings's (1995b/2011, 2003c, 2006) perspective of philosophy of education is a philosophical perspective which encourages the utilization of dialogue and role modeling for educators. In fact, some authors (Gotz, 1999; McCarthy, 1999) argued that TC was the feminine version of the Deweyan perspective of philosophy of education because they shared important characteristics and they were concerned with the future of the philosophy of education as they discussed the possibility of connecting theory to practice. Both philosophers of education,

Dewey and Noddings, are interested in the problems of educational practitioners and ordinary people and used a practical, jargon free language to educate people on philosophy.

Noddings provided the details of her caring philosophy of education perspective and relational, care-based teaching in several of her books; however, she fully mapped out this perspective only in her book, *Philosophy of Education* (1995b/2011). In this book, Noddings (1995b/2011) explained that the field of philosophy of education has two main components: essentially, a knowledge of the history of educational philosophy and a practical, wise vision of issues and concepts of today's educational system. Therefore, in this book, Noddings (1995b/2011) provided a detailed scheme of this hybrid approach employed in the philosophy of education and how to teach it.

Noddings's TC, grounded in her philosophy of education, is represented in articles in the selected journal, *JPE*, as the authors of these articles have included TC in their conversations. According to Scimago Journal Ranking and Journal Metrics, *JPE* is a well-respected journal having represented the discipline of philosophy of education for a long-time period. *JPE* only publishes papers associated with research conducted in the philosophy of education and, according to the mission statement provided below, these articles should be:

representing a wide variety of philosophical traditions. They vary from examination of fundamental philosophical issues in their connection with education, to detailed critical engagement with current educational practice or policy from a philosophical point of view. The journal aims to promote rigorous thinking on educational matters and to identify and criticise the ideological forces shaping education. Ethical, political, aesthetic and epistemological dimensions of educational theory are amongst those covered. (*JPE*, 2017)

Even though *JPE* has published for more than two decades, I chose to use only the articles about Noddings that were published from 2003 through 2013. My focus is limited to this time frame because, in 2003, Noddings published the second edition of her monumental work,

Caring: A Feminine Approach to Ethics and Moral Education, and, in 2013, she published the last and the third edition of this book. I have used only the articles citing Noddings's TC as the main theme. There were 16 articles that fit this criterion, and these articles exemplified how Noddings's theory has been received and appropriated by the authors publishing in the field of educational philosophy.

Themes Present in *JPE* in Relation to Noddings's TC

Noddings's TC and Moral Thinking Through Relations

One theme that has been present within the articles analyzed is how Noddings's TC has contributed to the discussion of drawing a philosophical framework of the relational moral thinking of people. Three different authors (Carr, 2004; Cuypers, 2009; Papasthephanou, 2004) have discussed Noddings's TC in relation to the structuring and improvement of the moral thinking of students. Considering that Noddings's theory is a theory of moral philosophy and moral education, and the fields of moral education and philosophy of education often overlap/interact, it is expected to encounter the influence of TC in the discussions found in the field of philosophy of education, particularly when the authors are interested in the moral development of children.

Stefaan Cuypers (2009) is one of these authors. In his article, he discussed how Noddings's theory may be helpful in providing a new philosophical perspective on teaching morality. Cuypers (2009) argued that rule-bound perspective employed in teaching morality is a harsh method/perspective of teaching, resulting in fear in young children. Therefore, Cuypers (2009) continued it may have detrimental effects on the learning of young children. In order to strengthen his argument, Cuypers (2009) benefitted from Noddings's dismissal of principles as the motivating guide to moral thinking and used her words:

What we do depends not upon rules, or at least not wholly on rules -not upon a prior determination of what is fair or equitable- but upon a constellation of conditions that is viewed through both the eyes of the one-caring and the eyes of the cared-for. (Noddings, 2003a, p.13)

Using Noddings's (1984/2003a/2013) contra argument on how rules are incapable of motivating individuals to moral behaviors and should not be used in moral education as the primary source, Cuypers (2009) hypothesized that there is a relationship between individual autonomy and the advancement of moral thinking in the education of young students, and teachers need to improve this individual autonomy throughout their time spent with the students. In fact, according to Cuypers (2009), the individual autonomy of the young students may not improve, especially if teachers embrace a perspective that encourages following the principled perspectives of moral philosophies implemented in education and the teaching of these principles. In Cuypers's (2009) view, using rules in the moral education of the students might be problematic, especially in the education of young children because rules represent the existence of the external authority and they "make use of ways that undermine such responsibility-relative authenticity" (p. 200) in young children.

In his article, Cuypers (2009) defended the idea that being responsible is an essential trait of the morally educated person, and he suggested that teachers should develop this trait in their students using alternative methods of teaching such as caring-based practices. According to Cuypers (2009), these caring-based practices teach students how to construct a healthy notion of dependency to other people and an autonomous identity that will balance this dependency with individual actions leading to the proper and moral ones. In TC, Noddings (2003a) explained the function of dependency on others in learning how to be moral/care as:

We are dependent upon the strength and sensitivity of the ethical ideal— both our own and that of others— we must nurture that ideal in all of our educational encountered. I shall claim that we are dependent on each other even in the quest for personal goodness.

How good I can be is [*sic*] partly a function of how you— the other— receive and respond to me. (p. 6)

Building this healthy notion of dependency within the individual requires to form caring relationships, which is one of the main purposes of an educational system promoting Noddings's TC (Noddings, 1984/2003a/2013, 2002a, 2003b, 2005). As discussed earlier in this dissertation, since relational teaching of morality is an important aim of TC; some scholars (Carr, 2004) categorize TC as promoting a romantic and spiritual framework in the teaching of moral education, improving moral behaviors and philosophical thinking in students.

David Carr (2004) is one of these scholars and, in his article, he argued that Noddings's theory is essentially a romantic theory of education, but this does not mean that it is irrelevant to educational philosophy and educational thought. According to Carr (2004), supporters of this romantic theory of education put "emphasis on the proper cultivation of sentiment and feeling, [which is] a mechanism of de-centering" rational thinking from morality (p. 236). According to Carr (2004), scholars publishing in the field of the philosophy of education have opposed this de-centering of the rational thinking often; however, this romantic theory, TC, may be beneficial in promoting a different kind of environmental ethics and improving the moral thinking of the students through the relationships they form with their surrounding environment because [before] "we can really think rightly about or behave appropriately towards the environment we must first care about it, and caring is no less a matter of emotional attachment and aesthetic appreciation than of right reason and conduct" (p. 226).

In his article, Carr (2004) claimed that compared to other theories of moral philosophy, the romantic theory of Noddings's TC may provide a better ground to discuss and analyze environmental ethics education. According to Carr (2004), an environmental ethics education focusing on care encourages students and teachers to ask questions centering around both care

and the relation to the surrounding environment. Carr (2004) imagined that these students and teachers would ask questions focusing around caring about someone or something. [Remember Noddings's discussion on caring about and caring for, which is provided in Chapter1.] Carr (2004) claimed that the questions formed as a result of the implementation of TC in the classroom might begin a great class discussion or a new group project that might be of interest to students and community surrounding the school.

In that light, Marianna Papasthephanou (2004) stated a potential disadvantage of individualistic moral education while highlighting the connection of being part of a community and having a philosophical perspective encouraging this community connection. In her article, "Educational Critique, Critical Thinking and the Critical Philosophical Traditions" Papasthephanou (2004) argued that current liberal education programs found in the schools may not take into account how communities have influenced one's critical and moral thinking skills. Drawing on this limitation further, Papasthephanou (2004) offered to move to the moral education programs, such as communitarian education programs, which embrace a care-based education philosophy. According to Papasthephanou (2004), unlike these care-based communitarian education programs:

Liberal educational moralist or strategic 'reading' of response does not constitute a proper responsiveness to the other's desire: what is missing is the destabilising quality of eros that questions the subject's sovereignty instead of glorifying it. Too much educational emphasis on the preoccupation with the self and serving its needs produces one self-referential voice, a limited entrapping order of articulation (system) and many echoes. (p. 371)

In Papasthephanou's (2004) view, self-referential voice problem is an important tissue to tackle with; thus, one should shift his/her focus to understand the needs of others if he/she wants to avoid the problem. In her article, Papasthephanou (2004) stated that the perspective aimed at meeting the needs of others requires a relational understanding of morality, which balances the

inner wellness with communal learning and the dependence on the community, improves one's thinking skills. With the relational teaching component offered in TC, Noddings offered a synthesis that would balance these two; and Papasthephanou (2004) identified this advantageous synthesis as the only solution to the self-referential problem. Understanding this is a difficult synthesis to form from the scratch, Papasthephanou (2004) offered to use Noddings's (1996) synthesis, which is detailed in Noddings's article named "On Community."

In this article, Noddings (1996) defended the function of the community is "the basis of his [one's] spiritual existence" (p. 254). The improvement of one's inner wellness and spiritual existence is not something the liberal educational programs may primarily aim as they pay "too much educational emphasis on the preoccupation with the self" (Papasthephanou, 2004, p. 371). Papasthephanou (2004) concluded her article by arguing that unlike care-based communitarian programs, since the teaching philosophy these programs structured around do not deliberately focus on relating to students and the needs of others; they can not build a community and an individual at the same time.

An educational perspective and a system designed to promote Noddings's TC requires a relational perspective in teaching, an approach that will highlight the importance of relating to students, and this new approach is interested in "feeling with" others, not analyzing their thoughts or feelings as information units (Noddings, 2003a, p. 177). A relational basis of teaching and the connection among Noddings's TC, relational teaching, and students' needs is the next theme analyzed in this chapter.

Noddings's TC, Relational Teaching, and Students' Needs

The contribution of Noddings's theory to the discussion of relational teaching and understanding students' needs is a theme present in the articles selected for and analyzed in this

dissertation. Five different authors (Benporath, 2003; Goodman, 2008; Noddings, 2003c; Tubbs, 2005a, 2005b) discussed Noddings's theory in connection to the nature and quality of teaching. In fact, one of these authors happened to be Noddings herself. In her article, (Noddings, 2003c) first constructed two distinct arguments related to care-based teaching, then criticized Alasdair MacIntyre's (2002) frame of ideal teaching.⁴² Noddings (2003c) claimed that any effort to represent teaching as a practice to achieve certain ends misses the moral value and flavor of teaching while limiting its focus merely to common core standards and standardized testing. Noddings (2003c) first discredited the rationale behind the standardized testing and claimed it to be sloganistic. Then she questioned the teachers, educational policy-makers, and politicians about their insistence on this sloganistic and standardized form of education:

What can all children learn? This is not a trivial question, and we should be given [*sic*] careful attention. Even if we were able to answer that question satisfactorily, we would still have to recognize that, beyond common basics (and we are not even sure what these are), every student needs a great deal more. But what is needed differs from student to student. (Noddings (2003c, p. 243)

In this excerpt, Noddings (2003c) drew attention to the uniqueness of the students and explained that each student has different needs to be fulfilled. In caring classrooms, a teacher's primary concern is to identify the needs of students by building trusting and caring relationships with their students. In Noddings's (2003c) view, deep down, a good teacher is a caring teacher, who knows that these relationships also benefit the students because they "form a foundation for the effective transmission of both general and specialised knowledge" (p. 250). Therefore,

42. In this discussion article titled "Alasdair MacIntyre on education: in dialogue with Joseph Dunne," Alasdair MacIntyre (MacIntyre and Dunne, 2002) defines what teaching is and elaborates on his framework of good teaching. One of the major claims found in this article is that the good teacher is and should be only interested the practice of teaching of the subject material well, which equates the teaching practice to something "never more than a means" of delivering subject knowledge to students (MacIntyre and Dunne, 2002, p. 9).

according to Noddings (2003c), a good teacher is also a morally caring teacher, who is “committed to establishing and maintaining relations of care and trust” (p. 250).

In this article, Noddings (2003c) provided more details regarding how the teaching practice is understood in the general society, while criticizing the conventional understanding of teaching practice. Noddings (2003c) argued that the conventional framework of teaching is not a great choice for students with diverse needs as it structures teaching as a mechanical practice. Moreover, Noddings (2003c) continued through this framework teachers have to allocate a large amount of time for teaching to high stakes testing rather than to understanding their students and meeting these students’ needs. In her article, Noddings (2003c) claimed this is an unsustainable and ineffective framework of teaching because the influence of the teachers embracing the conventional framework of teaching is destined to fade away when the class is over. In contrast to these teachers, caring teachers provide a continued inspiration for their students to learn because they:

are keenly aware that they might have devastating effects or uplifting effect on their students. Some of these effects last, or at least are remembered, for a lifetime. This first great good of teaching—response-ability and its positive effects—is clearly relational. Teaching is thoroughly relational, and many of its goods are relational: the feeling of safety in a thoughtful teacher’s classroom, a growing intellectual enthusiasm in both teacher and student, the challenge and satisfaction shared by both in engaging new material, the awakening sense (for both) that teaching and life are never-ending moral quests. (Noddings, 2003c, p. 249)

Reporting that the conventional approach employed in teaching limits the continuity of learning, Noddings (2003c) claimed it should be replaced with a better approach to teaching, preferably with the caring and relational one. According to Noddings (2003c), the key to improve students’ thinking skills and truly educate them is to inspire the students to learn more. Noddings (2003c) observed that the inspiration to learn is an internal motivation to learn, and this motivation is not associated with external conditions (i.e. moving to the next grade, getting

a recommendation letter for college applications, or getting a monetary reward from his/her parents). In the end, according to Noddings (2003c), the good teachers are the affectionate and caring teachers, who are remembered after college, because these caring teachers take the time to relate to the students and understand their needs. As a matter of fact, in Noddings's (2003c) view, understanding the needs of their students is partially dependent on being expert on the subject knowledge, since having pedagogical knowledge is a necessity in identifying the moments of disconnection in learning and knowing how to motivate the students:

I still remember with great affection a university professor of mathematics who halted a lecture with a very stressed class to say, 'This isn't a matter of life and death, you know'. After a collective sigh of relief, we worked together to figure things out. We were encouraged to concentrate on learning and co-operation instead of competition and acing the test. (p. 249)

Being uncomfortable with Noddings's framework of relational and care-focused teaching practice, which promotes situational learning dependent on students' needs, Nigel Tubbs (2005a) claimed that Noddings's theory, and the relational teaching practice associated with it, has several limitations. In his article, Tubbs (2005a) discussed these limitations in detail even though he admitted Noddings's TC might provide more room to study the practical implications of a relational framework in teaching and education.

According to Tubbs (2005a), one limitation of this theory was that it should be implemented only in the smaller home sphere because of the concerns of inequality. Similar to the concern voiced by Singer (2004) in Chapter 1 of this dissertation, Tubbs (2005a) discussed that if Noddings's TC is applied in larger public settings such as schools there will be concerns of inequality. Therefore, Tubbs (2005) did not imagine TC had the potential to overcome the concerns of inequalities and stated:

Noddings's ethic of care does not survive the transition of the relation of the one-caring and the cared-for into the civil sphere precisely because there it is forced to suppress its

inequality. Care in parenting and schooling is power, and is recognised as such in the onesidedness [*sic*] of those relationships. Care in civil society is the power of market relations, but is misrecognised as equality in the formal mutuality between persons. (p. 212)

In Tubbs's (2005a) opinion, Noddings's TC has been incapable of promoting equality in the larger society because it does not argue for the equal rights between the carer and the cared-for. As a matter of fact, in Tubbs's (2005a) view, in an education system designed upon care theory, there will always be cared-for students getting certain rights and goods, not because they deserve it based on the notion of equality but because they are vulnerable or needy. Using teachers' perspective, Tubbs (2005a) viewed this as a serious limitation of Noddings's TC because it tends to ignore the teacher's needs or discuss the struggles teachers experience.

In Tubbs's (2005a) opinion, this limitation is rooted in how TC defines the job/task of teachers based on the power they have on their students; teachers are not identified as the vulnerable party in a caring relationship formed between the teacher and the student. In his article, Tubbs (2005a) drew attention to this limitation and argued TC should be modified to pay equal attention to the teachers' needs as well as to the needs of the vulnerable students. For Tubbs (2005a), lacking an interest or being silent in discussing the needs of the carer/teacher party is troublesome for both TC and Noddings because these signal that "Noddings deserts teachers in their hours of need" (Tubbs, 2005a, p. 215).

Noddings's silence on the needs of the caring party/carers became the basis for Tubbs's criticism of TC, and this is a common concern raised against Noddings's TC. The original grounds for this criticism might be traced back to the first edition of the *Caring* book (Noddings, 1984), in which Noddings devoted only limited space to discussing the needs of the caring party while she describes the ethical and natural caring relationship and the vulnerability/dependency of the cared-for at length.

Another criticism of Tubbs (2005a) regarding Noddings's TC is that it is limited in scope as it is more concerned with the well-being of individuals living in proximity. In his article, moving from this limitation, Tubbs (2005a) claimed that, compared to other theories of morality, such as utilitarianism and Kantian moral theory, TC is an easy theory to apply if the individual is not bothered about having a limited morality in his or her life. Employing this limited lens of morality, the caring teacher only pays attention to the students he/she knows and pays little attention to the students' rights or basic needs if they live on the other side of the world.

Sympathetic to the criticism Tubbs (2005a) developed regarding Noddings's theory and its promotion of a needs-based thinking approach to teaching and moral thinking, in her paper, Joan Goodman (2008) argued that a teaching pedagogy favoring needs-based thinking is a difficult and burdensome teaching task for professional practitioners and parents. Goodman (2008) drew on the characteristics of the natural caring relationship formed between a mother and an infant, and she claimed this relationship may not provide a satisfactory background to moral thinking and educating one morally.

In her article, Goodman (2008) discussed that natural caring relationships, from which ethical caring relationships develop, are troubling because they are need-based and paint pictures of dependency between two parties, not the path to better thinking and improved moral understanding. In Goodman's (2008) view, people should distribute rights based on their moral obligations to each other, not based on their dependency or the significance of their needs. Unlike Noddings (1984/2003a/2013), Goodman (2008) described these caring relationships to be the ground of constant struggle between two parties, the child and the parent:

The needs of both child and parent are multiple and often opposed the relationship is essentially ambivalent: a constant holding-close and letting-go, leaning into and resisting. The enormous challenge for parenting (and teaching) and for care theory is how to strike a coherent balance. Tip too far in the child's direction and risk a poorly adapted adult.

Tip too far in the adults' direction and risk distorting the child's emerging self. No two care-takers will reach the same judgments—making parenting so endlessly various— but all, if they are conscientious, will be constantly alert to the tradeoffs—making parenting so endlessly difficult. (p. 234)

In her article, Goodman (2008) pointed out that Noddings's (1984/2003a/2013) observation of the caring relationships described only a limited view of the educative connections occurring between parents and children, as education is more than the conversations parents have with their children. Goodman (2008) argued that, due to this limited, even biased, observation, Noddings's framework of ethics and education lacks the answer to the question of how to balance between the children's needs and the parents' needs. In fact, according to Goodman (2008), lacking a satisfactory answer to this question constitutes an undesired situation for Noddings and her relational theory of education because it fails to address the difficulties parents and teachers face when they try to teach through TC (Goodman, 2008). In Goodman's (2008) view, a more reliable observation describing the caring relationships is needed, as the relationships described by Noddings (1984/2003a/2013) are hardly the source of being moral or provide a sufficient background in learning to live morally. Finally, in Goodman's (2008) interpretation, care-based education and the TC complicate things even further because:

Caring theory, with its emphasis on empathy, compassion, and attentiveness to the child's present state undervalues the role of adult restraint and imposition in a rounded caring philosophy. Parents (and teachers) must continuously balance gratification with suppression, support with restraint, engrossment with detachment. (p. 233)

I think an important flaw with Goodman's reading of TC is that she ignores TC is all about shaping moral knowledge and moral education through relationships. Considering this, it is natural for TC to be structured around the language of the mother and operate on a relational framework of education rather than describing and assigning a role for each parent and their child(s). Finally, Noddings (2003a, 2003c, 2005) never undermined the role of adults in shaping

the moral knowledge of the child as she identified the function of the caring parent and teacher as a major tenet of her theory. On the contrary, for Noddings (1984/2003a/2013, 2002a, 2010b), parents, particularly mothers play a crucial role in shaping the moral thinking and moral education of the individuals; and this makes TC an important and influential member of the maternal theories of education.⁴³

The influence of maternalism in education is present in discussions about the role of feelings in education and how women contribute to educational thought and philosophy (Martin, 1985, 1992, 2002, 2011; Noddings, 1984/2003a/2013; Nussbaum, 2000, 2004, 2005). As a feminist philosopher of education who constructed a theory of ethics and education using the lens of women, Noddings (2003a, 2003b) discussed how certain feelings (joy and happiness found in a caring relation) motivate students to improve their moral thinking and be moral persons. For instance, in her book, *Happiness and Education* (2003b), Noddings related happiness to the satisfaction of children's needs and discussed that "Happiness should be an aim of education, and a good education should contribute significantly to personal and collective happiness" (p. 1).

Even though Noddings felt confident regarding her claims that TC is fully capable of the fulfillment of children's needs, Sigal Benporath (2003) disagreed with Noddings and challenged her stance on this issue. In her article, Benporath (2003) argued that Noddings's theory, at best, was an optimistic theory of education that preferred care and attention, feeling and emotive capacities, and the students' needs over school discipline and the curriculum taught and valued in

43. Several frameworks of maternalism in connection to feminism exist in feminist thought, sociology, and political studies (Koven, & Michel, 1993; Ladd-Taylor, 1993, Ruddick, 1989), and I view maternalism as a concept which is originated through and during the historical movements of feminism. I associate Seth Koven and Sonya Michel's (1993) framework of maternalism with TC because they define maternalism as "ideologies and discourses that exalted women's capacity to mother and, applied to society as a whole, the values they attached to that role: care; nurturance; and morality" (p. 4).

schools. Benporath (2003) drew on Noddings's preference for the maternal language and the presence of this language in TC. Throughout her article, Benporath (2003) challenged the potential educational implications of maternal educational theories and the practical influence of the maternal language in an educational theory.

Similar to Tubbs (2005a) and Goodman (2008), Benporath (2003) claimed that Noddings's TC has a hard time with balancing the rights and interests of two parties in a relationship. Benporath (2003) analyzed this issue on a somewhat different scale compared to Tubbs (2005a) and Goodman (2008), and asserted that schools need to be more paternalistic if they want to be in the business of educating students for future moral societies. Different than Noddings, Benporath (2003) believed that these moral societies and the social communities of the classrooms represent a small part of these larger moral societies and happen to be just societies at the same time:

Many times society's aims challenge or disregard personal ones, and therefore a just society must assign specific adults (parents, teachers, health-care professionals) to protect the interests of the more vulnerable members of society. The fulfillment of adults' obligations in schools, as in other public institutions, should take the form of protective paternalism—it should take into account not only the expressed views of children (whenever possible), but also a careful interpretation of their interests. (p. 141)

In her article, Benporath (2003) defended the idea that there must be a balance between care-based (maternalistic) education and individual rights and justice thinking based (paternalistic) education. Otherwise, the child's best interests would not be served adequately. Benporath (2003) drew heavily from Noddings's TC when she sampled TC as the influence of the maternalistic in education and teaching. In Benporath's (2003) opinion, maternalistic pedagogies of education like TC have been grounds to the problematic applications found in education because even though "it is not clear that additional rights can in fact promote children's well-being" (p. 128), they still assign additional rights to children. In fact, Benporath

continued (2003) with these additional rights, the problem of educating the children about who should be responsible for what portion, becomes even more complicated.

Throughout her article, Benporath (2003) argued that the function of schools is and should be different from the function of the homes. Therefore, these two spheres of living (home and school) need to be separate, not combined. Furthermore, Benporath (2003) claimed that societal institutions like schools need to embrace a protective paternalistic education system, not a maternalistic one because maternalistic approaches to education function on the core principle of vulnerability, and this principle “creates immanent inequality between children and adults” (p. 127). In fact, according to Benporath (2003), schools need to operate on an equal respect and equal rights pedagogy, not on a caring based pedagogy, if they want to solve this problem and serve society and its members as they deserve.

There are three problems with Benporath’s argument if my interpretation of TC is accurate. The first problem is that Benporath’s (2003) interpretation of Noddings’s TC as a maternal theory of education that only addresses the problems of women is inaccurate since Noddings (1984/2003a/2013) repeatedly stated caring is not limited to one gender and there are male examples of carers. The second problem with Benporath’s reading of TC is that the vulnerability of the cared-for is the front view compared to the discussion of the rights of the both parties involved in this relationship, because TC prefers the forming and maintenance of the human relationships over individual rights.

The third problem with Benporath’s (2003) argument is that the best interests of the child may not be determined without relating to the child and encouraging the child to obtain some sort of access to self-knowledge. In Noddings’s (2002a, 2003b) view, the caring parents demonstrate their love by discussing certain important decisions with their children, employing

positive and constructive ways of talking. Imagining that these discussions ideally serve the child's best interests for educating the child to morally care, Noddings (2002a, 2003b) encouraged the adults, especially parents to have these educative conversations with their youngsters. These discussions compose a certain type of dialogue Noddings (1989, 1995c, 2002b, 2003b, 2005, 2013) had in her mind, while educating the child to develop a better self. Throughout her article, Benporath (2003) view these conversations to be additional rights provided to children and by nature, adults need to know how to handle these problems.

Unlike the previous authors (Tubbs, Goodman and Benporath), who challenged Noddings's TC over the issue of maternal thinking in moral education and how to balance the needs of the cared-for with other important concepts that require deep thinking, Megan Lavery (2004) aligned herself with Noddings on maternal and relational thinking in moral education and claimed that TC has been positively influential on moral development and teaching pedagogy. In fact, according to Lavery (2004), since Noddings's TC is a maternalistic theory of education and uses the language of the mother, Noddings's effort has merit in itself and TC should be discussed in more detail.

Throughout her article, Lavery (2004) constructed her pro argument discussing the inclusion and implementation of maternal thinking in the education of young children. Her pro argument of TC focused on the detrimental effects of the power differences present in the relationships formed between adults and children (Lavery, 2004). Due to these power differences and some other psychological and social factors that affect the adults participating to these relationships, the paternalistic thinking in education, which defends adults should be the sole responsible in the students' education, has its own disadvantages:

Adults cannot be trusted always to do what is in the child's best interests: children have been, and continue to be, subject to the most violent abuses from parents, welfare and

educational institutions, war and political turmoil, and are at these times particularly vulnerable to the exploitations of the mass media. It follows that we need, in our communities, to think very carefully about what children are owed as children. (Laverty, 2004, p. 302)

In the introduction section of her article, Laverty (2004) first provided a detailed chronological account of the philosophical debate between maternal and paternal thinking in education, then described how this debate/competition has created quite a tension in the academy. In Laverty's (2004) view, this tension is divisive in several ways; therefore, we need to eliminate it if we are unable to combine maternal thinking and paternal thinking. In the final section of her article, by posing the questions provided below, she called for the integration of the male and female languages and perspectives influencing education:

Are there ways to ensure the protection of children that do not make the difference between adults and children dangerously divisive? How are we properly to address the power dynamic of the adult-child relationship? A genuine interest in children as human beings—with appetites and souls—seems a step in the right direction. (Laverty, 2004, p. 303)

Any theory of education essentially has a connection to and a framework that describes how students should think and learn, because at some point it defines or recommends ways to improve student thinking using the theory suggested. Noddings's theory is not an exception to this, and how it contributes to student thinking is the next theme to be discussed in this chapter.

Noddings's TC and Student Thinking

Student thinking and its connection to Noddings's TC is another theme that has been discussed in the articles I have analyzed for this study. Five different authors discuss TC in connection with the development of the students' thinking, including empathy and thinking, thinking through the experience, caring and its contribution to the discussion of the development of moral education and critical thought.

In his book review article discussing *The Ethics of Care and Empathy* by Michael Slote (2007), Paul Smeyers (2010) constructs two major arguments in favor of the theoretical improvement of TC. In his first argument, Smeyers (2010) states that the debate between caring ethics and justice ethics is not recent; it is almost 30 years old, hence, it is past time for scholars to move beyond this debate. In fact, according to Smeyers (2010), by now scholars should be discussing how to improve without endangering its status in the fields of moral philosophy and philosophy of education. As part of his theoretical discussion about how Noddings's TC might complement other theories of moral philosophy, Smeyers (2010) provided a detailed account of this debate before moving to Slote's framework of care ethics, which is reconstructed around empathy. As Smeyers (2010) is interested in the potential improvements to TC, he reviewed Slote's book and his framework of care-based thinking and the caring philosophy. In his book review article, Smeyers (2010) promoted Slote's (2007) construction of the just and caring society and the law found in this just society using the emotional concept of empathy:

A society is just to the degree or extent that its laws, institutions, practices, attitudes, and customs are just, i.e. in terms of ideals of empathic caring that apply at the level of social groups; and further 'a law is just if it reflects or expresses empathically caring motivation toward their compatriots on the part of the legislative group that is responsible for passing it ... less demandingly, a law is just even if it merely fails to reflect or exhibit a lack of appropriate empathic concern on the part of those who promulgate it.' (Slote, 2007, p. 95)

In his second argument in favor of the theoretical improvement of TC, Smeyers (2010) elaborated on Noddings's TC and compares it with Slote's empathy included version of care. Smeyers (2010) pointed out that Noddings's original theory, the one without the inclusion of empathy, has a hard time providing a satisfactory answer to the issue of critical thinking and autonomy. Smeyers (2010) identified this to be a necessary move in overcoming the limitations of TC and stated that with Slote's inclusion of empathy, care ethics and TC shall have a better argument constructed on the issue of teaching and discussing critical thinking and autonomy

because in empathy included TC “the autonomous person is seen as not afraid of his or her own desires or aspirations; she realizes the initial human capacity for thinking and deciding things for herself” (p. 174).⁴⁴

In relation to student thinking and philosophy of education, Azadeh Osanloo (2008) evaluated the contribution of Noddings’s theory to students’ critical thinking in her book review of *Critical Lessons: What Our Schools Should Teach but Do Not* (2006) by Nel Noddings. Noddings’s theory promotes inner motivation to act morally and encourages people to know themselves better. In Noddings’s (2006) view, the questions that could lead to the improvement of critical thinking and moral living are “What sort of person am I? What sort of person should I become? What does it mean to be good? To be happy?” (p. 215-216).

The questions provided above require the skill of self-reflection, which I think is the basis of critical thinking and philosophizing in Noddings’s (1995b/2011, 2006) view. In her book review, she claimed that in Noddings’s view, “critical thinking [is synonymous to reflective thinking for Noddings] is a necessity for schools in particular and liberal democratic society in general” (Osanloo, 2008, p. 341). The teaching of critical thinking in schools is only possible through extensive, sometimes off the topic discussions, and these discussions may not happen within the boundaries of a designed curriculum. Moreover, high-quality teachers are needed to lead these discussions because “without teachers specifically addressing controversial issues, critical thinking does not exist readily in schools” (Osanloo, 2008, p. 341). Apparently, the term ‘high-quality teachers’ defines teachers who are experts in their curricular subject, but also have the skill of using this curricular knowledge to discuss controversial issues beyond, or even outside of, the written school curriculum. [In Chapter 3, this skill is defined as *the art of talking*

44. In her article titled “Complexity in caring and empathy.” Noddings (2010b) describes why she has used sympathy not empathy, when she is constructing TC.

under the theme *Noddings's Theory of Care and Relational Thinking in Moral Education* and Roger Bergman (2004) discussed it in connection with the characteristics of the caring teacher.] Students may ask personal questions after experiencing a care-based critical thinking: “What happens to my family if my father does not return from his tour in Iraq? Who will care for my family after his death?” I have constructed these questions based on my reading of Noddings, but I am sure several other questions might be constructed too.

Personal questions provided in the above paragraph represent the personal and cultural experience of the students and how they reflect on these experiences when they perform critical thinking. The influence of culture and one's experience with the culture over one's critical thinking and doing philosophy has attracted the attention of Nigel Tubbs (2005b), and to elaborate on this influence he writes his article titled “The Culture of Philosophical Experience.” The notion of culture in philosophical thinking and how culture contributes to the philosophical thinking compose the center point of Tubbs's article. In this article, Tubbs (2005b) discussed that culture is a necessary ingredient to consider when it comes to philosophy and thinking, while he is pointing out how TC discussed the culture to philosophical thinking as it explained one's moral judgment level based on one's firsthand experiences, living conditions, and culture. Tubbs (2005b) drew on this explanation of TC and determines culture is a concept which:

has a specific educational meaning and import within speculative philosophy. It refers to the way in which an idea or an experience, in being known, re-forms itself in this being known. Ideas without such a notion of culture or re-formation tend towards dogma because they are asserted without philosophical or educative significance. (p. 219)

Tubbs (2005b) identified Noddings's TC as a theory promoting the contribution of culture to philosophical thinking because it highlights the importance of women's culture in philosophical thinking and education. Moreover, one can adopt several different cultures as one can be the member of various cultural groups such as being a Black, lesbian, graduate student.

According to Tubbs (2005b), teachers embracing Noddings's TC acknowledge their culture to educate their students morally, and this culture might be any form of culture including the women culture present in Noddings's TC:

If teachers cannot see how they are re-formed in their struggles with theory and practice, then not only are they destined to repeat the abstraction of culture, they are also denied the means to learn from these difficulties. In short, denied of the notion of education as culture, as their formation and re-formation, they are denied themselves as an object of philosophical thinking ... The philosophy of the teacher aims to retrieve the culture of the teacher, not least in response to the appearance of their work as increasingly apolitical. (p. 220)

Cultural thinking is an advantage when it comes to the teaching of critical thinking, as educational policies and programs that define critical thinking in the schools of today are the cultural products of the society. Additionally, in today's world, critical thinking is not a skill that is only associated with numerical and book thinking. It is a skill that is also associated with 'practical street thinking' (Crawford, 2009) and political thinking. This critical thinking skill could be acquired through experiencing the different forms of culture, such as school culture, teacher culture, and student culture. One way to experience different forms of culture is to pose questions about several cultures in schools and to think critically about these questions and the answers provided to these questions. A number of questions serving this purpose may be originated; however, I borrow a representative set of questions present in the second edition of Noddings's *Philosophy of Education* (2011) book:

Do we as Americans demonstrate the universal values embraced by cosmopolitanism? Should immigrants to America give up their ethnic culture and give first priority to being American? Should we be open to learning from others whose values are different from those we have been taught to accept? Should we be critical of some of these values? (p. 213 - 214)

The questions written in the above quote are philosophical questions in nature. Different programs of education are applied around the USA and the world to improve students' critical

thinking; and in her article, Maughn Gregory (2011) analyzed one of the oldest philosophical programs for teaching young children in the USA. In a group discussion over how this program, Philosophy for Children (henceforth P4C), has been influential in the philosophy of teaching literature, Gregory (2011) discussed the main tenets of this program. While discussing these tenets, she names a number of the educational theorists the program's executive staff followed. Noddings is one of the educational theorists, who has had some influence on this program.

According to Gregory (2011), one of the main tenets of P4C is that it strives to teach critical thinking and educational philosophy employing a “caring thinking” approach (p. 200). In her article, Gregory (2011) reported this program of the philosophy of education promotes an understanding of teaching philosophy to young children through living it and reflecting on their first-hand experiences. The developers of the program do not push young children to read difficult and complex texts of ancient philosophical thought, instead they encourage the children experience critical thinking using philosophical methods of inquiry by helping them interpret their experiences through reflecting on these experiences. Gregory (2011) summed the mission of the program as teaching philosophical thinking and/or improving critical thinking to the individuals using a teaching pedagogy composed of “self-examination, a certain ethics of dialogue, communal caring” (p. 201).

I have discussed somewhere along Chapter 1, how dialogue is an important part of Noddings's TC and her care-based philosophy of education and relational teaching. In Noddings's (2013) view, “The purpose of dialogue is to come into contact with ideas and to understand, to meet the other and to care” (p. 186) because it provides the opportunity to understand the others' reality and thinking. Noddings (2002a, 2003a/2013, 2006, 2015) encourages teachers to use TC in their classrooms and have a dialogue with their students

regarding ordinary life issues on which students and teachers have differing opinions. In fact, according to Noddings (2006), it is not possible to care and teach something to individuals, especially to the young individuals without having a dialogue with them first because “One function of dialogue is to help us and our students to reflect upon and critique our own practice. It gives us an opportunity to ask why we are doing certain things and with what effect” (p. 230-231). Agreeing with Noddings on the function of dialogue within teaching, Gregory (2011) argued that teaching philosophy and improving students’ critical thinking skills through dialogue is an effective method used in the P4C program.

Teaching philosophy through living is part of an important debate in the field of philosophy of education and several philosophers (Freire, 1998; Greene, 1973, 1978), including Dewey (1916/2004) contributed to this debate. Following Dewey’s ideas in educational research, Geoffrey Hinchliffe (2011) attempted to answer the question ‘What is a significant educational experience using a Deweyan perspective?’ and discussed TC in connection to student thinking and Dewey. In his article, Hinchliffe (2011) argued that TC has encouraged the teachers to promote the construction of the significant educational experiences in diverse settings, particularly in a caring home environment.

In Noddings’s theory, a caring home environment is the first place to have this experience; therefore, home learning is as valuable as school learning. According to Noddings (1993), by nature, any caring relationship has its own educational value because ideally, the educative caring experience is a result of a social and continuing caring relationship, and this caring experience present in home environment transcends schooling:

When we say that learning is not the only purpose of schooling, we do not have to invent activities demonstrably devoid of learning and show they are somehow valuable. All we have to do is to point to activities that we think are worthwhile and that we would

continue to promote even if we could not state what children are learning from them. (p. 735)

In his article, Hinchliffe (2011) discussed the importance of ‘experience based home learning’ and sided with Maughn Gregory, John Dewey and Nel Noddings on promoting having practical learning experiences and extending the scope of learning to settings outside the schools. over the importance of teaching using other methods and curricular tools. Throughout the article, Hinchliffe (2011) elaborated on the differences between the significant educational experiences and the conventional educational experiences, while arguing that an experiential curriculum structured around care may be the grounds for constructing these significant educational experiences. In Hinchliffe’s (2011) opinion, traditional turgid book learning should be replaced with a liberating caring curriculum not only because the traditional school curriculum may not be the grounds for the significant educational experiences, but also the liberal caring curriculum has supported the idea that “Excellence (and a significant educational experience) can take many forms” (Hinchliffe, 2011, p. 428).

As an additional point to this discussion, Hinchliffe (2011) claimed teachers implementing this liberating caring curriculum knows that “there is no point in compelling children and students to undertake subjects for which they have no liking or aptitude” (p. 428). Similar to Hinchliffe, Noddings (1993) structures this liberating care-based curriculum as the curriculum, in which a wide range of courses exist, and students learn to care after experiencing a thematic learning approach. Unlike the students of today, who follow the prescribed and test-driven curriculum, and students benefiting from this liberating care-based curriculum “would follow programs in which these interests would be allowed full play ... its students could invent, construct, repair and maintain machinery ... the list is endless” (Noddings, 1993, p. 740).

In his article, as an interesting point of the discussion, Hinchliffe (2011) discussed how a significant educational experience included in a liberal caring curriculum can improve the student's thinking through the co-creation of "*eureka*" moments. Hinchliffe (2011) defined this special *Eureka* moment, in which the student understands the material, relates to and reflects on his/her experience with the material. His definition provided in this article was similar to the awakening moment found in an educational curriculum constructed around Noddings's theory. In Hinchliffe's (2011) words, this eureka moment "can often come about when a pupil or student manages to make a connection or link with material that is clearly related but has not been explicitly mentioned thus far" (p. 429). These eureka moments are the results of the interaction between the student and the social environment, he or she has, and Noddings (2003b) observes these awakening moments in which "the challenge and satisfaction shared by both in engaging new material, the awakening sense (for both) that teaching and life are never-ending moral quests" (p. 249).

Student learning and how to design educational environments in order to improve student learning is an important issue to investigate for philosophers of education (Dewey, 1916/2004; Freire, 1968/1996; Martin, 1985, 2002, 2011; Noddings, 1995b/2011, 2013). As discussed in the introduction section of this chapter, the philosophers of education use unique lenses to define the ideal education, and most of the times these lenses have been used to construct educational policies. The fourth and final theme found in this chapter discussed the influence of Noddings's TC in educational theory and its contribution to the development of educational policy.

Noddings's TC as A New Perspective and Theory on Educational Policy

Noddings's TC and its influence on the realm of educational policy is another theme that was present in the articles selected for this dissertation project. Three different authors (Knight-

Abowitz & Roberts, 2007; Sockett, 2009; Stitzlein, 2013) discussed TC in connection with theoretical thinking in educational philosophy and with recent developments in the field of educational policy established in the micro and global sense. All articles analyzed under this section are book review articles. Each one presented in this section discussed how the selected book was connected to Noddings's TC and eventually became a topic to analyze in the article.

Kathleen Knight-Abowitz and Jay Roberts (2007) analyzed *The World is Flat: A Brief History of the Twenty-First Century*, written by Friedman (2007). In their words, Knight-Abowitz and Roberts (2007) were especially interested in the "notion of the social contract, the moral centre of Friedman's hopeful vision of a globalised world" (p. 471). Even though they were impressed with Friedman's hopeful vision of a globalised world and an educational system to carry out this vision, they still challenged this vision and benefit from Noddings's TC in order to strengthen their review.

In the introduction to their article, Knight-Abowitz and Roberts (2007) described the processes (economic changes, the influence of the political establishments, and the wide spread of the Internet) that have paved the way for the globalization trend in education. Then, they named the educational theorists interpreting the influence of this globalization trend in education, and Nel Noddings was one of those theorists. As an educational theorist interested in the philosophical studies of education, Noddings (1995b/2011, 2005, 2015) has written on how globalization changes the educational landscape.

Noddings's account of global/universal education and how it changes educational theory and schooling as we know it can be summarized in these words quoted in Noddings words: "Children are not equal in their capacity for academic learning, and a universal, academic curriculum may well aggravate academic differences" (2003a, p. 30). Noddings's TC is a

perspective frequently employed in education; however, according to Knight-Abowitz and Roberts (2007), Friedman did not favor this perspective in his book for several reasons. In Knight-Abowitz and Roberts's (2007) opinion, Noddings's care-based perspective on education called for a more inclusive thinking in schooling and education. However, TC does not side with Friedman's system/perspective of education which promotes one standard culture and the educational system created within this culture, while Friedman (2007) defends an education system based on contract theory referenced back to Rawls (1971):

social contract provides a rationale for how a government can re-distribute resources so as to provide all workers with education and training opportunities at all levels, similar to the life-long learning initiatives in the European Union and elsewhere. His social contract not only involves educational investment but a ringing endorsement of the idea that schooling is primarily an instrument for economic prosperity of individual and nation. (Knight-Abowitz and Roberts, 2007, p. 475)

In Knight-Abowitz and Roberts's (2007) view, Friedman's global account of education and schooling was a utilitarian account of education, and it should not be preferred by educational policy makers. It acknowledged that human beings should have ideals in education, but these ideals rely on external goods, such as better schools that graduate the students who score in the top percentile of the Programme for International Student Assessment (PISA) test and compete in the world economy. Considering these disadvantages, Knight-Abowitz and Roberts (2007) concluded in any education system serving to this end and promoting this ideal:

schools, students, teachers, and administrators increasingly feel the pressure to 'perform' and 'achieve', terms borrowed from the market, popular texts such as *The World Is Flat* feed into perceptions that our schools, like our corporations, must be made more nimble [*sic*], efficient, and productive. ... This moral vision (*in education*), however, is dangerously naïve. (p. 478-479)

In her *Educating Moral People: A Caring Alternative to Character Education*, Noddings (2002a) opposed the negative terms and effects of globalization in education (competition, teacher pressure, sloganized education, and the reign of standardized tests in schools). In

Noddings's (2002a) view, globalization resets the priorities of education and there is confusion regarding the needs of society and aims of the education provided in societal institutions because of this resetting. Knight-Abowitz and Roberts (2007) acknowledged Noddings's caution regarding the aims of education and agreed with Noddings on what should be prioritized and aimed for in education. Their position on this argument with Friedman (2007) became even clearer when they quoted Noddings (2002a):

The society does not need to make its children first in the world in mathematics and science. It needs to care for its children to reduce violence, to respect honest work of every kind, ... to produce people who can care. (p. 94)

The second article analyzed in this theme was Hugh Sockett's (2009) book review about the influential theorists of education. In this article, Sockett discussed how the development of the field of educational policy could be analyzed using the unique self-portraits of important educational theorists. Nel Noddings had written a chapter for this book, *Leaders in Philosophy of Education: Intellectual Self-Portraits* (2008) edited by Leonard J. Waks. In the chapter written for this book, Noddings (2008) described her relation to the philosophy of education and policy shifts in education, and, according to Sockett (2009), this chapter represented how she was influenced by "the women's movement" (p. 169) in education.

In his article, Sockett (2009) explained how Noddings's work is different from the works of other feminist philosophers and scholars, such as Iris Murdoch and Patricia White. Even though these two scholars have also written about "the absence of women in (analytic) philosophy of education" (Sockett, 2009, p. 169), Noddings's work with caring, education, and TC signaled a different direction in educational philosophy, policy, and women's philosophical thought. In his book review, Sockett (2009) drew on Noddings's TC in order to argue in defense of this different direction.

Noddings's TC signaled a direction in which women's contribution to educational philosophy is important because it sees the world from an alternative perspective, specifically focusing on the relational bonding experience of women, not on the general experiences of women described by Roland-Martin (1985, 2002, 2011). It is true that they are both trying to include women into educational philosophy and change the educational policy in this direction. However, they focused on distinct character traits of women's thinking. In promoting the moral value care, Noddings reinitiated the debates found among feminists about how women should be viewed in society at large: the same and equal or different and equal. The former centered on the belief that until society (men) see women as having the same ability as men, they will never be considered equals. The latter argued, as in the case of Noddings's TC, that women are not the same but, nevertheless, they should be considered equal.

The third and the final article analyzed in this section was an article written by Elizabeth Stitzlein (2013), and in this article, she reviewed the quality of the arguments present in *Dear Nel: Opening the Circles of Care (Letters to Nel Noddings)* (Lake, 2012). Stitzlein's (2013) review had been about this book edited by Robert Lake, and Stitzlein's (2013) aimed to provide a review discussing how TC has contributed to our thinking on many issues (family relations, relations with students, and how Noddings's career was shaped by these relations) and general educational research (educational standards, teaching through care, and applying the care ethics in her life). The review article did its job in a simple way, and Stitzlein (2013) criticized this simplicity.

In Stitzlein's (2013) opinion, the book represented a noble effort to explain the importance of Noddings's TC in educational research, but that is all the good things she could say about this book. She found several problems with the book, but her main concern was

related to the rationale for the grouping of chapters as circles are ill described and need to be detailed by stating “It is unclear to the reader whether these circles are divisions of life that Noddings herself has asserted” (Stitzlein, 2013, p. 663). In general, Stitzlein (2013) criticized Lake’s style of discussing the need to compile this book, his job as the editor of the book and she was uncomfortable with the quotations present in this book, as she claimed the selected quotations were either irrelevant to Noddings’s work or are incapable of representing TC’s true strength.

I agree with Stitzlein’s (2013) criticism that Lake’s book should be more comprehensive and provide a better argument regarding the construction of the circles/themes and that the chapters should be categorized in a better way. However, I think the book has more merit than Stitzlein (2013) claimed because of several reasons, including that it is the first book of its kind to study and document the influence of Noddings’s TC in educational research, and its simplicity may be appealing to other readers if not to the academicians. Finally, there are two major problems with Stitzlein’s reading and analysis of this book, and they need to be reported here.⁴⁵

One problem with Stitzlein’s review of this book is that Stitzlein (2013) looked for rigid lines that separate the personal/relational chapters from the public/research chapters discussing Noddings’s life and work and how these contributed each other. In her review, Stitzlein (2013) criticized that the chapters are grouped based on a rationality unknown to the reader and there is no target audience for this book. I think Lake (2012) had purposefully avoided answering the

45. Unlike Stitzlein (2013), I categorize *Dear Nel: Opening the Circles of Care (Letters to Nel Noddings)* as a good resource to start with if one wants to understand the influence of Noddings’s work in educational research as a general field of scholarship. I agree with Stitzlein over her criticism claiming that this book should have been more comprehensive in scope and provided a better introduction argument discussing how he has ended up with the circles/themes it has, the chapters should be categorized in a better way. However, I think these criticisms Stitzlein (2013) voiced may only be the beginning point of the possible modifications to the book and an important discussion about Noddings’s TC, which is a very important theory for the continuation of the certain discussions present in the fields of moral philosophy, moral education, and philosophy of education.

questions of “why” and “who” as he wanted his book to reach a wide group of people interested in Noddings’s work.

The second problem with Stitzlein’s (2013) current review of Lake’s book is that I think she wanted this book to be the textbook of a hypothetical *Introduction to Noddings’s Caring:101* course, but the book failed to undertake this job. In my opinion, there exist two reasons for this failure. First, Lake (2012) never intended this book to be a textbook. Second, compared to other theories of education, such as Dewey’s experiential education and Montessori’s naturalistic education, Noddings’s TC is still a very young theory of education and ethics; therefore, the scholars are far from agreeing on the scope and the content of the words composing the vocabulary of TC, meaning that there is a lot to be studied within TC and its contributions to the relevant fields of research.

Noddings’s TC is a theory, framing an educational policy representing the “new scholarship” described by Roland-Martin (1986, p. 10), and by using the language of the excluded other, this theory and an educational policy constructed upon it would, ideally, address a number of concerns many people have. How this theory has addressed these concerns, contributed to the discussions mirroring these concerns, and influenced the field of philosophy of education have been the focus of this chapter. The four themes analyzed in this chapter represented these discussions, and they helped me explain the influence of Noddings’s TC in philosophy of education. The interpretation of these themes concludes this chapter.

Conclusion

In analyzing 16 articles about Noddings and TC from the *JPE* published from 2003 through 2013, the ideas of the authors published in this journal within the selected time frame

might be categorized under four different themes as they related to Noddings's TC. These themes are:

1. Moral Thinking Through Relations
2. Relational Thinking and Students' Needs
3. Student Thinking
4. Educational Policy

There are two ways to reflect on and interpret these themes and how the authors used Noddings's TC in their writings. One way of interpreting them is to divide these articles into two main groups, whether or not they have acknowledged TC. Another way of interpreting these themes as they demonstrate how Noddings's TC has been present in the field of philosophy of education is to discuss how they related to the relevant literature provided in the previous chapter. Here, I offer them both.

The authors using Noddings's TC to construct and present their ideas in their articles might be divided into two main groups. The authors of the first group of the articles have been quite critical about Noddings's theory. These authors have pointed out the drawbacks of this theory; therefore, their articles have been quite critical about Noddings's theory. For example, in her 2008 article, Goodman argued that this theory promoted a need-based perspective in educational thought and in the philosophy of education, and it had a hard time determining whose needs should be identified and met first.

In contrast to these authors, there exists another group of authors, who have applauded Noddings's TC and have pointed out the advantages and positive contributions of this theory to educational thought and the research in the philosophy of education. For example, in her article published in 2008, Osanloo discussed how Noddings's TC had contributed to culturally relevant

critical thinking, and educators serving in classrooms may begin great discussions that might improve students' critical thinking skills by giving them the opportunity to talk about controversial issues affecting their living conditions. If a teacher embraced this theory, then the teacher acknowledges that there is no one way to start these discussions and there are multiple answers to the questions posed in these discussions, as all the questions posed are unique and all the answers received in response to these questions are subjective and valuable in themselves.

A second way of interpreting these themes is to understand how they are addressed in the relevant literature. For example, the authors of the selected articles categorized under theme #one have discussed how the discussion of TC is relevant to the discussion of relational thinking and the improvement in the moral thinking of students through relations. With the relational framework it provides, TC has significantly contributed to the discussion of the relational and emotional thinking in educational philosophy also. Considering that particularly influential scholars have categorized Noddings's TC as a relational theory of ethics and thinking, it is expected that this theme be discussed in the articles. I have provided these authors' opinions in Chapter 2 under the section of women's contribution to the philosophy of education.

As theme #two in this chapter suggested, Noddings's TC has contributed to the discussion of meeting diverse student needs after understanding these needs. TC has become a natural party to this debate because, in her writings, Noddings (1984/2003a/2013, 2002a, 2003b, 2005, 2015) devoted a significant amount of time to understanding the reality, the problems, and the needs of the cared-for students and offers teachers several strategies to meet these students' diverse needs. Finally, I expect this debate to continue further as the teachers serving in the schools meet with groups of students from more diverse backgrounds each school year.

Theme #three concentrated on student thinking as the articles contributed to the connection between TC and the development of the students' learning of philosophy and critical thinking through empathically thinking and experience. Noddings (1995b/2011, 2003b, 2005) promoted the idea that emotions could support the development of critical thinking and philosophical thought through caring relations and emotional dialogues teachers have with their students. TC's insistence on the reliance on emotions within all types of critical thinking and moral decision making has found a place in the fields of moral philosophy and in the philosophy of education, particularly in the discussion of whether emotions can replace reason in moral philosophy and in the discussion of emotional reflective thinking, as presented in Chapter 2.

The articles present in the final theme of this chapter discussed the contribution of Noddings's TC to theoretical thinking in education and educational policy. Theme #four focused more on the general representation of TC in educational policy, educational theory, and philosophy. The literature provided in Chapter 2, signaled that TC has been a theory of major influence in the field of educational theory, and theme #four has confirmed this influence.

Chapter 5 is composed of three different sections. The first section presents concluding thoughts regarding this dissertation project. The second section is the section; in which the limitations of this project are noted. In the third and last section of Chapter 5, I humbly offer a number of suggestions for future research that might be of interest to the future researcher who wants to learn more about this theory and its involvement in educational research.

CHAPTER 5: CONCLUDING THOUGHTS

In Chapter 5, the themes as they relate to the larger literature of moral philosophy, moral education, and philosophy of education are interpreted and these themes are presented as the findings of this research. I reflect on the connection of these themes to TC and the relevant literatures of moral and philosophy of education. More information is provided regarding how this study might be limited only to the articles published in the representative journals within the pre-set time frame. In this chapter, several recommendations are offered that might be conducted as future research on Noddings and TC.

Nel Noddings's (1984) work about care has provided the theoretical basis for this concept in educational research. Scholars have primarily used and cited her books and/or articles when they referred, reflected on and analyzed the concept of care in more detail; therefore, in most cases, the TC has become the starting point for discussions related to care in education, ethics, and relevant fields of research. The influence of Noddings's TC and how it has contributed to the research in more practical fields of education has been documented by the studies of several scholars;⁴⁶ however, understanding the influence and the potential contributions of TC will be incomplete without research implemented in the more theoretical fields of education. This is an important gap to be filled in educational research, as these more theoretical fields are more relevant to Noddings's TC and they harbor and cultivate the main lines of argument mirroring the influence and the contribution of TC to the ongoing discussions in these fields. With this dissertation, my aim was to fill this gap in the larger literature of educational research and to

46. See the works of Salehian, Heydari, Aghebati, Moonaghi, & Mazloom (2016) on nursing education; Chalke, (2013) and Goldstein (1998) on early childhood education; and Louis-Seashore, Murphy, & Smylie (2016) on educational administration.

document the influence of Noddings and TC within a certain time frame in moral education and the philosophy of education.

As mentioned in Chapter 1, the fields of moral education and philosophy of education frequently interact with each other, while scholars publishing in one of these fields trade ideas with scholars publishing in the other field; thus, certain debates in these fields tend to co-occur. As a matter of fact, it is very difficult for one to draw a line separating moral education from the philosophy of education or vice versa. Still, in order to properly document the possible influence and contribution of TC fully in several debates, and for the sake of the clarity of the issues/themes debated, I approached moral education and the philosophy of education as two distinct fields of education. This approach helped me to explain the influence of TC on the issues discussed by other authors and to underline this influence several times, which also improved the quality of this project as it clarified a number of connections of TC to several topics related to educational research.

Providing insights regarding the influence of Noddings's TC in the fields of moral education and the philosophy of education required a systematic reading of the articles present in *JME* and *JPE*, as these articles documented how TC has contributed to the discussion of certain themes in these fields. Although the number of articles discussing Noddings's TC in these journals was overwhelming; my focus was on the articles fitting the criteria of being published between the years of 2003 and 2013 and having treated Noddings's TC as the main issue within the text. The number of articles fitting these criteria and published in the *JME* was 20, and I grouped these articles under five different themes based on the discussed in them in connection to Noddings's TC. Similarly, 16 articles fitting these criteria were published in the *JPE* during the same time span, and their connections to the discussion of TC in the field of the philosophy

of education are discussed under four different themes. The themes discussed in this dissertation reflect the areas, in which Noddings's TC has been most influential.

Throughout the articles analyzed in this dissertation, the connection of TC to these fields were discussed using themes. The themes presented in Chapters 3 and 4 raised the suggestion that the influence of TC in moral education and the philosophy of education has co-occurred as the authors publishing in both fields of education have discussed similar educational issues. Identifying this co-occurrence, the connection between moral education and philosophy of education has been an important finding of this study even though that was not my prior intention when conducting it.

The connection between these two fields of education has resulted in the discussion of certain topics to be repeated. Moreover, the discussion of certain topics, such as the scope of TC and how it deals with the important questions of moral thinking and education have been repeated over time, meaning that the topics to which TC is connected have gained attention from diverse groups of scholars and have influenced their way of thinking as they have used TC in their articles. The attention of these scholars, at least the attention of the ones published in *JME* and *JPE* from 2003 through 2013, has presented itself as a number of themes in this dissertation.

The influence of TC in moral education and the philosophy of education has gone undocumented for a long time; however, it is beginning to get attention (Bergman, 2004; Lake, 2012; Stitzlein, 2013). The lack of this documentation has been a problem both for understanding the influence of an alternative perspective/theory of education in educational research and the modifications/developments done to this theory due to the criticisms it has received. I have documented this influence by looking at how it has shaped the direction of conversations related to schools, cultures, teacher student relationships and additional

conversations, which are named as themes in this dissertation. The dissertation at hand has contributed to the relevant literature by clearly documenting Noddings's TC's influence because the dissertation pointed out exactly to which concepts it has contributed as the authors of the selected articles appropriated TC.

As the reader of this dissertation might remember, the first theme presented in Chapter 3 discussed TC's connection to the school culture. The articles analyzed under this theme either stated TC's potential to build a better school environment or provided a descriptive picture of what schools would look like in the absence of a care-based teaching and relational perspective of education. This was an expected debate for me to witness in the field of moral education considering that Noddings (1995a, 1996, 2002a, 2003b) has described what caring classrooms look like and has repeatedly defended the nurturing effects of the caring classrooms on students.

TC has been a theory of moral philosophy and moral education, which offers to redefine the concept of the "practical ethics." Moreover, it has had implications for teaching through culture, as both teaching and culture are dynamic and relate/connect to the social and practical aspects of real life. This connection is important to note here because it is the direct consequence of the two notable changes TC has brought to the table of moral philosophy and education: Noddings's (2003a/2013, 2005) defiance of the dominant male voice found in mainstream ethics and moral thinking, and Noddings's insistence on hearing the diverse and alternate voices, which are mostly muted and unheard, in moral thinking and education. One way to hear these alternate voices is to include teaching through culture to the teachers' inventory of teaching methods and encourage its practice in the classrooms.

In Chapter 3, the discussion of theme #two was mostly in favor of this inclusion and the kind of culture TC embraces while elaborating on the connection between TC and teaching

through culture. In the original version of the theory offered in the first edition of *Caring* (Noddings, 1984/2003a/2013), Noddings did not necessarily connect TC to culture or cultural learning. However, I think TC already has a cultural flavor in it as this theory is derived from the culture of the home sphere. This, in fact, is a point of discussion in one of the articles analyzed under this theme, and this discussion/debate is expected to continue as other scholars from diverse backgrounds continue to be involved in this debate.

The current debate centering around the status of TC, whether or not it is a sufficient/legitimate theory/framework of moral thinking and education, is a theme that appears in both Chapters 3 and 4 with different names: TC as a theory and TC and educational policy. The literature presented in Chapter 2 documented the general information on this debate, and I anticipate it to be discussed in the field of moral education and the philosophy of education. However, these themes have offered more detail about this debate, which has grown to a large extent when compared to the original debate presented in Chapter 2. To a large extent, the debate has grown because scholars have not only limited their focuses to the status of TC but also have discussed its possible implications for moral education, philosophy of education, and educational theory and policy when they have debated TC's status.

In Chapter 1, the reader was familiarized with TC and its characteristics, including relational teaching, women's language, and the alternate way of thinking it proposes. According to Noddings (1995a, 2002a, 2003a, 2005, 2011), to apply care-based teaching requires one to use relational thinking in teaching, and this represents an important change that deeply concerns those in the fields of moral thinking, moral education, and philosophy of education, as this change relates to the philosophy of teaching, child pedagogy, and the teaching of philosophy. Naturally, this shift is present in the debates (theme #three in the *JME* and themes #s one and

two in the *JPE*) occurring in the representative journals selected for this study, as relational thinking is one of its most obvious features.

Theme #two in Chapter 4 concentrates on students' rights and how one might interpret these rights when employing TC and other theories. The authors, whose articles were analyzed in this chapter, have participated the debate about how this shift has influenced, and will continue to influence, the educational research, and they have argued that TC is the cause of this shift as this shift is understandably promoted by TC. There have been several articles in *JPE* mirroring this shift and these authors have responded to TC and contributed to the relevant literature when they have tried to answer the questions: 'How do we balance students'/childrens' needs with their rights and parental obligations?' or 'How do we serve the best interests of the children?' Documenting TC's connection to these questions and the problems of education represented in the selected articles demonstrates how Noddings's TC has influenced two different fields of education within a pre-set time frame. The contribution of this study to the larger educational research literature becomes even more significant when the analysis and the interpretation of the articles revealed that TC has been particularly influential on the discussion of several themes/educational issues.

As one might remember from Chapters 1-3, TC is a theory addressing the questions: 'What is moral knowledge? How do we teach moral knowledge to students so that they will become morally educated individuals? and Whose knowledge is considered to be worthy of teaching as moral knowledge?' Almost each one of the themes discussed in Chapters 3 and 4 has touched upon to at least one of these questions, underlining the fact that TC is concerned with educating (individuals) morally; hence, the debates in which TC is relevant are more likely to be the debates addressing the questions found in moral education. This is an anticipated result as

the literature surrounding TC is focused on these questions, although I had expected the articles present in these journals to offer additional themes of discussions other than these.

I think the repetition of particular themes in Chapters 3 and 4 has been both an enrichment and a limitation to this study. On the one hand, I consider the repetition of certain issues in the articles selected for analysis in this dissertation as an enrichment because it has provided an opportunity to analyze TC's influence on the discussion of these themes and how it contributes to these themes in a deeper way. On the other hand, I recognize this to be a limitation of this study as these themes have suggested TC has been influential only on the discussion of certain educational issues found in the fields of moral education and the philosophy of education. One may interpret this as limiting the influence of TC to only a couple of discussions related to care and relational thinking, which might be an inaccurate interpretation as TC has also contributed to the discussion of issues that have not been analyzed in these journals.

Limitations

This study has been successful in documenting how Noddings's TC has been influential in the fields of moral education and philosophy of education as it has identified the issues discussed in connection to Noddings's TC in these fields within a pre-set time frame. However, it has limitations. These limitations do not alter the importance and/or contribution of this dissertation to the relevant literature and educational research; yet they need to be discussed. In light of this, I want to mention them here, as they are relevant to the research design and future research suggestions. It is also my hope that future researchers reading this dissertation make the necessary improvement(s) to their research after analyzing these limitations and dealing adequately with them.

The themes documenting the influence of Noddings's TC are limited to the articles selected for this dissertation project, meaning that the criteria used to select these articles are also limitations in this study. The discussion describing and documenting the influence of Noddings's TC in these fields of education was limited to the articles published *JME* and *JPE*, and this interpretation might potentially be different if journals other than *JPE* and/or *JME* had been selected.

The intent in this study was only to analyze how Noddings's TC influenced the discussions occurring in the fields of interest. Therefore, it was designed to explain this influence by analyzing only the articles that discussed Noddings's TC as a main theme in the text within a pre-set time frame. Due to time constraints, my analysis of the articles was limited to a time framework of 10 years and two different journals. However, this study might have provided a different and a more detailed picture if a longer time frame had been used as a criterion in the selection of the articles. Being aware of this limitation, future researchers might use a longer time frame of publication, for example 20 years, and provide a quite different argument documenting the influence of Noddings's TC.

At the beginning of this dissertation project, I limited my focus to the journals publishing high quality articles in the selected fields of education, as I was interested in documenting the influence and the contribution of Noddings's TC in these fields by analyzing the discussions to which it has contributed from 2003 through 2013. However, the influence of TC has been vast and has, thus far, spread to other fields of educational research (Rice, 2016), and the detailed discussion of the literature in each one of these fields was beyond the limits of this dissertation. Thus, the reader of this dissertation should be aware of the fact that the literature cultivating this study was limited only to the fields of moral education and the philosophy of education.

Following the limitation stated in the paragraph above, this study used only a small sample of articles discussing Noddings's TC as their authors' main theme in the selected areas of research. Another researcher, who does not want to divert his/her focus in either area of research, may use more than one journal representative of these fields and analyze these journals while comparing the themes/discussions they provoked based on the influence of TC. A study of that kind may include the discussion of additional themes that have not been discussed in this dissertation, and may add more concepts to the educational research literature and the literature surrounding TC.

Suggestions for Future Research

Nel Noddings and TC are cited frequently by scholars publishing in philosophy and educational research, particularly in the fields of moral education and philosophy education. In fact, according to Bergman (2004), due to ownership of the patent on TC, "Nel Noddings is arguably one of the premier philosophers of moral education in the English-speaking world today" (p. 149). This is understandable considering that the crux of the TC is the concerns of Noddings regarding moral thinking and how to improve it. However, as this dissertation project proves that the influence of TC has spread to several other fields of educational research, it is my belief that this dissertation may and will inspire future researchers to document the influence of TC in other fields of research and to study this particular relational theory in more detail.

One of these fields of educational research is multicultural education, as the findings and the themes indicate TC has an influence on the discussion of cultural teaching and the teaching of cultures. TC's influence on these themes may, in fact, be referring to multicultural education, which is a larger field of research. I imagine that multiple layers of issues referring to TC are present in multicultural education and these issues may be connected to other issues. One

researcher might study how TC is located within the larger body of the literature about multicultural education, and another researcher might be interested in exploring whether different perspectives employed in multicultural education are compliant with an educational system established upon TC. There is also the topic of investigating how a specific subculture may have been the basis of a care-based education model or how care-based education programs may be implemented to students when their teachers are informing/educating them about other cultures. I think these are interesting topics to investigate, and I believe that they certainly have the potential to contribute to the further development of research in multicultural education and culture through teaching.

Another possible suggestion for future research might be to investigate the contribution of Noddings's TC to teacher education. Considering that TC is a theory of education that addresses the improvement of student knowledge by employing several strategies of caring, and how these strategies might be developed to target the needs of a diverse student body, I think this theory needs to be deeply analyzed by both current and future teachers. One way to analyze this contribution is to implement a care-based teacher education course in a school of education and reflect on the experiences of both students and professor(s) interacting through this course. Ideally, the content of this course needs to be structured very carefully; and the professor(s) teaching this content should be able to integrate it into his/her classroom based on the strategies discussed in *Critical Lessons: What Our Schools Should Teach but Do Not* (Noddings, 2006). Certainly, the content of the course needs to be modified during the process, and the students taking this course will have to put a great amount of trust in their professor(s) before participating in this project.

This study employed a reflective and descriptive framework of understanding the influence of Noddings's TC in moral education and philosophy of education. Through this framework, how TC is connected to the academic discussions occurring in the fields of interest and how it has been influential over the discussion of issues related to education while undergoing slight modification by Noddings over time. The future researcher interested in understanding the changes present in Noddings's TC may analyze all the books and articles written solely by Noddings to see how TC has been modified over time not only by Noddings but also other scholars like Slote (1998, 2007).

This study was by analyzing the articles published solely in the English language since the journals selected for this study use this language. As mentioned in Chapter 1, Noddings's books have also been translated into other languages, and their influence has been present in other countries' literature about educational research. A future researcher who is fluent in one of these languages and interested in Noddings's TC, may analyze the influence of Noddings's TC in the literature of educational research specific to other countries using one or more of these languages.

There are peer-reviewed journals that publish articles that only discuss the problems and advancements of one major philosophical theory. *Utilitas* is the name of a journal that embraces this kind of framework in moral philosophy, and *Education and Culture*⁴⁷ embraces this same framework in educational research. The researcher interested in both Noddings's TC and John Dewey's educational theory and the philosophical framework shaping this theory may delve into

47. The *Education & Culture* journal publishes essays inspired by John Dewey's theory contributing to the academic research and the interests of him. According to the information posted on its website, Education & Culture is a peer-reviewed academic journal supported by John Dewey Society. Since 1935, the year it was founded, this society mainly focuses on the educational theory of John Dewey and supports the research concentrating and improving this theory. For more information regarding this journal see <http://docs.lib.purdue.edu/eandc/>. For more information about the John Dewey Society see <http://www.johndeweyociety.org/>.

the archives of this journal and bring both theories of education into a comprehensive and inspiring conversation. Noddings was a former president of the society publishing *Education and Culture*; therefore, the results of that research project might yield several interactions between these two frameworks.

As discussed earlier in Chapter 2, TC has had a major influence in other fields of research, including moral philosophy, feminist thinking, and moral and developmental psychology. I have connected TC to these fields; however, my connections were only brief. They may provide the necessary grounds for studying the influence of Noddings's TC in these fields employing either the theoretical framework I have used or a different one. Either way, I think it is necessary for researchers to study the influence of TC in these fields and encourage them to share their studies discussing the theoretical contributions and the practical implications of it in these fields.

Conclusion

Chapter 5 has presented the findings of this dissertation and how the findings/themes present in *JME* and *JPE* relate to Noddings's TC, its major components, and, in part, the changes these components and TC theory offer to educational research. Some of the themes analyzed in Chapter 3 may also be found in Chapter 4, as these themes both highlight the connection between the fields of moral education and philosophy of education and the fact that scholars have discussed TC under different names. These themes are the representations of the academic conversations in which TC has been influential and how authors publishing in these fields have received and used TC to participate in these conversations based on the journals selected for this study, which were limited to the pre-set time frame of 2003 to 2013, and the second and the third editions of the *Caring* book.

In this chapter, the reader can also find the limitations of this study detailing what decisions I made while I designed this research. These limitations do not diminish the significance of this study or change its findings, which discuss the influence and the contribution of TC to the ongoing conversations in moral education and philosophy of education and how scholars have used TC in their writings while they are structuring their arguments. I think it is important to report them, as they are relevant to the study and may help the future researcher to construct his/her project in an improved way.

Finally, one may find several suggestions for future research and work through his/her own study/project on Noddings's TC either by directly transferring these research suggestions to their own research projects or modifying their research projects based on these future research suggestions. In this last section of my dissertation, I have tried to offer various ideas about future research that might be beneficial to researcher(s) interested in the diverse areas of academic research. Finally, the future research suggestions provided here are not fully developed research projects; they are merely ideas that are worth (in my opinion) pursuing, as they may significantly contribute to educational research.

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